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ABSTRACT.
This thesis describes the development of legal adoption since 
1926 and latterly Its Increasingly significant role as an 
alternative disposal for children in the care of local 
authority Social Services Departments. In achieving such 
prominence as a function of statutory social work, it is 
proposed that legal adoption can now be regarded as part of 
the panoply of ideological domination. This development is but 
one of a number of modifications of practice taking place 
within statutory social work. Pressures for change are seen to 
originate outside of the profession for the most part.
To situate the study within the modern state, practice under 
the Poor Law after 1834 is reviewed. The developing legal 
position of children throughout the nineteenth century vis a 
vis their parents and the state, is also considered.
Detailed description and discussion of the official discourse 
of legal adoption comprises much of the thesis. This 
consideration is mainly of official government reports 
proposing legislation, and the legislation itself, together with 
analysis of legal interpretation and the role of the High Court 
in determining social work practice.
The development of statutory social work particularly with 
families and children since the second world war is outlined,
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with more detailed consideration given to what is 6een to be 
an increasing emphasis upon surveillance at the expense of 
assistance in relation to client families. The increasingly 
significant role of legal adoption within social work practice 
is seen to have been encouraged by recent inquiries into 
incidences of abuse of children "in care". Legal adoption should 
now be considered as only the most far reaching of several 
statutory social work procedures available in relation to 
children "in care", under the recently defined rubric "the 
permanence principle of social welfare". The local authority 
power to assume parental rights over children in its care is a 
second social work procedure which has also gained 
considerably in significance in recent years as an alternative 
means to "permanence".
It is concluded that the trend towards negotiable parenthood is 
a powerful symbolic and instrumental force for an altered 
statutory social work practice, congruent with the aims and 
attitudes of contemporary ideological domination.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
An unequal society which functions from day to day in an 
atmosphere suggestive of consensus rather than conflict must 
rely to a considerable extent upon the power of ideological 
domination. In an unequal society such as Britain during the 
latter part of the twentieth century, several significant groups 
can be seen to be more or less disadvantaged. Yet up to the mid 
nineteen eighties no really significant or co— ordinated 
opposition to the status quo has appeared. This situation, it is 
proposed throughout this study, is best explained as the 
achievement of the dominant ideology.
The hypothesis might be argued by considering the social 
situation of one or several groups within society, groups 
associated with class, employment, ethnicity, sex and gender, 
geographical location, age, etc., etc.. The study will in fact 
touch upon problems associated with several of these groups by 
considering the purpose and process of statutory social work. 
To move from generalisation to detail, it will be necessary to 
define particular processes and practices within the large
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area of operation covered by social work in the contemporary 
state. The specific practices to be concentrated upon will be 
those associated with modifying family composition. Modifying 
family composition is an inelegant phrase simply to describe 
legal adoption. However its use is intended to emphasise that 
legal adoption is not the only social work procedure available 
to modify family composition. The custodianship order introduced 
in the Children Act 1975, and implemented in 1985, must also 
be considered and the extended powers of local authorities to 
assume the parental rights over children in their care are also 
relevant. Thus, at the outset this study can be seen to have a 
dual perspective. An inquiry into trends in social work practice 
illustrates ideological influences on state procedures, while at 
the same time a consideration of the incidence of ideological 
domination provides a model for understanding social work 
practice as compromise.
Legal adoption is a recent practice, only being available in 
England and Vales since 1926. It did not come about through an 
intended development of state policy, so much as a result of 
the activities of pressure groups. Only reluctantly did the 
state come to include adoption within its main stream social 
policy directed at certain sections of the community. Such may 
well be typical of the process of social policy. However, the 
point here is that given the specific and relatively short 
period of time involved, the process of development from 
peripheral optional power to typical administrative policy can
- 11 -
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be clearly demonstrated. Demonstration is mainly by means of an 
analysis of the official discourse of adoption. This discourse 
comprises the official reports proposing reasons why there 
should be such legislation, and later official reports proposing 
reforms, together with the statutes themselves. The reason why 
official discourse is concentrated upon is that it is a prime 
site of the influence of the dominant ideology. It also aids the 
argument to concentrate on such an authoritative source to the 
exclusion of other no doubt interesting and fruitful sources, 
which must nevertheless be of more questionable authority. An 
apparent exception to the rule of selecting only official 
publications might be MA Child In Trust" (1985) considered in 
chapter 7. As a local authority report it might be seen as semi­
official. However, such an assessment would probably be wrong. 
The question of whether such inquiries and reports are funded 
centrally or locally is an administrative and procedural one and 
the topic is considered within the report itself. (A Child in 
Trust, 1985. p.3) notwithstanding the nature of its funding, the 
report is likely to be of significance to contemporary social 
work practice.
Of course legislation is Itself as a result of debate and 
manoeuvre but undoubtedly the final draft is as close as one 
might reasonably expect to get to identifying the official will. 
This is the more so if a series of legislative occasions are 
considered in terms of both their content and their relation to 
each other.
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Also considered within the ambit of official discourse are legal 
Judgements. Here the state has the opportunity to re-define or 
define further, legislative expressions. Thus legal judgements 
can intervene between statue and practice to ensure that 
practice is as the state requires. Legal judgement can be seen 
as a possible curb on the development of a professional
practice.
Legal adoption is unique as a disposal associated with destitute 
children in that orders are more or less permanent and 
irrevocable and of course they are highly significant. There are 
indeed few other acts which the state can authorise or instigate 
which are likely to be so significant in the life an individual.
The second chapter of this study considers methodology in 
relation to identifying within official discourse the dominant 
influence of ideology. However a brief note needs to be 
included within these opening remarks indicating the definition 
of the term ideology as used throughout this study. Ideology is 
associated with domination. It therefore has a political
dimension first and last. To be ideological, ideas and
attitudes must first become activated through the auspices of 
some purposive organisation, with the aim of domination. The 
obvious example concerns a ruling class which has achieved a 
level of acceptance by a population and whose rule is therefore 
seen as legitimate, sustained by normative acceptance rather 
than by force. This does not pre-suppose that a population does
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not recognise the power exercised over it by the ruling group 
or class, ieither is there a supposition that a population 
whole-heartedly supports such a regime. Conflict may well be a 
feature of any society, but ideologically contrived domination 
is usually resilient in the face of such pressures. The strength 
of ideology is its propensity to disguise itself as common 
sense, what everybody "knows" (Habermas, 1976).
Legitimation is the achievement of ideology. The exercise of 
power sustained by force cannot be perceived as legitimate. 
Legitimation could ideally be endowed upon a regime by all the 
knowing members of a society. However, the structure of modern 
societies is far removed from such utopian concepts as 
democracy, and in its absence ideological domination holds sway.
Contemporary statutory social work can be seen to date from the 
establishment of "the welfare state" during the period 1945- 
1950. This short period saw the final demise of the Poor Law 
and the setting up of a series of state organisations aimed at 
specifically dealing with the inevitable, albeit temporary
problems of a capitalist society. This at least, was how 
Beveridge described the problems in his Report of 1942 
(Beveridge. 1942). It will be proposed that the period of the 
late 1940s was a watershed, and though services instigated 
shortly after the Second World War addressed problems which 
had been wrestled with prior to the war, the concept of a 
"welfare state" was qualitatively different from what had gone
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before. This was nowhere more so than in the case of the 
welfare services set up under the National Assistance Act 1948 
to assist the elderly and the disabled, and to an even greater 
extent those services set up under the Children Act 1948. On the 
basis of social analysis and with the advantages of hindsight, 
it may now seem inevitable that the high hopes and fine ideals 
which inspired the authors of the Curtis Report <1946) and the 
legislators of the Children Act would no more be realised than 
would be the aims of the National Health Service Act 1946. (It 
will be recalled that it was proposed that a health service free 
at the point of use, would lead to declining demand consequent 
upon an increasingly healthy population. In the event, demand 
continued to increase.) The personal social services, as they 
came to be known, were separated from the income maintenance 
and employment services upon the break up of the Poor Law and 
upon the setting up of the welfare state. These services for the 
physically and mentally disabled, the elderly and families and 
children, were eventually staffed by a work force containing a 
new and specifically trained group who only had the merest 
relationship with any previous statutory professional group.
Inevitably considerations of professionalism and 
professionalisation will be considered within this study, but it 
will be seen that this is a peripheral issue. Thus any 
discussion of professionalisation which takes no account of the 
social context in which a profession develops ignores a 
determining factor in the rise or fall of that profession. It
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will be demonstrated that professionals, any professionals, have 
only a limited ability to develop their profession in terms of 
power, and are quite constrained within and by the state 
(Johnson, 1972). This is not say that professionals do not wield 
great influence, particularly as regards the well being of 
themselves and the fate of their clients/patients or what ever, 
within these absolute constraints (Dingwall and Lewis, 1983). 
And no doubt semi-professionals (Etzioni,1969) are only half as 
powerful as professionals.
An issue which arises in association with the consideration of 
the contemporary practice of legal adoption is the limits of 
professional influence. It will be demonstrated (see Chapter 7 
especially) that on the face of it there is a hierarchy of 
influence among the professions, and the lawyers, in this case 
the judges, are able to not only define the law, but also define 
good social work practice. This sort of judicial judgment is of 
a different order to that which applies where a specific 
practitioner is arraigned for alleged misconduct or heresy, a 
situation occurring in relation to the medical profession from 
time to time (e.g. see Savage, 1986). Judicial pronouncements 
relating to social work not infrequently specify good practice 
as an aside. Indeed there are instances where Judges have been 
specified in official reports as experts to be consulted on the 
day to day problems of bringing up children (see pp.136 and 141 
below). A salient conclusion of Chapter 7 is that judicial 
opinion is of greater significance than developed social worx
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practice where these two conflict. Given the overall argument of 
this study It will be argued Inter alia, that to suggest that 
this exercise of power can be explained simply as a 
demonstration of a hierarchy of professions is simplistic. More 
accurately it can be seen as an ideological operation, a 
modification by the state of the ideological state apparatus 
(Hirst,1979. Chapter 3). Such an analysis fundamentally
challenges descriptions of professions in functional and 
interest terms, and concepts associated with the attainment of 
full professionalisation (H.Vilensky, 1964). The object of the 
"true" professions, the church formerly, the law latterly to an 
increasing extent, and the army always, is the maintenance of 
authority. Other occupation groups associated with ideological 
domination, such as lecturers in higher education or social 
workers for instance, and other groups associated with the 
employment of force, the police particularly, are not required or 
permitted to attain the trusted status of the "true" professions. 
Medicine and the natural sciences generally occupy an important 
but peripheral position. Their ideological effects are as much 
to do with mystification as explanation. The relationship of 
natural science to the social world is a complicated one though 
Kuhn (1970) makes the point that even here the status of the 
professional is very much a negotiated one (see also Gilbert and 
Mulkay, 1984). Thus, the terms profession and professions are 
used throughout this study to refer to occupation groups 
referred to elsewhere as professions, semi-professions, aspiring 
professions and such (Friedson, 1983). In using the term
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generically to refer to status occupations, the assumption is 
made that profession is not a particularly significant concept 
and the suggestion that particular occupation groups might 
"develop" into "true" high status and pivotal professions such 
as the law, the church or the army, is based upon a
misconception.
It was noted above that contemporary statutory social work is 
distinct from "what went before." The distinction, it is 
proposed, is in the professional attitude, the aims of practice, 
rather than the client group. Much developing social work 
practice after 1950 was based upon the psychoanalytic model 
popularised in the United States of America. Client's
predicaments were seen to be mainly as a result of inadequate 
psycho-social development. Practice was primarily aimed at 
giving clients "insight" into the roots of their own behaviour 
(Hollis, 1964, Irvine, 1966). Vhile such practice can be seen 
to be controlling of clients, it does assume a client centred 
attitude quite distinct from that associated with Poor Law 
practice. In reviewing the recommendations of the Curtis Report 
(1946) Packman comments;
"The children 'in care' were in future to be treated as 
individuals and not as an undifferentiated category of 
youngsters; and they were to have access to the same range 
of facilities as any other children. In other words, their
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situation was at last to cease to be 'less eligible', In 
nineteenth century terminology." (Packman, 1975.p.l4>.
Xore recent social work theory and practice has tended to 
disregard the psychodynamic, in favour of a more practical and 
immediate approach, but a client centred attitude of assistance 
remains central to social workers' initial motivation (Reid and 
Epstein,1972. Wood, 1981). However, if social work in the welfare 
state can be described as distinct from "what went before" 
recent developments in the required practice of the profession 
might question any lingering hopes concerning progress as a 
positive concept beneficial to a client group.
The enduring problems of any class based industrialised state 
are the dispossessed and the destitute. They may be regarded as 
a reserve army, they might serve "pour encourager les autres", 
but the monolithic Poor Law of the nineteenth century and the 
welfare state apparent for some time during the second half of 
the twentieth century, are monuments to the state's concern. 
Obviously legitimacy could not be retained for long without some 
alleviative policy towards the victims of capitalism, an 
enterprise designed in part to extract a surplus from labour. In 
reviewing the operation of the "New" Poor Law,and what has 
occurred since the partial formation of a welfare state in the 
late 1940s, the conclusion that asserts itself increasingly is 
that it was the attempt to inaugurate a welfare state that was 
an aberration, not its recent undermining in response to general
19 -
Introduction..
economic decline. The service state rather than the welfare 
state would appear to be the norm. (Titmuss, 1974 p.26 referred 
to the Law and Order state. Cawson, 1982 p.106 referred to "the 
dual welfare state.")
A detailed consideration of the development of adoption 
legislation and the development of the processes of legal 
adoption since 1926 up to the 1980s illustrates the gradual 
subsumption of a practice, and so a profession, under a process 
of ideological domination. It is here that the issue of co­
option is apparent. Considerable collective activity was 
apparent on the part of social workers in the late 1960s at the 
time of, and subsequent to the publication of the Seebohm Report 
(1968). The formation of the Seebohm Implementation Action 
Group was the most notable expression of collective action by 
social workers, but also in being at that time and also with a 
brief albeit more general, for the promotion of social work was 
the Standing Conference of Organisations of Social Work 
(P.Hall.1976). Both these bodies comprised representatives of all 
the main groups of social workers. It is clear that the 
agitation for implementation of Seebohm and the creation of a 
unified social work department within each local authority, 
rather than the existing Children's, Welfare and Mental Health 
departments, was a desire for the increased status and power 
which the new and larger department would bring. Indeed the new 
Social Services Departments were second only to the Education 
Departments in terms of size within the local authorities and
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expansion during the early years of the departments up to the 
mid 1970s seemed to justify the aims of re-organisation in 
terms of an increased power base for statutory social work. 
Since then, a series of inquiries into social work practice with 
children "in careM who have died, has quite shaken the once 
burgeoning confidence of the profession. Between the reports of 
"The Inquiry into the Care and Supervision Provided in Relation 
to Maria Colwell" (Colwell Report, 1974) published in 1974, and 
"A Child in Trust" published in 1985, there have been over 
twenty such reports all more or less critical of aspects of 
social work practice. (Child Abuse, 1982 reviews eighteen such 
reports published between 1973 and 1981.) The desire for a high 
profile for the profession amongst social workers has now 
disappeared. (Parton,1985. Dingwall, et.al.,1983.pp.280-281.) 
Significance at the local and national level, and career grades 
for workers within departments, have not enabled social 
workers to maintain let alone develop the autonomy of their own 
profession. Priorities are set elsewhere and the directed 
priority for the qualified worker is usually the supervision of 
poor families with children (e.g. see the discussion in Dingwall, 
et.al.,1983.p.211)
The above trends within social work can be detected within the 
enabling legislation without which no local authority Social 
Services Department can function. For reasons associated with 
the finite time span and the significance of such decisions 
noted above, an analysis of adoption legislation and practice
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provides a clear example of these trends. The increasing 
significance of adoption to the practice of social work can be 
gauged from the fact that the most recent central government 
committee report on the practice as a whole resulted in the all 
embracing Children Act 1975. This Act specified major reforms 
of practice, and amended all of the other significant pieces of 
child care legislation operative at that time. Almost as an 
afterthought, the relevant sections of the act were extracted 
and collected to comprise the Adoption Act 1976, not yet 
implemented. In the meantime the operative law remains the 
Adoption Act 1958, though its authors may now have a difficult 
task in recognising the legislation as theirs.
To conclude this introduction, some relevant publications will 
be noted with the aim of situating this study within the 
literature seeking to describe and/or analyse aspects of the 
social world. The particular contribution of this study to the 
social science corpus lies in its development of social theory 
which avoids functionalism or subjectivity as theoretical 
pillars. The issue is touched upon here and expanded in the 
following chapter. To achieve the aim of analysing the 
development of adoption legislation and linking this with 
judicial interpretation, the impact of "child abuse inquiries", 
the recent development of statutory social work and its 
association with the dominant state ideology, aspects of
several disciplines must be considered. These fall under the
- 22 -
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general headings of social work, social policy, law and 
sociology. Before considering some publications analysing 
statutory social work, a description of the development of 
social work practice itself is necessary, together with 
descriptions of some contemporary influences upon it. There will 
then be a brief statement concerning sociological analysis and 
methodology which, as noted above, is described in more detail 
in the following chapter.
Literature on legal adoption takes the form of discussions of 
practice and proposals for reform for the most part, rather 
than theoretical investigation. These are either social work 
publications (e.g. Triseliotis, 1980, Tizard, 1977, Seglow et al, 
1972) or law publications (e.g. Cretney, 1985, Bromley & Lowe, 
1987, Hoggett, 1981). Here adoption practice will be subsumed 
within a more general consideration of social work practice. 
Since the successful challenge to the hegemony of psycho­
dynamic casework in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there have 
been several competing paradigms of social work practice. This 
study is not proposing any particular model as likely to be 
more effective than any other, but in as much as the 
implications of this study have a direct bearing upon practice, 
the debate within the profession as to social work methods must 
be considered. The immediate challenge to casework was made in 
terms of demystifying practice and entering into a partnership 
with clients. Task centred casework was popularly defined by 
Reid and Epstein (1972) in terms of specific and agreed
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contracts regularly reviewed, and with either party, worker or 
client having the power to terminate at any point. Immediate 
problems for statutory social work related to say, the 
agency's obligations in certain circumstances to enforce 
compliance with a court order, or the situation where a client 
may have lacked the capacity to enter into a contract. 
Nevertheless, the principle of a contract was seen to be 
congruent with the developing professional ethos and it has 
remained a consideration in many alternative methods of work 
such as crisis intervention (Clarke, 1971, O'Hagan, 1986) and 
family therapy, particularly in the popular "structural family 
therapy" version advocated by Kinuchin (19/4).
Such developments in social work theorising were the result of 
attempts to modify practice in the light of radical criticism. 
But these reforms left intact the traditional social work focus 
on the client as the person who was in some way problematic. 
Roberts and Nee (1970) demonstrated well this continuing focus 
on the individual, in their popular review of practice in the 
late 1960s. The main impact of the so called "unitary approach" 
of the mid 1970s was to offer an alternative social work 
perspective on clients. The two american publications Pincus 
and Minahan (1973) and Goldstein (1973) were the first to spell 
out the details of a unitary approach to social work practice. 
They emphasised the point that in addressing a problem 
specified by a client, a social worker was as likely to seek to 
change some aspect relating to another individual or
- 24
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organisation as he or she was likely to be attempting to alter 
the behaviour or self perception of the client. Furthermore, the 
worker needed to consider whether some other person in some 
other organisation might not be better positioned to accomplish 
the proposed change. Thus the social worker was regarded as an 
agent of change within powerful organisations and with access 
to other such organisations. Much of this description of 
"unitary" practice was set out in terms of systems theory, no 
doubt the american authors seeing this concept as appropriate 
when proposing organisational change.
At the same time a more overtly radical social work was being 
proposed in this country alongside the unitary approach, and the 
links between the two schools were not effectively made. Instead 
systems theory evoked the criticisms which Talcott Parsons had 
more Justifiably provoked for his systems assertions of a 
consensus society (Brake, 1982). The various schools of conflict 
theory within social work practice can of course be seen to 
have a strong case given that statutory social work can be 
defined as part of the "poverty industry" (see for instance 
Bailey and Lee, 1982, Corrigan and Leonard, 1978, Bailey and 
Brake, 1975). Structural poverty is at the same time and by 
definition endemic and loathsome. However, as Jones (1983) 
indicates, even if the case for a radicalised social work 
practice is well put, the contemporary political barriers to 
really significant developments in terms of somehow empowering 
the poor are formidable.
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Alongside the professional Issues noted above, there are 
significant state pressures working on statutory social work. 
The Barclay Report (1982) spelt out the requirement that social 
work agencies would in future be required to deal with demands 
upon them without having recourse to increased resources from 
the public purse. While there may well be an increasing 
contribution from the private sector, and the current dramatic 
increase in the provision of accommodation for old people from 
this sector is a case in point (CCETSV.1986), the social work 
task is to be in the direction of encouraging and supporting 
■community networks" to deal with problems, thus reducing the 
need for expensive residential accommodation. No doubt many 
applicants to the social services departments for residential 
accommodation of one sort or another would prefer to remain in 
their own homes. This emphasis on community social work, has 
encouraged innovative practice in the shape of respite care and 
boarding out schemes of several kinds (e.g. see BASW, 1985). Yet 
the scarcity of resources to implement the method of work are 
such as to ensure that community care is will not be seen as a 
positive development of service but rather another method of 
cutting public expenditure.
Another significant influence on contemporary social work is the 
continual negative criticism concerning its function in relation 
to "children at risk" (e.g. A Child in Trust, 1985, A Child in 
Mind, 1987) ). The vindictive nature of media criticisms
associated with issues of workers* "failure" to remove children
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from their families and workers* "failure" to enable children to 
remain with their families, might indicate that it is the 
profession as much as these specific actions that arouse such 
criticisms. Certainly other professions are not immune from 
similar occurrences in practice, but none attract similar 
criticism. Indeed deaths caused by negligence in the National 
Health Service have recently been responded to by a 
supplementary vote of funds rather than a public inquiry.
"Child abuse" inquiries play a notable role in determining 
social work practice to an extent. Such inquiries might be 
considered along side the critique of "great person" theories of 
history. Hill and Bramley (1986) consider the concept in 
relation to accounts of social policy formation. They consider 
whether the responses to poverty apparent in the actions of the 
Liberal administrations at the beginning of the century and the 
first Labour government were better explained by the activities 
of Charles Booth, Seebohm Rowntree, William Beveridge, Beatrice 
Webb, and Eleanor Rathbone, or for instance, the extension of 
the franchise to the working class. They go on to contrast such 
"great person" approaches with marxist approaches which allow 
no significant role at all for "leaders" and conclude that the 
former explanations relied far too heavily for their own 
credibility upon assumptions of societal consensus and state 
altruism. Hill and Bramley are considering the origins of the 
•welfare state" and pose two alternative marxist explanations of 
reforms as "...concessions wrung from the capitalists..." or
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"...successful use of the state by capitalists to preserve 
capitalism" (p. 30). Though either case would be simplistic if 
proposed as a complete explanation, there is no doubt that 
working class organisations at the turn of the century 
vigorously campaigned for the establishment of state income 
maintenance and welfare schemes. As to the state's variable 
response to proposed reforms, it is the case that while 
structural functionalist explanations of state sponsored social 
welfare as simply to head off revolution may be simplistic, a 
catalogue of long ignored pressures for the abolition of morally 
indefensible policies, policies associated with say, imperialism, 
the slave trade, a limited franchise and the subservience of 
women, do demonstrate that simply to highlight a social ill 
without being able to apply real pressure for change such as 
that which became available to the working class with 
enfranchisement, is unlikely to result in state recognition of 
the problem. It can be seen that social policy considerations 
based upon "great person" theory adds little to understanding. 
This being so immediately throws up a problem concerning the 
development of children legislation and the recent modification 
of adoption practice. For the equivalent of great person 
activity in this field of social welfare is reports of child 
abuse inquiries. Beveridge (1942) could well be seen to be Blom- 
Cooper (A Child in Trust, 1985, A Child in Mind, 1987 see also 
chapter 7 below) writ large.
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Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning (Stone, 1966) incapsulates 
In a phrase what must be a further area of study relating 
centrally to this thesis. Chapter 7 (below) inter alia reviews 
the activities of the Courts of Appeal In relation to aspects of 
adoption and children legislation. Here it is proposed that the 
activities of these courts is no less open to the effects of 
unspecified pressures than are the executive and legislative 
branches of the state. There is a rhetoric of legal precedent 
and rules to be observed if change is to be made, but as 
demonstrated below (e.g. p.221) custom and practice of the law 
is not fettered by such means. In discussing the operation of 
legal precedent Julius Stone (1964) quotes Judge Konstam who 
noted that "Ve have in England a deep distrust of logical 
reasoning...Fortunately our Judge-made law has seldom deviated 
into that path..." (p.230>. Stone goes on to note the views of 
the academic lawyer Eugene Erlich:
"Eugene Erlich expressed the view in 1913 that the English 
system of precedent is a supreme example of the "free- 
finding of law" by Judges. Professor Erlich concluded that 
English Judges had to a remarkable degree used this power 
to endow with the force of "legal propositions" the actual 
rules of behaviour which from time to time sprang from the 
inner orderings of English social groupings" (p.230).
Stone accepts that Erlich has a point but sees the achievement 
of the common law as laudable in spite of rules of precedent. If
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such rules were rigidly obeyed, the law would not be able to 
adjust to social change over time, except by modified statute. 
However, it is proposed that such developments over time are of 
a different order to the situation described below in relation 
to the operation of the Children Act 1948 (see p.p. 194-209 
below). Lloyd (1972), in considering the application of stated 
rules by the Judiciary when seeking to discover the meaning of 
a statute comments that "...although the books are full of 
instances where such rules have been ostensibly applied, they 
are very apt to dissolve away like chaff before the wind 
whenever the court feels at all strongly that another 
interpretation is to be preferred" (pp. 736-737). When seeking 
to understand the workings of the state as a significant entity 
within the social world, concepts such as altruism and moral 
rectitude have little role to play.
Much social analysis veers either towards the structural or the 
interactive. The former, it is argued, is over deterministic 
leaving little scope for freedom of action and assigning 
precious little understanding of his or her social situation to 
the individual. Much marxist analysis can be seen to be based 
upon economic determinism with the individual being granted 
little recognition for social understanding outside the realms 
of what is termed "false consciousness". Burton and Carlin 
(1979) accept Giddens' maxim that one cannot remain true to the 
spirit of Marx by staying true to the letter of Marx, but while 
eschewing economic determinism their analysis of official
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discourse in the form of official reports, retains the structural 
functionalist perspective. On the other hand, interactionist 
perspectives concentrate upon inter-subjective encounters to the 
near exclusion of the material world. The work of Harold 
Garfinkel (1967) has inspired revealing studies in the area of 
ethnomethodology but on its own it is proposed that the theory 
is limited. To define sociology as ethnomethodology is as 
limiting as to define social work as psycho-dynamic case work 
(see p.246-248 below). In a situation where the single most 
oppressive determinant experienced by social work clients is 
material deprivation, social work concentration upon individuals' 
early psycho-social development can be. seen to be missing the 
point, or at best not addressing the main problem. Something of 
this problem can be detected in two recent attempts to analyse 
aspects of social work in the area of “child abuse". They are 
the publications by Parton (1985) and Dingwall, Eekelaar and 
Murray (1983).
In The Politics of Child Abuse Parton (1985) sets out to 
describe and account for the "moral panic" currently associated 
with the incidence of children under the supervision of social 
workers being killed by their care-takers, most often their 
parents. He recounts the history of the phenomenon indentifying 
moral entrepreneurs in the shape of medical personnel anxious 
to stabilise and enhance their professional position by 
demonstrating their essential expertise in identifying incidents 
of abuse. Later and in conjunction with welfare agencies they
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extended their argument to Include an ability to indentlfy 
potentially abusing situations. Politicians for their own 
reasons encouraged the development of the "panic" which was 
eventually taken up by news media. Parton's main point is that 
there has been a conscious concentration upon the individual 
homicidal parent to the total exclusion of any consideration of 
the social situation of that parent. Thus the model used to 
explain the event is the medical model and the parent is 
portrayed as sick. This situation has been encouraged all along 
byi amongst others, one of the original moral entrepreneurs, Dr 
Henry Kempe (see Kempe and Heifer 1968, 1974, 1981), who 
continued to claim that "child abuse" was not related to any 
particular social class. Counter evidence is quoted identifying 
"child abuse" as clearly class related and also wide spread. The 
problem becomes one for social work in that the families 
supervised by social work a) are among the most stressed 
families in the society, and b) are the most observed and 
therefore the most likely to be identified as abusers. The 
■moral panic" produces winners and losers. The uses to 
professional groups has been noted. Agencies can also benefit 
from being seen as being able to provide an answer to what 
might otherwise be an intractable societal problem. Parton notes 
that the national Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children quickly became an agent of Kempe's Denver, U.S. based 
initiative, and went on to found a Battered Child Research Unit 
in England and name it Denver House (Parton, 1985,p.61). As can 
be noted from the above outline, Parton's argument is based upon
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theoretical constructs from the sociology of deviance with the 
aim of showing how such theories might influence social work 
practice, "...structural inequality has direct implications for 
the everyday experience, stress and hardship faced by many 
children and families" <p.l73>. Rather than seeking to 
understand social work Parton takes this as given and goes on 
to explain what social work's attitude should be to its major 
current preoccupation. As such he no doubt makes a convincing 
case but the implications for practice, based upon a structural 
functionalist model are most general and little more than an 
over-arching attitude within which practice occurs.
Dingwall et al considers much the same subject, social work and 
"child abuse", at much the same time, the early 1980s, in much 
the same place, England. The methods and conclusions are 
somewhat at variance with Parton's. In seeking to examine State 
Intervention and Family Life, the sub-title of The Protection of 
Children the authors "...chose to collect (their) data... 
primarily by direct observation, supplemented by the questioning 
of informants and by the scrutiny of documents produced by 
various agencies" (p.21>. The work was done in social work 
agencies and the book contains many long quotes from observed 
social work interviews and discussions with agency staff. The 
question being addressed is how is "child abuse" socially and 
professionally constructed and processed. While this question is 
similar to that posed by Parton, where Parton uses Hall et al 
(1978) and its marxist model to a considerable extent to
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understand "moral panics", Dingwall et al prefers Garfinkel 
(1967) and ethnomethodological constructs to understand "the 
child as a social object". The point is that the process of 
defining an incident of "child abuse" is far more complicated 
than it would appear in common sense. Though in recent years 
the medical profession has become more "alerted" to the 
possibilities of abuse, ’the experience of the researchers was 
that it was only with reluctance that such diagnoses were 
arrived at. Social workers also did not seek to identify such 
occasions while other explanations associated with say sub­
cultural child rearing practices could be seen to be sufficient 
explanation. Typically it required discussion and agreement 
between two or more agencies before the label "child abuse" was 
attached to a situation. Thus Dingwall et al investigates how 
all the persons concerned make sense of such situations.
Like Parton, Dingwall et al concludes the study with 
recommendations for a reformed practice. But whereas Parton's 
conclusions for practice are in a rather generalised form, 
Dingwall et al reads as if it is an official report addressing 
the minutiae of practice. The main concern is to assert that 
"...states must...reconcile two conflicting objectives: respect for 
family autonomy and effective surveillance of child rearing." In 
this context the Health Visitor is seen as a central figure 
because she has a general duty to visit all young babies and on 
a voluntary basis. Thus her presence cannot be seen as selective 
surveillance. In the light of Parton's general criticisms it is
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noteworthy that Dingwall et al quotes Henry Kempe as also 
specifying such a system and for the same egalitarian reasons. 
Generally Dingwall et al sees the medical profession and
hospital services as less effective than social services
departments in dealing with "child abuse". The main problem for 
social work is too much supervision and too great a 
concentration on this client group at the expense of other
services. A similar conclusion following similar direct 
observation of practice is reached by a more recent study 
(Corby, 1987).
Elsewhere in this thesis (chapter 7) the recent and highly 
critical inquiry report A Child in Trust (1985) is considered. 
Vithin the context of this discussion of the partial nature of 
theories and models, it is of interest to note that . the 
bibliography to the report omits any reference to Dingwall et al 
(1983). Certainly it is one of the most generally respected 
publications in the field of late and it assumed an
individualist stance to the subject similar to that taken by 
the inquiry report itself. Yet Parton (1985), with its
alternative theoretical stance and conclusions is included. It is 
unlikely that the authors of A Child in Trust were unaware of 
Dingwall et al. Yet it is surely even more unlikely that the 
publication was omitted because of its alternative assessment of 
the effectiveness of social work in the area of work with 
abused children? What ever might be the explanation of this 
apparent aberration, it must be noted that the findings of
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Dingwall et ai are based upon far more thorough research than 
that which the inquiry was able to undertake. The concern for 
social work must be that if the above argument related to "great 
person" history is accurate, reports advocating change made by 
significant persons require complementary pressure from more 
powerful sources if they are to be implemented. The corollary of 
this must be that for such reports to be used as triggers for 
government action they do not have to be well argued. They 
simply have to make a clearly understood, popular and well 
publicised proposition.
The point of this brief discussion of publications by Parton and 
Dingwall et al has been to contrast styles and findings of 
social science research, rather than provide any comprehensive 
account of the publications as a whole. Both make a significant 
contribution to the social science analysis and understanding of 
statutory social work and this thesis has benefited from the 
discussions in those publications. The employment of 
6tructur&tion theory here responds to the criticism that social 
research concentrates upon either the inter-subjective or the 
structural rather than seeing both as contributors to the 
construction of the social world. The next chapter discusses the 
methodology of this thesis and describes its use of 
structuration theory.
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Over the past forty years or so, statutory social work has 
become established in Britain. Prior to the setting up of the 
welfare state in the late 1940s, statutory activities relating 
to what are now designated the personal social services, were 
undertaken by the state alongside its involvement with income 
maintenance, health care and such. While the removal of 
responsibility for income maintenance meant that the the new 
personal social services would be very much the "Junior partner" 
in the welfare state enterprise, it also meant that these 
services were able to develop an ethos of service and 
partnership with their clients, free of the overwhelming demand 
by clients or claimants for basic subsistance. While the state 
always has the opportunity to inject an element of social 
control into the process of supplying a scarce resource, the 
social control element within the provision of a subsistance 
income in lieu of a wage is likely to dominate the relationship 
of claimant to the state as provider (Jordan, 1974). This 
separation of the provision of cash from the provision of other 
services was the chief factor in allowing the personal social 
services to begin to develop an ethic of service within a 
context of co-operation, albeit never entirely free of control 
and surveillance elements. The abolition of the workhouse and
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the Poor Law meant that children and old people In need of 
accommodation would be the responsibility of different local 
authority departments and would be accommodated in quite 
separate establishments. Thus an official attitude of providing 
minimally for the destitute poor was exchanged for one of 
providing specialised services to assist in overcoming social 
crises.
The basic proposition of this study is that while the above 
description of the personal social services as they applied to 
families and children, accurately described the intention at 
their founding in the late 1940s, the period since then has 
witnessed a steady retreat from that position. No doubt this 
has also been the case in relation to other such services not 
considered here. It should however be noted in passing that the 
case of the needy elderly, another sector of society of central 
concern to local authority social services departments, is not 
strictly comparable with that of poor families and children. 
Destitution of the elderly and so requirements for 
accommodation do not automatically also bring a “requirement" 
for elements of "re-socialisation" as is the case with destitute 
families and children. Considerations here relate to the 
practice of the former Children's Departments and latterly the 
local authority Social Services Departments in as much as they 
are concerned with families and children.
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A problem for this study is one of demonstrating that an 
official change of attitude towards statutory social work 
resulted in a modified social work practice. Official in this 
context relates to the state or segments of the state, both 
central and local. The attitude of the state is as demonstrated 
in legislation, government reports and court reports. Because 
legislation is the primary source, the situation described will 
be that applying to England and Vales in as much as it is 
distinct from the situation elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
In short what occurred was that statutory social work was 
created to deal with the marginal poor and marginal problems 
which tended to fall outside the concern of the central organs 
of the welfare state. Given this marginality, the social work 
profession was left free to develop an esoteric practice 
calculated to achieve high status for its practitioners. The 
growing economic stringency of the 1970s necessitated, amongst 
other things, cuts in public expenditure as an aid to 
maintaining profitability in the private sector of the economy. 
Such cuts, and an official attitude increasingly hostile towards 
welfare and the redistribution of resources, brought statutory 
social work into the main stream of state activity. As such it 
was required to adopt to a greater extent than previously, the 
dominant state ideology. The ideology fitted only approximately 
with accepted social work practice and so practice was required 
to reform. The process of adjustment continues.
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This analysis is based upon the application of structuration 
theory to the situation of social work practice. Giddens (1976, 
1977, 1984.) has developed the theory of structuration at length 
as a distinct alternative to functionalism in all its forms. Hot 
the least remarkable feature of Giddens' work is that what is 
being proposed is a grand sociological theory applicable to 
analysis of the social world, rather than a segment of it such 
as deviance or the law. Thus, though this study aims at a 
sociological analysis of law it is not a typical study within 
the ambit sociology of law. Rather, implications will be 
identified relating to professions, power and ideological
domination, concepts which embrace law but also address wider 
aspects of the social world.
While a basic tenet of structuration is that the social world is 
produced and continuously reproduced by knowing actors, this 
must be considered alongside the associated and limiting 
proposition that ideological domination is a highly significant 
determinant of "what every one knows". The power of the 
dominant ideology resides in its covert influence.
"...the study of ideology may be conceived as the 6tudy of 
ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain 
relationships of domination. Just as it cannot be assumed 
that dominant values or norms are shared by all members 
of a society, so too it would be misguided to approach a 
society on the assumption that its unity and stability
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were secured by a dominant 'Ideology'. For ideology 
operates not so much as a coherent system of statements 
Imposed on a population from above, but rather through a 
complex series of mechanisms whereby meaning is mobilised, 
in the discursive practices of everyday life, for the 
maintenance of relations of domination." (Thompson, 1984. 
pp.63-4).
As social work has become more central to the organisation and 
operation of the state, so it has become increasingly influenced 
by the dominant ideology in relation to the "welfare" of its 
clients. This has required a modified structure for practice, 
modified rules and aims. For instance, the concept "the welfare 
of the child'* has been 6aid to be central to legal and social 
work decisions since the nineteenth century, but practice in the 
name of the principle has varied considerably over time. This is 
not to imply that social workers and lawyers are particularly 
devious. The operation of ideology is covert and requires a 
level of sociological analysis to reveal it.
It is usual to propose levels of awareness of the social world 
or consciousness. Sumner (1979) quotes Marx; "all science would 
be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of 
things directly coincided", and comments, "If spontaneous 
consciousness could grasp everything on sight, scientific 
philosophy would be non-existent" (pp. 16-17). Sumner goes on to 
identify "spontaneous consciousness" and "philosophical
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consciousness" equating the former more with manual labour and 
the latter more with mental labour. In his conclusion Sumner 
equates such dual consciousness with dual observation modes. 
Thus for Sumner perception is coloured to the extent that 
subjects do not recognise "the grid or spectacles of particular 
ideologies, material forms with specific modes of appearance 
shaped by their presence within a social structure" <p.224>.
Though Sumner sets out the problematic nature of the social 
world, he fails to specify a method whereby the phenomenon 
might be described and investigated. A final quote from his 
study catches both his recognition of the problem and his 
difficulty in proposing a solution.
"The products of philosophical work are thus incredibly 
complex, reflecting 'professional* ideologies, the practical 
contexts of philosophical reflection, and the nature of 
observations analysed, the ideologies embodied in the 
analysed observations, and, above all, the social structure 
of the practice of philosophical reflection" (Sumner,1979.
p.228).
The problem is a general one for any social scientific enquiry, 
the problem of the vicious circle, or the hermeneutic. It is also 
the feature which makes social scientific inquiry distinct from 
natural scientific inquiry and has led to endless speculation 
concerning the possible discovery of laws governing the social
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world similar to those which can be specified governing the 
natural world. Giddens (1976, 1977, 1984) proposes that the task 
for the social scientist is best described as confronting the 
■double hermeneutic". The hermeneutic arises because the 
observer of the social world cannot achieved a privileged 
position from which to observe; there is no escaping the social 
world. Thus speculation is placed within the context of that 
being speculated upon. This does not of course, inhibit actors 
from endlessly speculating on their circumstances. The social 
scientist, contemplating this situation is thus seeking to 
theorise and analyse a situation already subjected to analysis, 
albeit "common sense". Hence the double hermeneutic.
In seeking to theorise the social world of contemporary 
statutory social work, the problem posed by the double 
hermeneutic is well illustrated. Social work as an aspect of 
the social world has been well analysed by the two professional 
groups most concerned, lawyers and social workers. The feature 
most apparent when subjecting this "world" to social scientific 
scrutiny is the covert power of the dominating ideology 
operating "...through a complex series of mechanisms whereby 
meaning is mobilised, in the discursive practices of everyday 
life, for the maintenance of relations of domination" (see 
'.above,pp. 18-19) The discursive practices of everyday life in 
social work entail operating the legislation in relation to the 
"problems" presented, and in the light of, amongst other factors, 
how courts have interpreted the legislative powers and duties.
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Chapters 5, 6, and 7 comprise a detailed account of such 
proposals for legislation, legislation, interpretation and 
practice, with the aim of illustrating ideologically influenced 
meaning which is believed to be "common sense", or at least 
informed "common sense". As an example, a Law Lord, considering 
an appeal to "the highest court in the land" based his decision 
on the assertion that "It would surely be shocking if the law 
does compel an authority to hand over a child in its care to a 
parent who is, for example, a violent alcoholic, likely to 
neglect, injure and do the child irreparable harm" (Salmon L.J. 
in Lewisham L.B.C. v Lewisham Juv.Ct. (1979) 2 VLR 524. see also 
Chapter 7 below). There may be a question as to the degree of 
rhetoric in the remark, but the reasoning nevertheless was 
central in the final decision, effectively changing the law and 
practice. The question arises, can an appeal to the court at the 
apex of the legal structure be justified on the basis of such a 
situation as described by Lord Salmon? Given the attention 
which social work and child abuse had received over the years, 
and particularly since the early 1970s, it is difficult to 
believe that the law and social work practice were as described 
by Lord Salmon above, and so required a large group of local 
authorities to combine to bring a test case to the House of 
Lords with the aim of having the court modify the law. That the 
aim of the appeal was to modify local authority powers is not 
disputed. That the reasons why this reform was perceived as 
necessary were those cited by Lord Salmon above is disputed. 
Lord Salmon's statement is best understood as influenced by the
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dominant Ideology and disguised as common sense. The Issue 
Is dealt with in some detail in Chapter 7.
Giddens' analysis of the social world in terms of his theory of 
"structuration" illuminates the theory and practice of statutory 
social work and offers convincing explanations of its 
contemporary quandries and double binds.
"The characteristic error of the philosophy of action is to 
treat the problem of 'production' only, thus not developing 
any concept of structural analysis at all: the limitations 
of structuralism and functionalism, on the other hand, is 
to regard 'reproduction* as a mechanical outcome, rather 
than an active constituting process, accomplished by, and 
consisting in, the doings of active subjects" (Giddens, 
1976.p.l21).
Structuration comprises the duality of structure, the rules and 
resources of the social world, continuously reproduced spatially 
and temporally by the social activity of actors. "The basic 
domain of the study of the social sciences, according to the 
theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the 
individual actor nor the existence of any form of societal 
totality, but social practice ordered across space and time" 
(Giddens,1984. p.2>. Thus, the often proposed determining power 
of institutions of the social world can be seen to be a 
misconception. Substructure and superstructure are only
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determining in as much as actors agree or enforce the 
determination. On the other hand, interaction seen as simply 
rule governed as between the actors concerned is liable to 
ignore absent actors' abilities to influence behaviour through 
their access to, and manipulation of a degree of power. The 
significance of this, for statutory social work in this instance, 
is considerable. On the one hand, the institutions of local and 
central government, together with the judiciary, are experienced 
as powerful institutions by both social workers and their 
clients, while the process of the social work interview can 
seem to be simply a "one to one" encounter, at least as far as 
the social worker is concerned. Structuration theory indicates 
that both cases are misapprehensions. A more accurate summary 
would be along the lines that the social worker brings to social 
work encounters the structural rules and resources of the 
profession. Clients bring their perceptions and understanding to 
the interaction and in the ensuing interaction the social world 
in continuously reproduced. This reproduction takes into 
account the factor of ideological domination though usually at a 
practical rather than a discursive level (see below). This is 
simply an Inevitable outcome of statutory social work's being 
moved to occupy a more central position within the activities 
of the state.
The three dimensions of structuration can be seen to be 
signification or meaning, legitimation and ideological 
domination. The operation of such concepts as constituents of
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the social world are covert, to be revealed by empirical 
investigation and analysis. However, this returns the argument 
to the problem of achieving a privileged position, a vantage 
point from which to view the social world. Extending the
concept of the double hermeneutic, Giddens (1984) describes 
three modes or levels of consciousness/unconsciousness, 
discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and
unconsciousness. The unconscious Giddens deals with at length, 
developing Habermas's ideas of Freudian explorations. Giddens 
does go to some length to distance his position from a strictly 
Freudian one, but nevertheless he uses the concept of the 
unconscious as a heuristic device central to his scheme. 
However, for the purposes of this study the discursive and
practical modes of consciousness only are relevant for the most
part. Discursive consciousness allows actors to explain their 
actions and beliefs. Structuration theory refers to
knowledgeable actors reproducing the social world through their 
routine mundane interactions. But the structure of
intersubjective occasions, social interactions of any type, is as 
a result of actor's practical consciousness. It is unlikely that 
actors will be able to give a coherent account of practical 
consciousness, which is more a product of socialisation than 
consideration. Practical consciousness has its origins in 
ethnocentricism, but it is here that the researcher will locate, 
amongst other influences, the influence of ideology, subverting 
what Habermas refers to as "ideal speech situations" 
(Thompson,1982.p.128. McCarthy, 1984. Chapter 4. esp.p.307.)
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A major problem for this study of the development of statutory 
social work and its relationship to the dominant ideology, is to 
avoid slipping into a trite functionalism. A crude functionalist 
explanation might be along the lines that the poor are a drain 
to capitalist profit and a threat to order. By developing a 
policy of transferring their children to conforming families two 
major goals will be achieved. Firstly there will be fewer in the 
poverty classes and secondly the reserve army will be 
disciplined at the same time as they are held up as a warning 
to any who would seek to Join them. Put in such bald terms only 
the most ardent supporter of a conspiracy theory would support 
such propositions. Yet at more subtle levels, social work has 
been consistently criticised on such functional grounds. Morris 
and Mclsaacs (1978) concentrate on the "failure" of the juvenile 
justice system, dominated by social welfare ideals as it is, to 
prevent crime or reform offenders. Indeed, they adopt arguments 
from labelling theory to support their contention that such 
intervention only contributes further to the problem. An 
alternative and rather hysterical critique by Brewer and Lait 
(1980) attacks social work as being ineffective at any level. 
Jones (1983) adopts a more interactionist and optimistic stance 
in applying marxist social theory to the situation of 
contemporary statutory social work. His optimism springs from 
an assumption that in raising the consciousness of workers they 
might thereby effect considerable . social change for their 
clients. On the contrary, one might argue that the growing 
significance of say the permanence principle to statutory social
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work (see pp. 122-124 below) indicates a distancing oi social 
worker and client.
Such critiques fail to provide an explanation of the totality of 
contemporary statutory social work. Rather, they suggest 
discrete areas of concern associated with personal liberty or 
universal surveillance while ignoring both alternative 
explanations and social work's own concern with such "problems". 
Donzelot puts it thus;
"Ve must cease asking, What is social work? Is it a blow 
to the brutality of centralised judicial sanctions, putting 
a stop to the latter through local interventions and the 
mildness of educative techniques, or is it rather the 
unchecked expansion of the apparatus of the state, which, 
under the guise of prevention, is extending its grip on 
citizens to include their private lives, marking minors who 
have not committed the least offense with the stigmatizing 
brand? Instead we should question social work regarding 
what it actually does, study the systems of its 
transformations in relation to the designations of its 
effective targets" (Donzelot, 1980.pp.98-99).
Structuration theory as here applied certainly addresses the 
question what is social work? without the pre-conceptions 
apparent within most functionalist explanations. Consider
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Glddens' diagramatlc form of the two alternative accounts of 
social process as explanation.
1) social activity-Hpurposive action->->unintended consequence
2) social activity-Hfunctional need-Mfunctional consequence 
(Giddens, 1984.p294.)
The functionalist model 2) above would seek to explain the 
recent extension of social work powers to compulsorily transfer 
children from families perceived as deviant as follows. The 
functional need for say increased powers within adoption 
legislation to dispense with parental consents to adopt, would 
be to further assist in the rescue of children. The functional 
consequence of thus identifying a pariah group unfit to care for 
their children would not only be "to encourage the others" but 
also to discipline the pariahs themselves. Model 1) produces a 
far more subtle and convincing account. Adoption is
commonsensically "a good thing" in certain circumstances. The 
situation of those orphaned through the carnage of the First 
World War might be proposed as a case in point (see chapter 5, 
below). The purposive action is "obviously" in terms of the 
"best interests of the child". The arrow representing the leap 
from "purposive action" to "unintended consequence" is vastly 
over simplified in that if the phenomenon is considered in 
temporal terms as here, the unintended consequence may be 
somewhat distanced. However, it does not do violence to the
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concept to suggest that In terms of legal adoption, it is as an 
unintended consequence rather than by functional design that 
statutory social work has undergone something of a change of 
image. In instigating this particular "purposive action" under 
the conditions of the particular hue of contemporary 
ideological domination, social work has come to be seen as 
centrally an agency of surveillance and supervision, rather than 
one of assistance and supervision.
To adapt the model to the purposes of this study,the concept 
"purposive action" would have to be more fully defined. As noted 
above, the dimensions of structuration can be seen to be 
signification, legitimation and domination. Signification or 
meaning is at the level of discursive consciousness, that is, at 
the level of actors' abilities to explain themselves. Thus, this 
is the level of consciousness which accepts the present 
situation as legitimate more or less. Legitimacy is the 
achievement of ideology. As such Habermas (1976, Chapter 7) 
attributes contemporary stresses in modern society to 
challenges to bourgeois ideology apparent in art, science, 
morality and maybe most significant, in the operation of 
capitalist markets themselves. Public perceptions of the 
problems posed by the operation of capitalist markets can be 
seen to be an increasing stress on those seeking to maintain 
the legitimacy of the state. Challenges of a different order can 
be seen to arise from modern concepts of race, sex and gender 
and their previously little questioned ability to determine
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social position. Thus, when discussing the concepts legitimacy 
and ideological domination, there is no assumption that these 
terms signify the absence of opposition and conflict. They are 
features of society in as much as societies, nation states or 
what ever, are seen to describe large social groups. The 
diagramatic representation "purposive action" then, will note 
that purposive action is still at the level of discursive 
consciousness and so prey to the distorting effects of a 
dominating ideology. With this proviso, it can be seen that 
diagramatic representation 1> offers explanation and suggestions 
for further inquiry, while 2) offers a crude, closed and 
simplistic statement.
To conclude this discussion of methodology which will inform 
this study, a note should be added concerning the purpose of the 
extended consideration of official discourse, particularly 
comprising chapters 5, 6, and 7. The point is that within the 
context of this discussion, these official pronouncements are at 
the level of discursive consciousness. To an extent this can be 
seen to account for the cumulative nature of legislation. The 
"social activity" is always managing the governance of the state 
and the "purposive action" in this case is associated with what 
are perceived to be "problem families". Thus, in as much as the 
problems are seen to be urgent of solution, and it will be noted 
that this is variable, the three groups, legislators and 
parliamentary draftsmen, "the good and the great", and from a 
slightly different standpoint the professionals concerned, bend
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their minds to the problem. Solutions are sought in the light of 
what is perceived as the success or otherwise of what went 
before, and in the light of any recent "moral panic" demanding 
that something must be done. A detailed consideration of such a 
discourse would therefore be expected to reveal a trend rather 
than a series of unconnected leaps, though the occasional leap 
responding to urgent considerations might also be expected. It 
will be seen that both situations are present within the 
discourses considered here. The more problematic aim is to 
bring out the hidden influence of the dominant ideology, 
inevitably present within official discourse.
Method.
Before proceeding to set the study within an historical context, 
methods used in compiling the information which makes up this 
thesis will be outlined.
While most studies will have roots in the personal interests of 
the researcher, in this case an initial recognition of the 
conflicts and propositions addressed here occurred while 
practicing social work. The originating interest was therefore 
to a certain extent an informed one though this is not to 
suggest that the analysis arrived at is in any way typical of a 
professional social work analysis as distinct from a social 
scientific one. Current involvement in the education and 
training of social workers has continued to provide useful 
access to the developments and concerns of social work.
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Much of the research time has been spent in libraries and the 
bibliographies indicate the range of publications consulted. A 
considerable amount of the empirical information comprising 
the work on the nineteenth century and the first part of the 
twentieth century (see particularly chapters 3, 4 and 5 below) 
came from publications of collected statutes and Parliamentary 
Papers. The collection of nineteenth century Parliamentary 
Papers at the British Library of Political and Economic Science 
was distinctive. The dry and dusty bindings well match the 
rather dry prose of many of the reports within these 
discoloured and crusty volumes. They are themselves a study in 
class attitudes, well illustrated by the horrified surprise and 
concern of the authors reporting evidence on the state of the 
poverty stricken street dwellers of London or the exploited 
factory workers of the north of England among others. An odd 
association of the condition and content of these volumes 
poignantly evokes the lost world of starched aprons in the 
workhouse and dead babies in the streets. (See for instance 
British Parliamentary Papers. (1871) Vol VII. Report of the 
Select Committee on the Protection of Infant Life). The other 
library of London University which was used particularly for 
its law reports was that at the Senate House. Hatfield 
Polytechnic's facility for accessing a vast computerised data 
base of law reports, Lexlc, was useful in tracking down leading 
cases. However, the only way to keep abreast of the current 
situation of case reporting in the area of children law is the
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study of Journals, The Times and latterly (since October, 1987) 
The Guardian, such is the legal activity in this area at present.
Two central government libraries have been of assistance in 
providing information, particularly statistical information. They 
are the library of the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS) and the library of the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys (OPCS), both situated in London. While much 
of the statistical information relating to practice prior to the 
1970s had to be compiled from several sources and many volumes 
(see Appendix A), the recently instituted five yearly reports 
to parliament by the Secretary of State on the operation of 
children legislation, which will be published by the DHSS, and 
periodic issues of the OPCS Monitor should prove to be sources 
of comprehensive and reliable information in this field.
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One Hundred Years of Struggle: Parents Children and Paupers, 
1830-1930.
Before considering in detail twentieth century adoption 
legislation, and associated official discourses, it is necessary 
to set this review within an historical and practical context. 
To this end this chapter will briefly consider the question of 
the rights of children and parents, and the plight of poor 
families under the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, the so 
called "New" Poor Law. Chapter 4 will then outline the major 
issues and concepts of twentieth century social work. These two 
chapters will thus provide a back drop for the more detailed 
discussions of chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Except for matters strictly economic and financial; matters 
concerning heredity and apprenticeship, the state offered little 
recognition of the status "child" before the early nineteenth 
century. Pinchbeck and Hewitt refer to children as being 
regarded as "little adults" (1973.p.348.) Given contemporary 
official concern for "children at risk", it is notable that "For 
parental cruelty of any kind the law provided no remedy until 
the nineteenth century." (Pinchbeck and Hewitt.1973.p.348.) In 
this chapter the official attitude to children seen to be in
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some way deprived will be reviewed, from the early nineteenth 
century onwards.
The developing official concern for children apparent over much 
of the last two hundred years can be considered within separate 
categories; employment, destitution, crime, education, health, the 
family, and such. Though this categorisation is convenient and 
some such will form the basis of considerations here, it must 
be emphasised that categorisation can be misleading. 
Simplistic analysis which might indicate that, say, reform of 
regulations relating to the hours per day that children might 
work in industry, was achieved by an altruistic moral 
entrepreneur's tireless efforts, regardless of the wider social 
context, is as inaccurate as its opposite, a rigid social 
determinism springing from whatever situation (Carson, 1974). 
The altering legal position of children apparent when such a 
historical review is undertaken, must be understood as a process 
which can itself be considered in part, but can also be 
considered as part of a context; at its widest as part of the 
construction of the social world. Simplistic analysis might also 
construe the concept "progress" as unproblematic. To avoid this 
one need only point to Mary Carpenter's use of the concepts 
"perishing" and "dangerous" in relation to the deprived children 
she studied in the mid nineteenth century (Carpenter.1851), and 
note that these self-same concepts re-appear over a hundred 
years later within the acrimonious debate concerning the 
Children and Young Persons Act, 1969 (see chapter 4 below),
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though the concepts were retitled the "deprived" and the 
"depraved" (Berlins and Vansell.1974.).
Parents and Children.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the rights of 
children were minimal indeed. They had some rights under the 
Poor Law in terms of basic subsistance but the vast majority of 
children, who of course never came within the ambit of the Poor 
Law, were seen by the courts as the property of their fathers. 
This was even to the exclusion of their mothers who in legal 
terms had hardly more status than their children. On the death 
of a father, a testimentary guardian might take over the rights 
of the father to the exclusion of the mother. Before the 
passing of the Custody of Infants Act in 1839 mothers had no 
rights to the custody of their children other than that assumed 
as wives of their husbands. Thus when the socialite Caroline 
Norton separated from her husband the Hon. Richard Norton 
around 1835, taking her three children with her, she discovered 
on his re-claiming them that she had no rights whatsoever to 
either custody or even access. Because of her social position 
the case drew more attention than would normally be the 
situation. It became a cause célèbre and the focus of agitation 
for reforming legislation which, as noted above, was eventually 
passed after overcoming considerable opposition, in 1839 
(Strachey, 1928.pp.33-40.) Because of a series of such scandals 
in the early nineteenth century (Pinchbeck and 
Hewitt,1973,pp.362-386.) there were prior to the Norton case,
- 5 8 -
One Hundred Years nf Strnggl».
efforts being made to reform the law so that mothers might be 
allowed some minimal rights of custody. A Bill allowing access 
for separated mothers was defeated in the Lords after passing 
the Commons in 1838. An alliance including that Bill's presenter 
Serjeant Talfourd and Mrs Norton, by now a highly successful 
pamphleteer in the cause, campaigned for the 1839 Act. In truth 
it was a most timid reform, allowing the High Court for the 
first time to make a custody order in favour of a mother. This 
was always provided that she had not been found to have 
committed adultery, and the order was only valid up to the time 
of the child obtaining the age of 6even years. Thereafter she 
could apply for access only. Even this minimal position was 
interpreted strictly by the courts to the usual disadvantage of 
the mother. The rule as stated by Turner V.-C in re Halliday 
(1853) 17 Jur.56. was that three factors had to be considered. 
They were the paternal right to custody, the marital duty and 
the interest of the child. The particular problem was "marital 
duty". "Marital duty...includes not only the duty which the 
husband and wife owe to each other, but the responsibility of 
each of them towards their children so to live that the children 
shall have the benefit of the joint care and affection of both 
father and mother" < Pettit,1957. p.59.). Given that the initial 
presumption was in favour of the father, these factors placed 
the wife, having left her husband consequent upon whatever 
provocation, under a further presumption of culpability. In 
commenting upon the case of De Manneville v. De Manneville 
(1804) 10 Ves, 52, Pettit notes that " the very fact that the
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mother was living separate from her husband was apparently 
regarded as being an argument against any claim that the mother 
might seek to 6et up against the father, since it was treated as 
raising a presumption that she was acting contrary to her duty" 
(Pettit,1957. pp.57-8).
Yet while these terms are only minimally in favour of the 
mother, it was the first occasion on which the absolute right 
of a father to his children had been challenged. Though the 
arguments against the legislation tended to be phrased as 
defences of the family and the rights of the children, it is 
clear that there was no legal concern for children separate 
from a perception of them as property of the father. It would 
appear that only in cases associated with the flouting of 
religious or sexual morality, would the courts intervene to 
the detriment of the father. Percy Bysshe Shelley was denied the 
custody of his children in 1817 because he had declared himself 
to be an atheist. In Ball v Ball (1827) 2 Sim. 35, the court, 
while expressing sympathy for the predicament of the mother, 
stated that it would not interfere with the rights of the father 
to the custody of his children even though the couple were 
divorced because of the adultery of the father, "...unless the 
father brings the child into contact with the woman" 
(Pettit,1957 p.57.). Mere brutality towards wife and children 
were no grounds for depriving a husband or father and Pinchbeck 
and Hewitt quote instances where lawyers complained of their
- 60 -
Png Hundred Years of Struggle.
lack of powers to constrain husbands and fathers whom they saw 
as having behaved reprehensibly.
Pettit (1957,p.64-67.) lists five instances in which the courts 
were persuaded to act to interfere with the custody rights of 
the father during the first half of the nineteenth century, but 
this is very much a case of the exceptions which proved the 
rule. The court with the prime responsibility for the protection 
of the rights of children was the Court of Chancery and that 
court would only act in the event of the child having some 
interest in property. Pettit quotes the Lord chancellor, Lord 
Eldon: "It is not, however, from any want of Jurisdiction that 
(the court) does not act, i.e. when there is no property, but 
from want of means to exercise its Jurisdiction, because the 
court cannot take on itself the maintenance of all the children 
of the Kingdom." (op.cit.p.67.). While this view seems to have 
prevailed up to the mid nineteenth century, Judicial decisions 
and statutes effected a reformed practice subsequently.
The Judicature Act of 1&73 stated that in matters related to 
custody and education of children, rules of Equity should 
prevail over a narrow definition of the court's powers and 
responsibilities towards children. In other words, the primary 
consideration should be the welfare of the child. The notion has 
a very contemporary ring, but on the other hand, it should also 
sound the warning that the phrase in itself has only relative 
effect. It all depends upon what is meant by the term "welfare
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of the child." T.E.James was referring to the developing status 
of adoption law when he remarked that "...til recently the 
welfare of the child has not been the primary concern of this 
change of status. Indeed, it is the novelty of this approach 
that gives the subject considerable interest and importance" 
(James, 1957 .p.46). This perceptive remark applies equally to 
developments in legislation in the late nineteenth century in 
relation to custody and access as between parents, noted below, 
and legislation relating to children deprived or neglected, acts 
such as the Infant Life Protection Acts of 1872 and 1897. In 
short, a primary concern for the welfare of children is a legal 
concept stretching back little more that one hundred years.
The Custody of Infants Act of 1839 was repealed by the Custody 
of Infants Act of 1873. This Act gave the mother a better
standing in custody cases. It empowered the courts to make 
access or custody orders in favour of mothers operative until 
the child obtained the age of sixteen years, rather than seven 
as previous. It also removed the ban on mothers who had
committed adultery from applying for rights in respect of their 
children. The series of legislative interventions culminating in 
the Children legislation of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, began in earnest in the second half on the nineteenth 
century. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 challenged
patriarchal rights by empowering courts to , inter alia, place 
children under the protection of the Chancery Court. The
Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of Children Act of 1889
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seriously challenged parental rights to do as they wished with 
their children. The Guardianship of Infants Act of 1886 can be 
seen as extending further the rights of mothers in that in the 
event of the father's death the mother became guardian of the 
children either alone or in conjunction with a testimentary 
guardian appointed by the father. Also the mother was 
empowered to apply for custody or access. However it was not 
until the Guardianship of Minors Act of 1925 that the mother 
could be said to be on an equal footing in law with the father. 
It was with that act that the welfare of the child became "first 
and paramount" when the courts were deciding as between the 
claims of the mother and the father. The rights of women and to 
a lesser extent children, were marginal but increasing concerns 
throughout, the nineteenth century.
The "lew" Poor Law.
While the point has been demonstrated that throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century legislation sought to balance to 
some extent the opposing claims of custody and access as 
between father and mother, a more significant claimant than 
either of them also became established at this time. For the 
first time the state took upon itself a central role in 
association with the new and developing legal concept "the 
welfare of the child." Of course the Poor Law was responsible 
for thousands of children at any one time. In 1849 about 6.5% of 
the population were identified as paupers and children accounted 
for nearly half of this total (Children under the Poor Law.
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1910). But the point is that these children were a reluctant 
responsibility of the state for most of the nineteenth century, 
to be returned to the protection of their parents at the first 
possible opportunity. This was as distinct from the role which 
the state, through new legislation was embarking on in the 
latter years of the century. As the state oppression of "less 
eligibility" comprising the workhouse test withered away, so the 
state's role in loco parentis in respect of parental incapacity 
blossomed.
notwithstanding the above discussion of legislative
developments, the central issue of social policy as regards poor 
children and their families throughout the nineteenth century 
was of course, the Poor Law. From 1834 onwards the so called 
"Hew" Poor Law was in operation.
A consideration of the monolithic Poor Law throws up identical 
issues to those which arise when considering more recent 
adoption legislation, as well as providing a useful platform 
from which to review the relationship of the state and poor 
children throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
This particularly relates to the state's varying attitudes over 
time, resulting in altered aims for the legislation, so 
illustrating the generally negotiable nature of legislation. 
Clearly the process of legal adoption in the latter part of the 
twentieth century is of far less significance to the state than 
was the process of relieving poverty in the nineteenth century.
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However, the theoretical proposition concerning the uses of 
legislation by the state applies equally. Perhaps this statement 
should be qualified. It is not proposed that the activities of 
the state in the nineteenth century, given the restricted 
franchise and the relatively primitive communications media to 
name but two significant factors, can be equated with the 
contemporary situation except in general terms. But it is 
proposed that the salient features of the activities of the 
state and its use of legislation are directly comparable. A 
second point is that to grasp the significance and situation of 
twentieth century adoption legislation one must see it in 
context, and one of the dimensions of that context is the 
historical one. Hence a consideration of the nineteenth century 
Poor Law.
The Poor Relief Act of 1601, popularly referred to as the Poor 
Law Act 1601, or "the 43rd of Elizabeth" (Fraser, 1973. ch.2) 
was seen to be in dire need of reform after over two hundred 
years. The reasons for this were associated with the industrial 
revolution, and a growing and increasingly urban population 
which was being slowly enfranchised. The problems which were 
perceived by the state and which were to be addressed by the 
Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 were an increasing public 
expenditure being demanded to relieve poverty, and the resultant 
pauperisation of a large section of society. From the
perspective of one hundred and fifty years later, these 
perceived problems and the proposed solutions have a very
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contemporary ring. Too much money was being spent on the 
unemployed. If this amount was reduced, would-be applicants 
would find themselves better off taking available but low paid 
employment. To ensure that this would be the case the situation 
of anyone being maintained at the public expense was to be 
reduced below that of the lowest paid worker. The situation of 
the unemployed dependent of the public purse was to be always 
“less eligible". Of course, there were no fixed rates of benefit 
payable at this time. Therefore it was not a matter of paying a 
reduced benefit or even trying to introduce some sort of sliding 
scale of benefit. The Speenhamland System, named after the 
Berkshire parish where it is said that in 1795 justices first 
subsidised low wages on a sliding scale determined by the price 
of bread, was thoroughly discredited by 1834. Indeed, such a 
policy of subsidy was seen to be primarily responsibly for the 
excessive demand upon local rates leading to the urgent need 
for reform as it presented itself at the time. The deterrent 
value of the policy of less eligibility was based upon the 
workhouse. Thus so called "out door relief" was to be abolished 
for all able-bodied persons,and the relief to be offered to 
applicants was accommodation for men, women, children, families, 
elderly, and handicapped in a segregated workhouse, where those 
who could would pick oakum or break stones. This much "everyone 
knew".
The basis of the workhouse was to be a strict discipline and it 
was this rather than overt punishment or privation which was to
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dissuade the poor from Joining the ranks of the inmates and so 
becoming official paupers. (See Foucault,1977, for a discussion 
of the concept of discipline in nineteenth century institutions 
of incarceration.) The Royal Commission on the Poor Law of 
1832, in its report states that as well as rendering the 
pauper's position irksome through required labour;
"the strict discipline of well regulated workhouses and in 
particular the restrictions to which the inmates are 
subject in respect of the use of acknowledged luxuries such 
as fermented liquors and tobacco, are intolerable to the 
indolent and disorderly, while to the aged and feeble, and 
other proper objects of relief, the regularity and 
discipline render the workhouse a place of comparative 
comfort." (quoted in Crowther, 1981.p.41).
The above statement represents in outline what Edwin Chadwick 
and his colleagues had in mind when they set up and began to 
administer the "New" Poor Law in 1834 . It certainly is in 
keeping with the spirit of the Act. Yet even the briefest review 
of the working of the Act throughout the remaining two thirds 
of the century and into the present century reveals that the 
way the Act was applied, the uses to which the Act was put and 
the way the Act was ignored, make such a statement so 
simplistic as to be almost meaningless. The problem of
applying such accounts to acts is that they invest an act with 
quite unrealistic powers of determinacy. Efforts to control the
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details of everyday life through legislation are always doomed 
to frustration in direct ratio to the detail specified.
The "New" Poor Law remained in almost recognisable form for 
about one hundred years, and was not finally and totally 
repealed until the National Assistance Act 1948 appeared on the 
statute book. Then again, it is not difficult to trace more 
recent legislation which bears considerable resemblance to the 
Act of 1834. During the nineteenth century, there were periods 
when “no out relief" was enforced to the letter, but only in 
some areas of the country. The segregated workhouse offering 
wards for the elderly, the handicapped, children etc, could often 
be identified, but alongside others where inmates freely 
associated. Further, there were parishes which had no workhouse 
at all, and long before the demise of the Poor Law, institutions 
were built to remove certain categories from the workhouse 
altogether. Throughout the period the Poor Law remained a 
monolithic symbol of state power though paradoxically it was 
always locally administered.
"The Royal Commission appointed (in 1832) to investigate 
• the Poor Law was faced with unravelling legislation of 
more than two centuries, local acts affecting parishes, and 
almost unfettered local discretion in administration, all 
of which made both the theory and the practice of the Poor 
Law very complex. The Commissioners, or rather, the 
dominant figures of Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick, were
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fortunate in possessing that ability characteristic of 
political economists of their day: to reduce the most 
disorderly social problems to their simplest essentials." 
(Crowther.l981.p.ll>
Significant structural change in the early nineteenth century 
was confronted by a quite unreformed local government Jealous 
of its powers and partial independence from the central 
government which was itself inadequate to administer the new 
society evolving. Roberts <1960,p.12-13.) notes that in 1846 
France’s Ministry of the Interior comprised in excess of 200,000 
employees while the British Home Office employed twenty nine 
officials. Local Government was still in the hands of the 
Justices of the Peace, local dignitaries, and municipal 
corporations. J.P.s administered the poor relief and were
therefore responsible for the development of the discredited 
Speenhamland System. The Royal Commissioners were unduly 
concerned with rural pauperism and gave little consideration to 
such increasingly significant factors as trade and economic 
cycles. The concept of the segregated and all embracing 
workhouse was the wrong answer, and the reason that the Royal 
Commission of 1832 came up with the wrong answer was that they 
addressed the wrong question <Crowther,1981. p.271.). Structural 
unemployment, then as now, was not to be cured by the deterrent 
policy of a totally discipline based workhouse. However, a basic 
premis of this study is that legislation is an end in itself and 
the uses to which a statute is put are quite negotiable in the
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hands of the state. Thus the operation of the "Hew" Poor Law 
was simply and continuously switched to accommodate state 
requirement as they were perceived.
The official version of events placed much responsibility for 
the perceived increasing problems of destitution on the 
operation of the relief system itself. "If, in the distribution 
of poor relief, the parish stands culpable of negligence and 
mismanagement, it is the J.P.s who gave indiscriminate relief 
most freely, and to the importunate more that the needy. The 
result was the growth of a large pauper class" (Roberts, 
1960.p.9). Though Roberts' analysis gives undue weight to the
significance of the actions of J.P.s as a contributory factor to 
the economic problems of the 1830s , his Judgement of the 
activities of the municipal corporations of the time is 
apposite.
“The mayors and aldermen of England were far oftener 
defenders of ancient abuse than pioneers in municipal 
government...typical were the indolent, do-nothing aldermen 
of Bristol, the corrupt burgesses of Berwick-upon-Tweed, 
the disreputable corporation at Leicester. They were 
narrow, Tory oligarchies that were not only undemocratic 
in an age agitating for democracy but administratively 
ineffective in an age of acute social 
problems." (Roberts,1960.p.10.)
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Though quite unable to cope with the social problems thrown up 
by the press of the urban and rapidly expanding population the 
administrators of the local centres of population vigorously 
resisted any moves towards centralisation. In the place of 
thorough going reform the history of nineteenth century 
adaptation to changing social circumstances is one of ad hoc 
reform often through the creation of specific and largely unco­
ordinated Boards to manage initiatives. The operation of the 
Poor Law itself, originally managed by a commission, reverted to 
management by Poor Law Board in 1847, to be superseded by the 
Local Government Board in 1871. Generally the thrust of the 
succeeding bodies administering the Poor Law throughout the 
nineteenth century was towards humanising its consequences for 
the sick and old. A consequence of this was that within fifty 
years of the introduction of the "New" Poor Law, something 
approaching a free health service had been established for the 
poorer classes. By the 1870s it was being publicly recognised 
that to subject the sick to Poor Law deterrence, even if they 
were poverty stricken, was inappropriate. Florence Nightingale 
saw no more logical connection between the infirmary and the 
workhouse than the infirmary and the railway station, and the 
Metropolitan Poor Act of 1867 placed London infirmaries under 
the auspices of the Metropolitan Asylums Board. This 
reorganisation of medical services in London enabled specialist 
hospitals to be built, and an ambulance service to be created, 
and is seen as "the starting point for an efficient state 
medical service" (Fraser, 1973.p.85). Official recognition of the
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separation of the infirmary from the workhouse and sickness 
from undeserving poverty, came with the Medical Relief 
(Disqualifications Removal) Act of 1885 restoring to the sick 
their franchise which was until that time automatically 
forfeited on claiming relief under the terms of the Poor Law, 
that is on achieving the status "pauper".
Pauper children were accommodated within the confines of the 
workhouse throughout the nineteenth century, albeit it in 
decreasing numbers. To some extent education was seen to be the 
key to unlock the potential of the pauper classes for 
independent living. Therefore it was accepted by the Poor Law 
Commissioners that pauper children should receive education. As 
this was to be in a segregated workhouse, it is proposed by 
Duke (1976.p.68.) that the expectation was that this would be in 
an establishment separate from the workhouse. In the event, very 
few fully segregated workhouses were built in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, and pauper children usually found 
themselves in small "schools" within the workhouse being taught 
by adults of very dubious educational attainment themselves. 
Efforts to combine workhouse schools' resources and found 
District Schools comprising one large school enjoying the 
advantages of scale were never universally successful. Some were 
established in the 1840s in large centres of population but the 
cost of building and running such establishments was always a 
central issue. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1844 allowed the 
establishment of school districts, but "...the new powers were so
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circumscribed as to be inoperable" (Duke,1976. p.71). The
District Schools Act of 1848 waived many of the regulations 
which had made the 1844 Act something of a dead letter, at 
least as far as the development of District Schools was 
concerned. For example, the regulation limiting the size of 
districts to fifteen miles across virtually ruled out such 
developments in rural areas where upwards of fifty per cent of 
the population still resided. The ad hoc nature of nineteenth 
century social policy is further illustrated by the fact that by 
the time the 1848 Act became operable administrative enthusiasm 
for the concept of these large schools was waning. There was 
also a move to encourage the children of paupers on "out door 
relief" to attend school and even make such attendance a 
condition of relief. However, such notions were always seen to 
contradict the maxim of "less eligibility" and those arguing its 
case were, of course, for preventing the formal education of 
such children. Pinchbeck and Hewitt quote from an inspector's 
report where he objects to the principle of setting up a 
voluntary "home" where girls might train in domestic skills.
"...mislead by a name (home) the children may be induced to 
consider them as really their homes, and contrasting the 
kindness and indulgence they receive there with the 
sterner realities of actual life, they will feel indisposed 
to retain service under smart mistresses when they know 
that they have these refuges to fall back upon... The 
'home', as I take it , of these young persons just entering
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upon life, is the wide world...and helps of all description 
only neutralise the incentives of prudence and
independence." (Pinchbeck and Hewitt.1973. p.515>
Despite the built in contradictions of the "New" Poor Law and 
the education of pauper children at a time when there was no 
statutory requirement for children generally to attend school, 
by the time of the 1670 Elementary Education Act the education 
of paupers was also becoming established. The Poor Law Board's 
twenty-third annual report noted that all the London Unions 
maintained an educational establishment separate from the 
workhouse as did "almost all the large urban authorities." 
<Duke,1976.p.74.)
With the establishment of universal elementary education in 
England and Vales, an increasing number of pauper children in 
the workhouse attended the local Board Schools and fewer 
attended workhouse schools. Up to 1870 the practice had been 
officially discouraged and only about 70 unions used local 
schools as distinct from workhouse schools. By 1896 only 63 
workhouse schools remained and the children of 493 unions 
attended local day schools (Duke,1976.p.82.).
During this latter part of the nineteenth century there was 
considerable development in the methods for accommodating 
children designated as paupers either because their families 
were being relieved "indoors" or because the children had been
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abandoned. Unsegregated workhouses and vast barrack schools 
were seen as providing a dubious moral upbringing for the 
children whom the authorities desired to educate out of 
pauperism and dependence on the state. Cottage homes and other 
systems where children could be accommodated in small units 
were becoming recognised as more suitable for the accommodation 
and influencing of children. Barnardo had pioneered the idea and 
unions began taking it up in the late 1870s. Also at this time 
about 10,000 children were boarded out though it was not until 
1889 that the Local Government Board formally recognised and 
attempted to regulate the practice.
Yet these reforms which none argued were not an improvement on 
alternative methods of accommodating children under the Poor 
Law, were bitterly resisted by the proponents of "less 
eligibility". Professor Henry Fawcett, M.P., husband and
supporter of the campaigner for women's rights Millicent Garrett 
Fawcett and colleague of J.S. Mill, published his “Pauperism: Its 
Causes and Remedies" in 1871. The book generally opposed the 
operation of the "Hew" Poor Law on the basis the it was
profligate of public funds in relieving the poor, and it also
included a damning indictment of the practice of boarding out 
of children. Yet Fawcett as with Dicey, who will be considered 
below, cannot be ignored as a backwoods man putting in an
occasional appearance to support the cause of the status quo.
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The boarding out of children subject to indoor relief was to be 
achieved in the early 1870s by the payment of an allowance of 
four shillings per week and the employment of worthy women to 
offer some minimal supervision. Fawcett agreed that the 
arrangements would be to the great benefit of the children when 
compared with the alternative of accommodation in workhouses or 
barrack schools. But the Poor Law Board order had "...simply 
been considered in relation to the effect it will have on the 
children who are boarded out, and not a moment’s attention has 
been given to any ulterior consequences" (Fawcett,1871.p.79.). He 
saw the practice as introducing far greater evils than those it 
would cure. He goes on to describe the idyllic situation of 
children boarded out "in healthy country homes" lovingly cared 
for by doting foster parents and provided with more than enough 
cash to ensure their education and any medical treatment which 
may be required. Fawcett pointed out that the children who were 
eligible to be thus boarded out were those children likely to to 
be brought up under the auspices of the Poor Law, abandoned 
and orphaned children, illegitimate children and the children of 
imprisoned parents. He then goes on to compare the boarding out 
allowances most favourably with the lot of children of "an
ordinary English labourer." The family described had, we are 
informed, brought up three children on the wage of a farm 
labourer and might now be asked to bring up three pauper 
children and paid an allowance separate from the labourer's wage 
to do so. Such a system would demoralise the honest hard 
working parent and "the whole country will in fact be told that
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parents, by deserting their children, will secure for them an 
amount of physical comfort and other advantages which probably 
could in no other way be procured" (Fawcett, 1871.p.80).
Argument and diatribe are intermingled as Fawcett complains 
that the labourer will be discouraged from insuring his life to 
provide for his orphaned children, immediately following the 
argument that the labourer earned hardly enough to feed his 
children. Yet the more serious outcome still of this ill advised 
scheme would be the encouragement to immorality and the 
consequent "expense of society to the children begotten in vice 
and prostitution." The situation is -compared with that of 
Scotland where "10 per cent of all births are illegitimate; in 
England the proportion is only 6 per cent., and in Ireland only 
3 per cent" (Fawcett, 1871.p.86.>. Fawcett had previously 
eulogised the operation of the Poor Law in Ireland pointing out 
that because of the rigourous application of no out door relief, 
it had less than half the number of paupers that London alone 
contained. This he saw as a great achievement, indeed the only 
gauge of what a desirable system of relief might be, even though 
he notes that the condition of the Irish was greatly aggravated 
by "a vicious system of land tenure and by many other adverse 
circumstances" (Fawcett,1871. p.27). The poor may be always with 
us, but provided they were kept out of sight and did not become 
a charge on the rates there was no need to concern oneself too 
much. Fawcett saw the answer as education and the inculcation 
of intelligence. Education would develop morality which would in
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turn temper the activities of trade unions, for the good of the 
country. He also noted that the reason why agricultural 
labourers did not combine was that they were too stupid!
Villiams (1981) also considers the operation of the Poor Law at 
this time, but within the context of the nineteenth century as a 
whole. The 1870s saw the the emergence of the Local Government 
Board as the controlling body of the Poor Law. The 1870s also 
saw the emergence of what has become known as the "crusade". 
The stated aim was to return to the spirit of 1834 and a strict 
interpretation of "less eligibility" and the workhouse test. Out 
door relief was seen as excessive by the state and in need of 
severe curtailment. The tightening up of procedures was to be 
achieved by Local Government Inspectors instructing Guardians 
as to their functions. Inspector Longley's report, "Outdoor 
Relief in the Metropolis" was published in the Third Annual 
Report of the Local Government Board for 1873-4, and it 
contains instructions as to how the distinction between the 
deserving and the undeserving poor was to be abolished in 
favour of virtually no outdoor relief whatsoever. Previously 
widows with children were seen as usually deserving and so not 
subject to the workhouse test, and many elderly people were 
similarly in receipt of outdoor relief. Longley's report now 
urged, in the case of the elderly for instance, no outdoor relief 
where the old people were seen to be "of bad character", "where 
they had made no provision for their future wants" when they 
had previously received sufficient wages, where liable relatives
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would not contribute to their maintenance or where their home 
was so squalid as to make home care impracticable. Such rules 
were to be published to educate the poor so that they might be 
quite clear as to what personal fault of theirs had brought 
them to the workhouse and so that they and their family might 
do better in future. Though Longley's system was never 
implemented the "crusade" against outdoor relief was fully 
implemented .
The Crusade.
OUTDOOR PAUPERS INDOOR PAUPERS.
Year 0000) per 1,000 C000) per 1,000
tot. population. tot. D O D u i a t i r m .
1871 834 37.5 140 6.2
1876 567 23.6 125 5.2
1893 505 ____ YLZ_____________ 169 5.7
(Williams,1981.p.102.)
Williams goes on to demonstrate that this decrease in overall
numbers being relieved was not at the relative expense of any 
group of paupers or any particular geographical location. The 
misery was evenly spread.
"If education of the poor did not work, repression of 
pauperism did work since, in a large number of unions 
after 1871, most classes of pauper found it increasingly 
difficult to obtain out-relief; in 1871. 3.8 per cent of the
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population drew out-relief and by 1893, only 1.7 per cent 
of the population drew out-relief... There were significant 
changes in out-relief practices after 1870, but these 
changes were of a more crude and coarser kind than those 
envisaged in the Longley Report; the crusade turned into a 
purge of the out-relief rolls. So, in relief practice, there 
was a large measure of continuity and development between 
the outdoor strategies before and after 1870. By the 1860s 
outdoor relief to able-bodied men had been virtually 
abolished; in the 1870s, outdoor relief to all other 
classes was substantially diminished. Under the new poor 
law, before 1870, the poor were repressed into assuming 
responsibility for unemployment and after 1870, the poor 
were increasingly repressed into assuming responsibility 
for the vicissitudes of the working-class life. In 
practice, the education of the poor, before or after 1870, 
was a matter of brutal dispauperisation." 
(Williams,1981.p.107.)
Several conclusions spring from this discussion. Firstly
Fawcett's book can now be seen to be an element in the "crusade" 
rather than, as he presents himself, a voice crying in the 
wilderness. The argument on boarding out is more of an aside to 
the overall argument of reducing all relief and educating and 
forcing the paupers of what ever category, deserving or 
undeserving, to live (or die if they must) independent of public 
funds. Another and central consideration for this study arises.
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At a time when the state was emphasising dispauperisation 
certainly at the expense of the pauper population, it was also 
expanding and "humanising" its care of pauper children. The 
inevitable conclusion is that the state was prepared to take 
responsibility for the children of the dispauperised as yet 
another price which the dispauperised were required to pay.
The trend away from accommodating pauper children in 
workhouses continued so that Pinchbeck and Hewitt <1973,p .540- 
541) are able to note that "between 31 March 1906 and 1 January 
1913 the number of children over three years of age being 
maintained in workhouses had dropped from 11,072 to 8,206, 
although the total number of children receiving indoor relief 
had risen from 56,991 to 70,676." The Poor Law Institutions 
Order of 1913 stipulated a maximum period of six weeks that a 
healthy child over the age of three years could remain in the 
workhouse. Pinchbeck and Hewitt comment that as a result of 
this order, "After many generations children had been released 
from the punitive aspects of English Poor Law policy." That may 
or may not be a consequence of the order. Preventing children 
from being accommodated in the workhouse did not prevent their 
parents from being so accommodated or as an alternative, being 
forced to abandon their children to the state. Thus, in many 
cases the separating of parents and children must have seemed 
at best a mixed blessing to the parents and a cause for total 
despair for the children.
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It is a truism to state that the institutions of the Poor Law 
were for the exclusive use of the poorest section of society. 
The full panoply of state organisation and power was brought to 
bear upon the already wretched of society. As well as being 
supplied with the minima of societies resources they were 
unfairly stigmatised and systematically and publicly disciplined 
as an example to anyone who might favour the idle life without 
having the material wealth to support such a life style. Thus 
all those who became a drain on the public purse were subject 
to the creed of "less eligibility" and stigmatisation. However, 
even amongst this grouping there were and no doubt remain to 
this day, sub-groupings of even less favoured persons. The able 
bodied un-employed were always seen to be the main problem for 
whose benefit the "Hew" Poor Law was largely conceived. Of this 
group the vagrant was seen as the traditional problem. The 
original 14th century Poor Law legislation addressed what was 
seen as the problem of the mobile labourer threatening to 
exploit a scarce labour market consequent upon the ravages of 
the Black Death. Subsequent Poor Law legislation and 
particularly the Act of Settlement of 1662 aimed at defeating 
the mobility of labour and ensuring that a parish would not 
have to support those who were seen to be the responsibility of 
another parish or group of rate payers. Yet while such statutes 
were no doubt effective as regards the mass of the population a 
small number of vagrants who could not easily be controlled by 
the Poor Law because of their habit of moving on, continually 
challenged the system. The Local Government Board's Annual
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Report of 1874 recommended that children of vagrants should be 
detained by the workhouses so that they might be educated and 
that their parents might be sent to cultivate the Yorkshire 
moors to pay the cost of their children's schooling! Duke notes 
that "the Vebbs were clearly disappointed that legal powers of 
guardianship allowed to the Poor Law authorities were not 
applied in their case." The other pariah group whose late 
twentieth century image has no doubt improved considerably as 
compared to the vagrant, is the un-married mother. Given their 
precarious financial position in the nineteenth century, the un­
married mother and her child were often to be found among the 
inmates of the workhouse. The First Report of the Ministry of 
Health (1920) shows the following position as at 1.1.1920.:
Relief of wives and Mothers,.
Out Relief______Indoor..Relief___7. Indoors.
Widows & Children 35,061 892 2.5
Deserted Wives 2,356 470 16.6
Separated Wives 1,306 451 25.6
Unmarried Mother 731 2,783 79.2
(Crowther,1981. p.100)
Crowther goes on to note that unmarried mothers;
"still suffered from a social stigma so powerful that the 
offer of outdoor relief could seem an invitation to 
immorality. Even deserted wives were under suspicion, at
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least In the first year of desertion: as In 1834 the 
central authority believed that outdoor relief would 
encourage collusion between husband and wife to defraud 
the ratepayers." (Crowther 1981,p.100.)
Deserted divorced and unmarried mothers remained a stigmatised 
group well into the twentieth century and even Beveridge felt 
unable to include them in his new insurance plan of 1942.
The "New" Poor Law thus presents a picture of a powerful 
instrument for the social control of a large poverty stricken 
working class. The Act was designed to achieve its aims through 
systems of harsh disciplines and powerful stigmatisation. The 
powerful stigmatisation was achieved through the agency of a 
dominant state ideology. By no means is it suggested that the 
state ideology justifying "less eligibility" was universally 
accepted or seen to be correct. The "New" Poor Law received a 
hostile reception especially in the industrial areas and in its 
ideal type always proved to be unworkable in such situations. 
Large scale unemployment in times of trade depression could not 
possibly be dealt with by applying the workhouse test. (For 
accounts of the reception given to the "New" Poor Law by the 
working class see for instance, Thompson, 1968, and
Roberts,1960.) Nevertheless, a universal and powerful stigma was 
attached to the label "pauper". The stigma was universal, even 
or particularly among the poverty stricken who recognised 
before most, the injustice of it all.
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The final repeal of the Poor Law was achieved with the 
implementation of the National Assistance Act 1948. However, by 
this time it had lost most of its significance. The Liberal 
Governments of 1906-14 introduced alternatives to many Poor Law 
functions. A compulsory scheme was introduced for health 
insurance and free medical treatment for many millions of 
workers. A lesser number of workers were able to insure against 
unemployment. A non-contributory pension scheme was available 
to those over seventy. School meals and school medical 
inspection was provided for children. These and other benefits 
became available outside of the Poor Law and free of its 
stigma. No doubt the extension of the franchise and the creation 
of a political party by the working class was a great 
encouragement to the liberal party to be seen at last to be 
taking seriously the demands of the poor. Even so, the liberal 
administrations in the first decade and a half of this century, 
arguably has the credit for beginning the momentum which 
resulted in the post 1945 welfare state. As Frazer (1973,p. 163.) 
notes, "(t)he work of continuing these developments was not 
performed by liberal hands, for the greatest of all Liberal 
Governments turned out to be the last."
Hay (1975) sees the liberal reforms of 1906-1914 as initiating 
a Social Service State rather than a Welfare State, providing 
minimal rather than optimal services. It is no doubt correct to 
point out that "welfare" can and to an extent does aid the 
maintenance of an oppressive industrial state, while only
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marginally redistributing wealth. Nevertheless the fact that 
many welfare benefits both in terms of cash and services were 
created as a result of working class agitation makes the 
argument for their denigration something of an elitist one.
The Great Var and subsequent mass structural unemployment 
meant that the Poor Law was never to re-gain its former 
significance as a determinant in the lives of the poor. It is 
therefore instructive to consider a circular, "Children Under the 
Poor Law", circulated to the Boards of Guardians by the Local 
Government Board dated 16th June, 1910. The circular was issued 
both to remind Guardians of their responsibilities, to ensure 
that they continued to "humanize" the Poor Law to some degree in 
relation to children in its care, and to inform them of the 
attitude of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law as stated in 
the majority report of 1909. The circular was in fact one of 
several inspired by the Commission's report, with the aim of 
modifying the image of the discipline workhouse in favour of 
the refuge workhouse, and these circulars were summarised in 
the Poor Law Institutions Order of 1913. From 1913 the title 
workhouse was officially changed to Poor Law Institution, and in 
future "paupers" were to be termed inmates of wards and 
patients of infirmaries. Vith representation came at least a 
degree of influence such that the wilder excesses of the 
dominating state were deemed worthy of reform.
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The most notable aspect of the circular "Children Under the Poor 
Law", is its bland assumption that all the children of all the 
families being relieved by the state because of poverty were by 
definition the direct responsibility of the state. From the 
perspective of the nineteen eighties it is as if there is no 
distinction between the state's responsibility for children "in 
care", and all the children living in families who are in receipt 
of state benefit possibly excluding Child Benefit Allowance. It 
is only when this fact is fully appreciated that the enormous 
significance of the insurance based and other allowances 
brought in by Asquith, Lloyd George and their colleagues at this 
time, as an alternative to the Poor Law," can be grasped.
After noting the proportional decrease in numbers of children 
in receipt of relief over the previous sixty years from forty 
one per cent of the total to twenty five per cent of those 
relieved, together with an absolute decrease in the extent of 
pauperism from 6.3 per cent to 2.7 percent of the total 
population, the circular immediately goes into detail of how the 
Guardians were required to improve their management of the 
supervision of children receiving out door relief. While noting 
that children living with their parents were primarily their 
responsibility, nevertheless it is pointed out the the guardians 
are "...bound to see that the relief is properly applied and 
that the child is not neglected." (Children Under the Poor Law. 
1910.p.l.) To this end it was suggested that Guardians might 
employ extra staff in the shape of women visitors or assistant
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Relieving Officers. At the same time it was also suggested that 
voluntary agencies might be enlisted in the supervision of such 
children, though the problems of supervising the supervisors 
was also recognised. As a matter of course Guardians should 
obtain copies of the newly instituted medical examinations "...of 
children who are in receipt of out-door relief." (op.cit. .p.2.) 
There was no recognition of any requirement, moral or otherwise, 
to obtain the permission or agreement of the parents, though 
the circular did indicate that Guardians could only obtain 
school reports with the agreement of the Education Authority. In 
similar vein, the circular went on to remind Guardians of their 
absolute right to remove sick children receiving out-door 
relief, on the recommendation of a medical officer. "In many 
instances it will be found that the child's best chance of 
recovery is in removal to the poor law infirmary" (op.cit. p.2.). 
Before going on to consider sections such as "Adoption of 
Children of unsatisfactory parents" or "Training Ships" or 
"Emigration" it is amply demonstrated in the circular that even 
in the comparatively enlightened twentieth century there was no 
letting up on the state's total domination of the poor. Any 
concessions were always and only achieved through struggle.
Widows with children were seen as presenting special 
difficulties. The practice of relieving the widow of the 
responsibility of some of her children so that she might the 
better care for those remaining with her should not be a 
blanket policy. Each case should be reviewed on its merits. The
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circular reports the Commissioners as stating that "...money is 
the least (sic) of a widow's many needs. If her independence is 
to be preserved and her family to be well started in the world, 
she must have encouragement to persevere, opportunities for self 
help, and openings for her children. Such a case should clearly 
be dealt with by voluntary aid, for voluntary aid is more 
sympathetic and more elastic than official assistance can be." 
(op.cit. p.2.)
The circular noted the powers of Guardians under the Poor Law 
Acts of 1889 and 1699 to assume control of pauper children if 
their parents were deemed to be unfit to have control of them. 
It was noted that this power of (.de facto) adoption was 
subject to appeal, "but so far as the board is aware such an 
appeal is but rarely made. The separation of the child from the 
unworthy parent should be strictly carried out, and, where ever 
possible, contributions by the parent to the maintenance of the 
child should be enforced" (op.cit.p.2-3.). The circular goes on to 
note that that the number of such "adopted" children in 1902 
was 7,724 and in 1908 12,417. The Commission were of the 
opinion that the power of adoption should be more widely used. 
Guardians were to be discouraged from relieving children living 
with relatives or friends rather than parents.
The order excluding children from the workhouse except for an 
initial and short period is clearly stated in the circular 
though its official date is seen as that of the summarising
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order of 1913 noted above (p.64.) Exceptions were those children 
in Poor Law infirmaries and such, where these still formed part 
of the workhouse, and babies under three months of age who were 
allowed to remain with their mothers in workhouse nurseries. 
The condition of some nurseries was cause for concern.
There then follows a review of the alternatives available for 
the accommodating of children subject to in-door relief. The 
Board, the "Central Authority" refrained from advocating one 
alternative as against another stating that all had their pros 
and cods and all could be demonstrated to achieve the main 
purpose, "...all the evidence available shows that children 
trained under each system are depauperised, and do as a matter 
of fact succeed in after life" (op.cit.p.4.). The subsequent 
paragraph reports the Royal Commission's more sanguine view 
that "children trained and educated under each of these systems 
do not relapse into pauperism In any appreciable numbers" 
(op.cit.p.4. emphasis added.) Vhile the circular goes to some 
length to avoid giving the impression that the cost of education 
and training should be the only consideration, there is no doubt 
that it is uppermost in the minds of the drafters of the 
document. However, it is also admitted that there would be 
occasions when particular children would require specific 
disposals distinct from the Guardian's usual preference. "For 
instance, some children should clearly be sent for special 
treatment in a certified institution, others should be boarded 
out in specially selected homes, while some boys will get their
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best chance from the ordered life of a training ship, or from 
the rough discipline of the fishing trade" (op.cit. p.4.>.
The Board and the Commission detected some reluctance to board 
out children especially outside the area of the relevant union. 
Boarding out was seen by the Board as often successful and 
involving no capital expenditure. However their note of caution 
continues as a finding in most research studies of boarding out 
to this day. "The experience of the Board shows that if the 
system is to succeed in rescuing the children from pauperism 
the fosterparents must be selected with the greatest care and 
the Committee must keep in very close touch with them." (e.g. 
Holman,1975. Adamson,1973. Stone and Stone, 1983.)
The Guardians were enjoined to give more serious consideration 
to placement of "poor law boys" on training ships, and 
emigration was seen to be "one of the surest means of 
extricating children from pauperism and the influence of evil 
surroundings." In placing children out in work situations "blind 
alley" Jobs were to be avoided, but as with training within the 
workhouse, the only occupation considered appropriate for girls 
was domestic service.
Finally, the Board and the Royal Commission were concerned at 
the paucity of After Care supervision available to those placed 
in work situations. It was noted that in the ten year period to 
1909 12,500 children were placed for employment in the
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Ketropolis from Poor Law schools while only 48 children were 
returned from the schools to the workhouses as unsuitable to be 
set to work. The Board and the Commission stated that from what 
records they had, it seemed that Poor Law care proved 
successful for the vast majority, yet their directive to 
Guardians to begin to keep records on children up to the age of 
eighteen years does not indicate that the assessments on the 
"success" of Poor Law care were based on full information.
Dominant state ideology was well expressed through the Poor 
Law. The concept of "less eligibility" was used as a policy of 
deterrence, and while Inspector Longley's proposition (see pp. 
78-79 above) of spelling out to the population how and which 
personal defects would cause someone to become a pauper was not 
taken up, the same effect was achieved by the stigmatising 
effect of the workhouse. The whole oppressive system was of 
course, of great significance to the whole working class. Anyone 
without wealth was at risk of falling under the rule of the Poor 
Law, and so its discipline acted upon the whole working class, 
not Just those who actually applied for relief.
As noted In chapter 2, the dominant ideology acts un-noticed; it 
is what "every one knows", the every day reality of life. The 
ideology that has to be imposed by apparent force has failed. 
Williams may assert that "after 1870 the poor were increasingly 
repressed into assuming responsibility for the other 
vicissitudes of a working class life (as well as unemployment)"
One Hundred Years of Struggle.
(Williams,1981.p.107), but "everyone knows" that paupers are idle 
and shiftless, and if you are so labelled, so you become. Not 
only are poor people and their consequent problems rather 
invisible, but even the institutions particularly catering for 
them are also. Hence the poor are not even seen to require law 
of a proper type. Lawyers notoriously avoid the law for the 
poor, though Bankowski and Mungham (1976) note that an
improvement in remuneration for, say, a duty solicitor scheme at 
a time of say a fall off in the demand for property 
conveyancing, can raise interest. This phenomenon of
invisibility is well illustrated in relation to the nineteenth 
century Poor Law. The law, as described above dominated the 
social reality of the poor, the poor comprising the vast 
majority of the working class. Indeed there was a voluntary
element in claiming relief though the whole process was made so 
unattractive that it is difficult to imagine applicants who had 
more than "Hobson's choice". As well as this the statutes 
contained and were associated with powers of a compulsory 
nature, powers associated with the incarceration of the insane 
and the "adoption" of children. These latter powers, though 
spoken of as adoptive powers were really the fore runners of 
the contemporary powers of local authorities to assume the
parental rights of children "in care". By the Poor Law Amendment 
Acts of 1889 and 1899 Boards of Guardians were given the
powers to assume the parental rights over children in their 
care (Heywood, 1965. p.93.). The Guardians can therefore be seen 
to have been Judge and Jury in their own court. Indeed, the
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parents who wished to object to this administrative action could 
appeal to the court. However, as was noted above (p.89) the 
Local Government circular on Children Under the Poor Law of 
1910, expressed the opinion that “an appeal is but rarely made" 
and "the Royal Commission were of the opinion that the power of 
adoption should be more widely used."
On the face of it it is difficult to understand how A.V.Dicey 
(1835-1922) could ignore the institution of the Poor Law, 
riddled as it was with discretion and non-judicial tribunals. 
His Introduction to the Law of the Constitution ran to ten 
editions from 1885 to 1959, Dicey preparing the first eight up 
to 1915. The booR was seen to be authoritative on the Law of 
the Constitution at the turn of the century though since his 
death Dicey's intellectual reputation has declined. In the Law of 
the Constitution, Dicey deals mainly with two topics,
parliamentary sovereignty and what he terms the rule of law. 
Dicey proposed that:
"(The rule of law) means, in the first place, the absolute 
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of 
arbitrariness, of perogative, or even of wide discretionary 
authority on the part of the government. Englishmen are 
ruled by the law, and by the law alone; a man may with us 
be punished for a breach of the law, but he can be 
punished for nothing else." (.Dicey, 1915.p. 198.)
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It is not the purpose here to review The Law of the 
Constitution. That has already been done by Dicey's biographer 
in some detail (Cosgrove,1980.). Rather the purpose is to briefly 
note some points of the argument as examples of received wisdom 
of the time. There is little doubt that one of the purposes of 
the book was to demonstrate the superiority of the common law 
system over the Civil Codes of many European countries. The 
last sentence of the above quote catches the flavour of his 
certitude. He particularly compared the English legal system 
with that of France, the Droit Administratif and boldly asserted 
that there was no such thing as administrative law in England. 
Unlike France, no English state bureaucrats were above the law 
and protected from the courts by legislation. Because everyone 
was equal before the law, there was no need for a Statute of 
Rights, indeed the very assertion by a state of its championing 
of the rights of subjects merely indicated the negotiable nature 
of those rights. Two points can be made indicating Dicey's 
blinkered vision. The idea the the average working man in the 
second half of the nineteenth century had recourse to the courts 
is even more nonsensical than would be such a proposition one 
hundred years later. As to there being no administrative in law 
in England, the Poor Law was only the greatest manifestation of 
the state's "arbitrary power" and "wide discretionary authority." 
But the main point is that Dicey was only arguing "what every 
one knew." The report of the Donoughmore Committee of 1932 on 
Minister's Powers <Cmd,4060) "cited Dicey favourably so often 
that Sir Cecil Carr remarked that the committee investigated
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whether Britain had gone off the Dicey standard in regard to 
administrative law and, if so, what was the quickest way to 
return" (Cosgrove,1980.p.97.). de Smith attributes the Lord Chief 
Justice's dismissal of the idea of administrative law in 1935 as 
"Continental jargon", to the legacy of Dicey (de Smith, 
1973 .p.525.) and Friedmann states that "it is no exaggeration 
to say that the views of this eminent jurist played a 
considerable part in delaying the growth, not of administration, 
but of administrative law in the common-law world, for several 
decades" (Friedmann, 1972.p.379.). It seems to be more likely the 
case that administrative law has long flourished but it suffers 
(or benefits) from the tendency to invisibility ever apparent 
from a societal perspective, when viewing the working class 
situation and particularly those in poverty. After all, Sir Henry 
Maitland, a contemporary of Dicey wrote in 1888, "If you take up 
a modern volume of the reports of the Queen's Bench Division, 
you will find that about half the cases reported have to do 
with rules of administrative law; I mean with such matter as 
local rating, the powers of local boards, the granting of 
licences for various trades and professions, the Public Health 
Acts, the Education Acts, and so forth" (Maitland,1908. p.505. & 
quoted in de Smith,1973. p.525.). Dicey makes only two and 
passing references to the Poor Law, while the "bastiles" 
flourished around him. And even one of those references 
(Dicey, 1915.p.lxx.) was omitted from his index!
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At the level of common sense, the degree of invisibility of 
poverty is notable. The Victorian era is better remembered for 
its supposed moral values, its imperial domination and its 
manufacturing capacity, than for its squalor and poverty. While 
the poor, the majority of the population, were coerced by the
prospect of supposed personal incompetence leading to
incarceration in the "bastiles" of the Poor Law, the
authoritative text on the law and the constitution was blind to 
such ideological domination. Poverty retains its invisible 
tendency, and while the "bastiles" have since been stormed, 
other and no less severe threats oppress the poor.
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The latter part of the nineteenth century can be seen as the 
time when the state began to recognise children as citizens or 
at least potential citizens, and began to create institutions to 
take that into account. At that time they amounted to little 
more than rules for allocating children between parents of a 
broken family and accommodation for children of the destitute. 
While there was also a growing concern for offending children 
they still languished in prisons and the hulks, and the more 
enlightened reformatories and borstals were only slowly 
becoming established (Pinchbeck and Hewitt,1973. esp. Chapter 
XVI). The twentieth century has seen considerable development in 
the accommodation and attempted reform of children, usually 
from the poorest sections of society, who come to the attention 
of "the welfare".
The main landmarks of state concern in the area of protection 
and reform of children are the principle Children and 
Children and Young Persons Acts which have been passed up to 
1975. The list comprises the Children Act 190Ô, the Children and 
Young Persons Act, 1933, the Children Act 1943, the Children and 
Young Persons Acts of 1963 and 1969, and the Children Act 1975. 
With the exception of the Children Act of 1975 which is
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considered in detail later, these acts will be briefly reviewed 
in this chapter. However, other factors can be seen to have 
influenced legislation during the twentieth century and must be 
noted. The social work profession has come to prominence during 
this time, and, as described in chapter six, that profession has 
wielded some influence upon legislation. At the same time, the 
social climate in which social work has been required to operate 
has itself influenced that practice, and this will be 
demonstrated by considering the changing prominence given to 
various social work principles. Possibly the Children and Young 
Persons Act, 1969 was the high point of the profession's 
influence and it may or may not be a coincidence that after 
opposing a powerful group with arguments which, (if narrowly) 
won the political arguments on that occasion, social worker's 
credibility has been severely undermined since. The present 
ideological position may be stated as; the juvenile courts and 
their magistrates have been proved right in their tussle for 
control over children subject to care orders of the court. This 
has been achieved through the agency of a whole series of 
public inquiries into the misfortunes of usually young children 
subject to care orders. Most of these children died. It is 
noteworthy that the widespread criticism of social work and 
social workers has effectively silenced the only group of 
workers in the state with a commitment towards the poor and 
the poorest, coupled with some first hand knowledge of their 
circumstances. This has been achieved not directly by the 
responsible ministry, but by "public opinion" forming news
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media, in their interpretation of the interpretations of the 
public inquiries as to "what happened". In his foreword to the 
recent review of eighteen published reports of the most serious 
child abuse cases (Child Abuse,1982.), the Secretary of State for 
Social Services commends the study to relevant agencies with 
the hope that it will "...help to make their work even more 
effective." The operation of scandal, apparent during the 
nineteenth century, can be seen to be very significant to the 
contemporary operation of the dominating ideology.
Twentieth Century Children Legislation.
The Children Act 1908 was unoriginally hailed as "the Children's 
Charter". It was in part a grand consolidating act "which 
repealed no fewer that 39 earlier measures" (Bruce, 1968.p.225.>, 
including the legislation on Child Life Protection and Cruelty 
to Children. Its most significant enactments related to the 
prosecution of children for offences. Late in the day, Juvenile 
courts were set up to hear cases involving children. The first 
Juvenile court had been set up in the U.S. in 1699 (Platt,1977>, 
but as early as 1875 Benjamin Vaugh had launched a vigorous 
attack upon the treatment of offending children in his "The Gaol 
Cradle - Who Rocks It?" proposing a separate system for dealing 
with them. Under the terms of the Act of 1908 children were 
hence forth, to be heard separate from accused adults and the 
juvenile courts were to be closed to the public not immediately
involved. Children under sixteen years were no longer to be sent
/
to prison and the act encouraged the setting up of remand homes
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to hold children, If necessary, before trial. The distinction 
between Industrial schools and reform schools was deliberately 
blurred with the aim of continuing the recent emphasis on 
treating more than punishing delinquent children. Parents of 
children appearing in court were required to attend, and the 
court was given expanded powers to fine parents for their 
children's misdemeanours. Heywood comments:
"The Children Act of 1908, was a great and fundamental 
step in child protection, not so much because it was new, 
or clarified any matters which were controversial, but 
because for the first time it gathered together into one 
statute a host of amending laws and piecemeal legislation 
which publicly emphasised the social rights of children." 
(Heywood.1965. p.108.)
The concept of "the social rights of children", blossoming into 
the full legal rights of children later in the century, is not as 
unproblematically "a good thing" as Heywood, amongst others, 
assumes. The point is that while all children are subject to 
Children legislation, it is overwhelmingly from one sector of 
the population that prosecuted children come; the working class, 
and predominantly the poorest sections of it. It is these 
parents and children who discover that rights to families are 
legally negotiable, and the position was to continue to develop 
throughout the first three quarters of the twentieth century. 
During the nineteenth century the Poor Law had hit upon the
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practice of separating what were then termed pauper children 
from their parents, almost by accident: the twentieth century 
state went on to develop the practice in some detail.
Ideological support for the practice of "care" in all its forms, 
is maintained by the few hard cases of serious physical abuse 
of small children by their caretakers. The reality is that in 
the nineteen eighties there are, at any one time up to 100,000 
children and young people “in care" (see Appendix A Table 4land 
the most significant factor they share is their poverty stricken 
homes. It is true that many families in equal poverty manage to 
maintain the family group in tact, but 'this no more justifies a 
blanket policy of “care" for the children of those who are seen 
to fail, than does the small number of cases coming from 
families not in dire poverty argue for abolition of all 
accommodation facilities maintained by the state for destitute 
children. There will be exceptions to any rule, and in the case 
of children there will always be some who become totally 
destitute and in need of state care; but up to 50,000 in any one 
year in late twentieth century England (see Appendix A, Table 
5)? It is only by regarding the separating of children from 
their families in the numbers which have been apparent since 
the inception of the practice in the mid nineteenth century, as 
a state practice of ideological domination, that the policy can 
be understood. "The social rights of children" do not 
necessarily include as a high priority of the state, the rights 
of some children to their poverty stricken families.
-1 0 2 -
Social Vork Principles and Ideological Domination.
The Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 really continued the 
direction of reform taken by the Act of 1908. The Act dealt 
with both the sinning and the sinned against child, and further 
attempted to see them both as victims of their circumstances 
and in need of treatment or assistance, rather than punishment. 
The age limit for consideration by the juvenile court was raised 
from sixteen to seventeen years and the offending young person 
seen to be in need of removal from home would in future be 
placed in an "Approved School". The distinction between the 
reform school and the industrial school had in practice been all 
but removed and the Act confirmed this by merging them into the 
group of schools approved by the' Home Office for the 
accommodation of children and young people sent there by the 
courts. As well as the offender in the juvenile court, the Act 
covered the ill used child who might be made the subject of a 
"fit person" order, the forerunner of the "care" order. Grounds 
for making such orders, as well as covering delinquency, cruelty 
and abandonment, covered the much more negotiable areas of 
"moral danger" "bad associations" or neglect "liable to cause 
unnecessary suffering or injury to health" <C & YP Act 1933. sec 
1.). While eulogising the act, Heywood does sound a note of 
caution. "It is interesting to see how firmly the concept of 
training by alteration of the environment had permeated the 
legislation of the time." (Heywood,1965.p.130.). Heywood goes on 
to criticise a lack of economic support for what was clearly a 
problem of poverty. But she fails to develop this aside when
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tracing the development of social work since the second world 
war.
The Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 followed shortly 
after the Local Government Act of 1929 which was itself another 
blow to the significance of the Poor Law. By this act the 
Boards of Guardians had been abolished and their powers passed 
to the local authorities' new Public Assistance Committees. Thus, 
children whose care was taken over by the state were becoming 
the responsibility of several authorities. A perennial problem 
associated with children "in care" relates to the different 
authorities with responsibilities for such children , and how 
their actions might be co-ordinated (see Child Abuse,1982, or A 
Child in Trust, 1985, for recent re-statements of the problem.). 
While the 1933 Act can be seen to have advanced the liberal 
attitude towards children "in care" by stating that "Courts 
shall have regard to the welfare of the child", the problem of 
divided responsibility was not addressed.
The role of scandal in the reform of welfare legislation, and 
particularly children legislation is a significant one. It may be 
argued that there is nothing more effective than public outrage 
to move so conservative and uncaring a body as the House of 
Commons. Alternatively, scandal can be seen as a situation prime 
for exploitation for the political opportunist. A third scenario 
has scandal as creating the situation for re-emphasising the 
state ideology as "common sense", and resultant action becomes
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"the right thing to do". No doubt there are elements of all 
three in most scandals leading to reformed legislation. They are 
apparent in post war scandals associated with children "in 
care".
In January, 1945, Dennis O'Neill died as a result of blows and 
chronic neglect. He was boarded out by the local authority in 
the area of another local authority. Dennis and his brother 
Terence had experienced successive foster homes since being 
removed from their parents for long term neglect. But it was , 
above all, the treatment Dennis suffered at the hands of his 
foster parents at Bank Farm, Minsterly, his last foster home, 
that caused his death. The government responded promptly to the 
coroner's Jury finding as to the cause of death and particularly 
its rider questioning the serious lack of supervision by the 
local authority, by setting up the Monckton inquiry (Monckton 
Report, 1945.). Yet before this committee had reported the 
government set up a more far reaching inquiry "to inquire into 
the existing methods of providing for children who from loss of 
parents or from any cause whatever are deprived of a normal 
home life with their own parents or relatives: and to consider 
what further measures should be taken to ensure that these 
children are brought up under conditions best calculated to 
compensate them for the lack of parental care." (Terms of 
reference of the Inter-departmental Care of Children 
Committee.[the Curtis Committee]). The Curtis Committee reported 
in September, 1945. (Curtis Report, 1946) This governmental
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activity on behalf of poor children was laudable. It might, 
however, have been more convincing if such unprecedented 
concern in response to an indignant "public opinion" had not 
arisen immediately before a general election. A similar 
situation arose in 1974, associated with the death of Maria 
Colwell (see p.2QQ below). The Curtis Committee report was a 
model of an account of thorough and conscientious investigation, 
compassion and concern. It was also painstaking in discovering 
and describing the confusion of interlocking responsibilities 
between departments for the welfare and supervision of children 
"in care". The committee recommended as a solution to the 
perceived problem, the appointment by. local authorities of a 
Children's Officer with appropriate staff to take over 
responsibility of ail children "in care". Children were best 
placed with families, with the best solution being adoption. 
Failing that children should be boarded out, and if, as a last 
resort, children had to be accommodated in local authority 
establishments, these should be modelled as far as possible on 
family homes. Certainly the spirit of "less eligibility", as it 
had applied to children "in care", was allowed no place in this 
compassionate and indignant report.
By the time that the committee reported, the post war labour 
government had been in office for one year and the spirit of 
reform of the report fitted well with a government legislating a 
small social revolution. The Children Act of 1946 might be 
described as the epitome of the liberal attitude to caring for
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the destitute children of poor people. Certainly Its attitude has 
not been approached before or since in the field of children 
legislation. However the tragedy of Dennis O ’Neill and his 
family was used by media and politicians, and however the 
judicial committee of the House of Lords "re-interpreted" the 
statute (see chapter 7.), the Children Act of 1948 can be seen 
as addressing the perceived problems with a degree of empathy 
and concern. It addressed the problem of multiple centres of 
responsibility by creating the local authority Children's 
Departments and it addressed the problem of supervision by 
granting the Secretary of State powers to makes regulations 
concerning the supervision of children boarded out. Of course, 
what neither the report or the Act did was to consider in any 
serious way whether there was a need for these children to be 
"in care" in the first place. That there was this general need 
for tens of thousands of children to be brought up "in care", 
was no more apparent than that some derivation of Parkinson's 
law was in action, providing children to occupy a given number 
of local authority vacancies.
The Act, on the demise of the Poor Law, made the local 
authority's Children's Departments responsible for accommodating 
and caring for children in need. It also laid on them a
responsibility to return the children to their families as soon 
as possible. Indeed, the Act goes to some length to specify the 
limited powers which section 1 of the Act gave to the local 
authority. Section 2 also passed on to the Children's
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Departments tie Poor Law power of assuming the parental rights 
over a child “in care” whose parents were seen as culpable or 
incapable (see chapter 7.).
The Children and Young Persons Act, 1963 is seen as the Act 
which remedied the defect in the 1948 Act (Packman, 1975. p.67), 
and allowed Children's Departments to undertake preventive work. 
They were enjoined to prevent the need to receive children into 
care where possible and if necessary they could give material 
aid to help achieve this aim. The Act was primarily concerned 
with the workings of the juvenile courts and delinquent children 
and like the report which preceded it -(Ingleby Report,1960), it 
was seen to be cautious. However, the report did open up a 
subject which remained a live issue throughout the sixties and 
is still the subject of lively debate. "Despite its shortcomings, 
the Ingleby Report did make some important observations which 
both reflected and amplified the debate on prevention. One was 
the link between child neglect and juvenile delinquency. (The 
Committee's terms of reference) assumed a connection between 
the two and Ingleby was the first of a whole series of reports 
and white papers in the 60s, which explored this connection." 
(Packman.1975.pp.64-5.).
Three of the "whole series of reports and white papers" will be 
noted in describing the development of this debate throughout 
the 60s. The debate eventually led to the Children and Young 
persons Act of 1969, the reform of the juvenile justice system
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which was side stepped by the Act of six years previous. The 
problem which exercised the Ingleby Committee, a perceived rise 
in juvenile crime, was by the mid 1960s seen as a crisis which 
had to be addressed. "By 1959, the proportion of indictable 
offenders under 17 years was 70 per cent greater than that in 
1938. By 1961 it was 107 per cent, in 1963, 125 per cent and in 
1965 133 per cent higher than the pre-war figure"
(Packman,1975.pp. 112-3.).
While in opposition, but no doubt anticipating office, the labour 
party had set up a committee under the Chairmanship of Lord 
Longford to consider crime, including juvenile crime, and on 
coming into office in 1964 the Labour Government published a 
white paper "The Child, the Family and the Young Offender" in 
August 1965. This white paper was based to a large extent on 
the Longford Committee's report, "Crime - a Challenge to us all" 
(Longford Report, 1964). The white paper's proposals were 
radical and similar to those for Scotland contained in the 
parallel Kilbrandon Report of 1964. In Scotland the Social Work 
(Scotland) Act of 1968 followed Kilbrandon closely.
"In England and Vales, however, this challenge to existing 
methods and institutions was too great and it was poorly 
argued. The white paper was a flimsy document compared 
with Kilbrandon - insubstantial considering the changes it 
was proposing" (Packman,1975.pp.115-6.).
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The white paper was proposing no less than the abolition of the 
juvenile court in favour of a system of family councils for the 
vast majority of children who had previously appeared before 
the court charged with offences. As with the Scottish model, 
only if the offence was denied or agreement could not be 
reached in the family council, would a court appearance be 
indicated. This was quite unacceptable to the English courts who 
argued the need for "due process" . The argument quite ignored 
the fact that about ninety per cent of juvenile offenders 
pleaded guilty and so the facts of the case were usually not in 
dispute. Arbitrary powers were also cited as unjustifiable; the 
family councils would comprise social workers and informed 
laymen, not necessarily lawyers. The decisions of such a body, 
based on the perceived need of the child rather than the 
offence, may well be seen to be unfair in suggesting fines, for 
instance, for the middle class boy, while his co-defendant from 
a deprived home may well be subject to some type of 
incarceration. Again such an argument might have been met with 
the observation that that was precisely what was already common 
practice. However, the point of the argument was that in a 
contest between the expertise of social workers and the 
expertise of the courts, the courts could not be seen to lose 
out.
Priestley, et. al. (1977) saw the proposed reorganisation of the 
juvenile court as part of a wider process of administrative 
rationalisation and centralisation in the public sector
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occurring throughout the 1960s, with the aim of preventing 
overlap and achieving economies of scale. Application of this 
process "...to the Juvenile Court and its cohorts of agencies 
was, however, thwarted by the inassimilable and autonomous 
powers of the police and the magistracy" (p.23). A second and 
compromise white paper, "Children in Trouble", was published in 
April, 1968. This white paper was enacted more or less as the 
Children and Young Persons Act, 1969.
While the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969 can be seen to 
be a compromise measure, it still comprised what were seen as 
radical reforms of the juvenile justice system. However, real 
compromise between the alternative positions of treatment and 
punishment, welfare and Justice, discretion and due process 
proved to be ephemeral. The new Tory government of 1970 refused 
to implement vital sections of the act and the moment of 
welfare influence died with the 60s. Yet something of the spirit 
of the act survived, so that this tiresome statute eventually 
demanded the amending attention of the radical right under the 
terms of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (McEwan,1983).
Before considering non-implementation and wrecking amendments, 
a note concerning what was achieved by the Act of 1969. . 
Firstly the Act substituted for the approved school order and 
the fit person order, the care order. The care order placed 
subjects in the care of the local authority, in effect the 
Children's Department. This was the limit of the court's powers
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in this area. What happened to the children after the making of 
the order was a matter for professional judgment and not for 
juvenile court perusal or review. The approved schools were 
disbanded and hence forth accommodation for children in care 
and not boarded out, was provided in community homes. Ex- 
approved schools became "community homes with education on the 
premises" and were brought within regional groupings of such 
resources, to be administered by regional committees comprising 
officers of several local authority Children's Departments. Thus 
the professional Child Care Officers under the direction of the 
professionally qualified Children's Officer can be seen to have 
taken over the responsibility for children "in care". It will be 
recalled that already, under the Children Act of 1948, children 
"in care" voluntarily and by agreement were already the 
responsibility of the Children's Departments. Almost the final 
act of the Labour government in 1970 before failing to win re- 
election that year, was the passing of the Local Authority 
Social Services Act 1970, setting up the Social Services 
Departments. These local authority departments were an amalgam 
of Children's Departments, Hental Health Departments, Welfare 
Services Departments and the Home Help Service, with
occasionally other services included. Because the Children's 
Departments had by far the larger number of qualified fieldwork 
staff the new departments were taken over by the Children's 
Departments to a considerable extent. This process was assisted 
by the emphasis on the workings of the new 1969 Act and the 
priority given to "child saving". The Secretary of State was
- 1 1 2 -
Social Work Principles and Ideological Domination
given similar powers of approval or otherwise in relation to 
the appointment of Directors of Social Services as had been the 
case with the appointment of Children's Officers under the 
Children Act of 1948.
The reformist influence of "The Child, the Family and the Young 
Offender" (see p.109) could still be detected in the Act of 1969, 
but with the coming of the new administration in 1970 opponents 
of the Act recognised a more favourable climate for maintaining 
the status quo. Under section 4 no child under the age of 
fourteen could be charged with an offence. Under section 5, 
young persons, up to the age of seventeen could not normally be 
charged with an offence. In the exceptional case where the 
police might feel it appropriate to prosecuxe, they were 
required to consult with the local authority before doing so, in 
every instance. Recourse to the courts would have been under 
the terms of section 1 of the Act, where an offence was one of 
several alternative conditions which might provide grounds for 
care proceedings. However, such care proceedings would only be 
embarked upon if, in addition to meeting one of the primary 
conditions, the social workers involved deemed that the child 
was "in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive 
unless the court makes an order..." (Sec 1 (2>. The effect of
these two sections would have been to remove most offending 
children and young people from the ambit of the juvenile court, 
and to curtail the powers of the police. The Conservative 
government which came to power in 1970 refused to implement
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sections 4 and 5 of the Act, and so any assessment of the 
effectiveness of the original proposition was rendered 
impossible. The social workers of the local authorities were 
made responsible for children coming into care, while being 
denied the associated influence over police decisions concerning 
the charging of offenders. In relation to the original 
proposition, the two powers were as one. By implementing the 
former but refusing the latter, the spirit of the act was quite 
defeated.
"As a charter for a new welfare dispensation, the Act was 
therefore, by the time of its due date, a pretty broken 
backed affair. The attempted coup against the criminal 
stigmatization of children had failed, and the new order, 
like the old, reflected deep divisions in both professional 
and secular opinion over the right approach to the 
problems of Juveniles."(Priestley et al.l977,p.l9.>.
While Priestley's conclusion is accurate, it must be emphasised 
that the result of the dispute over "the right approach to the 
problem of juveniles" which continued throughout the 60s, 
resulted in the status quo remaining more or less in tact. The 
reformers can be seen to have had some success in wresting 
responsibility for the "treatment" of children "in care", but the 
goal of near abolition of court procedures for offending 
children and young persons was lost in England and Vales. Nor 
were "the powers that be" content to allow this lesser victory.
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The partial implementation of the Children and Young Persons 
Act of 1969 heralded a vigorous and continuing offensive 
against the proposition that social work attitudes towards 
the poor should gain wide acceptance. At the same time a more 
covert influence on the profession from within the state sought 
to redefine social work goals. The success of the former has 
enabled that latter influence to gain in significance also.
That the basic aims of social work practice are modified from 
time to time is not of itself cause for comment. Any social 
institution must alter over time as the social situation alters. 
Such alterations are as inevitable with professions as with any 
other social construction. And as with any social change, its 
causes are several. Thus, to note a possible change in a related 
profession, any move from curative to preventive medicine would 
be as a result of a struggle between the professionals 
themselves, but mediated by "public opinion" and the attitude of 
the state. While these three sites of influence can be 
conceptualised separately, each is influenced by the other. 
Indeed, to a considerable extent "public opinion" is formed by 
the state, and if these two confront the professional attitude, 
obviously the professional attitude would have to bend. 
Of course, the experienced professional group ensures that it 
avoids a confrontation with the state by inhabiting "the 
corridors of power" while losing no opportunity to influence 
"public opinion". That the medical profession are valued if 
junior partners in the running of the state probably would not
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be disputed. The National Health Service Is the organisation 
with the most employees in Western Europe. An example of its 
ability to influence public opinion in favour of curative 
medicine might be the effort it makes to publicise expensive 
"spare parts" surgery at the apparent expense of preventive 
medicine. The hierarchy of medicine is often to be found in the 
Teaching Hospital but only very occasionally beside the leaden 
motorway or in the acid forest. While the state does not insist 
otherwise the profession is pleased to nurture its present 
position (Kennedy,1981>.
This section will conclude by considering how negotiable has 
been the basis of a central sector of statutory social work 
practice over the last forty years. This will be as a prelude to 
the more detailed consideration of the requirements of social 
work by the state in the following three chapters.
Principles of Child Care.
Since the implementation of the Children Act 1948, three 
distinct principles of social work with families and children 
have held sway at different times. They can be identified as 
"care", "prevention" and "permanence".
Care has been associated with state involvement with children 
since about the mid nineteenth century. Prior to that, the 
common law recognised seven years as the age of criminal 
responsibility, and between seven and fourteen years the
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prosecution was, by the doctrine of doll incapax, required to 
demonstrate an offender's appreciation of right and wrong, 
"Beyond that, the law made few concessions to children, either 
by way of procedure, or in sentencing practice. Children were 
liable to be imprisoned, transported or hanged impartially 
alongside their convicted elders" (Priestley et al.1977. p.l). The 
care children received in workhouses, schools and boarding out 
situations was variable in the extreme but the amount of 
legislation in the hundred years up to 1948 indicates a growing 
concern for children by the state. The 1948 Act laid upon the 
local authorities a duty to receive children into care if 
necessary for the child's well being, and the only ground which 
permitted the authority to retain that child in its care was 
that that course of action was demanded in the interests of the 
child. Stipulations concerning the accommodation of children in 
care, and duties to seek to return children to their own homes 
underlined the element of child centredness of the legislative 
attitude. This emphasis on care and concern for the child 
separated from its family soon found expression in a social 
work practice considering how children might be retained within 
their families during such crises as saw them received into 
care. The Boarding Out Eegulations 1955, issued as a consequence 
of the Act and defining specific minimum visiting requirements 
of local authorities to boarded out children, further 
demonstrated concern; not least concern to avoid the situation 
associated with the tragedy of Dennis O'Neill. The pressures 
consequent of such moral panics lend an increased urgency to
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local authority's efforts at protecting children boarded out (see 
pp.88-90 above).
Thus, as a further expression of the concern for children, 
coupled no doubt with Whitehall's recognition of "an even better 
and even cheaper way of caring for children" (Stroud,I960, 
pp.242-3.) "prevention" became a new basis for such social work. 
The concept was introduced in a joint circular to local 
authorities in 1950 (Joint Circular 1950.) However the basis was 
only really given legal sanction and material provision by the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (see section 1 of that 
act.). As with the concept "care" "prevention" can be seen as a 
humanitarian and compassionate principle for social work to 
adopt in relation to families and children. Yet, as with care, 
prevention also has its "unintended consequences". Jordan 
(1974) argued at length that it was naive of social workers to 
attempt to compensate for a rigid state income maintenance 
scheme by themselves underpinning the scheme with payments 
available under the "prevention of reception into care" powers 
of the local authorities. Though such activity was only a small 
part of the duties of local authority social workers, it is clear 
that the purposes of such payments were usually to do 
with supplementing state income maintenance payments in 
increasing amounts. Jackson and Valencia (1979) note that in the 
70s the greatest demand for "Section 1." money was in relation 
to fuel debts and temporary accommodation, though they do point 
out the difficulty of generalising in the face of huge
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variations in practice between local authorities. Vhat is clear, 
is that financial aid given under section 1 of the 1963 Act has 
been considerable. The Social Security Act, 1986 envisages a 
developing role for social work in this field of income 
maintenance. A significant role is suggested for them in the 
administration of the proposed Family Fund. (Social Work Today. 
27.9.1986.)
Financial Assistance— CHysn— under__Sec.l. C.&Y.P. Act 1963.
(England)
Year._____________________ Amount, U ),
1966 66,600
1968 188,800
1970 377,000
1972 652,000
Source: Adapted from tables in Jackson & Valencia,1979.
Thus, the above two reforms of practice as a direct result of 
legislation can be seen to produce effects both supportive of 
and contrary to a humanistic as distinct from a bureaucratic 
social work practice. The positive aspects of “care" can be 
ranged against the difficulties of questioning the whole 
organisation of removing children from their homes for social 
reasons. The obvious advantages of "prevention“, taking steps to 
prevent the need to receive or take a child into public care 
become more questionable when such assistance becomes an 
alternative form of income maintenance. If social work becomes 
involved with the routine income maintenance of the poor and
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very poor, the issue will dominate any other social work 
function. The bureaucratic rationing of money will negate any 
other role for statutory social work.
If there are such negative “unintended consequences" of the 
principles "care" and "prevention", the consequences of the third 
principle, "permanence" would appear to be more clear. Again 
the argument for a basic principle of permanence can be seen in 
part to spring from a professional concern for the problem of 
clients but the "unintended consequences" could be such as to 
alienate potential clients of social work to a greater extent 
than was the case hitherto. "Permanence" relates to the child's 
need for a permanent relationship with a reliable and loving 
carer or carers, usually the parents. John Bowlby (1952,1953) 
did most to popularise the idea at a time when social work was 
establishing itself . Though there have been vigorous debates 
within social work since, particularly related to the sexist and 
blood tie implications of Bowlby's findings, the basic idea of 
the benefits of a dependable carer or carers have never been 
seriously contested amongst either professional or lay opinion. 
(For a discussion of the subject see Tizard, 1977. Clarke & 
Clarke, 1976. Rutter, 1981.) If multiple carers for infants pose 
serious questions as to their future development and mental 
health, the implications for children in care are obvious. 
Further, studies by Trasler (1960) and Parker (1966) and more 
recently by Packman et. al (1986) Millham et. al. (1986) and 
Rowe, et. al. (1984),continue to point up the short comings and
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disadvantages of boarding out and life in care. Of course such 
information is not new, and in part accounts for the reasons 
why Curtis and the Children Act 1948 placed such emphasis on 
returning children to the their families as soon as possible. 
Such arguments also indicate why social work placed such 
emphasis upon prevention. "Permanence" addresses the question by 
turning the situation on its head. If multiple carers and 
multiple admissions to care are detrimental to children, then 
deal with the problem by placing children permanently with 
substitute carers who are reliable, loving, etc. etc.. Within one 
hundred and fifty years, the state's attitude towards children 
has altered from one of hardly recognising their existence to 
recognising them as individuals and if need be, quite separate 
from their parents and family. On the face of it, this 
development in the perceptive powers of the state is to be 
applauded. However, the increasing negotiability of parenthood 
might raise questions concerning such decisions. When it is 
realised that this negotiability only really relates to the 
poorest sector of society the practice becomes much more 
questionable. This new "realism" was being demanded of "woolly" 
social workers by the state and "public opinion".
Maria Colwell was seven years old when she was killed by her 
step-father early in 1973. At the time she was under the 
supervision of the Social Services department having previously 
been the subject of a care order. The scandal which followed 
centred upon the role of the social workers concerned and their
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failure to protect Maria (Colwell Report.1975). Tie tragedy of 
Maria Colwell proved to be a water shed in the development of 
social work. Given its proximity to the implementation of the 
Children and Young Persons Act of 1969, and the continuing 
series of trials by public enquiry to which the profession has 
been subject since, it is arguable that if the Maria Colwell 
episode had not happened it would have to have been invented.
The new realism of the “radical right" has pervaded the social 
world of the eighties, but there were many such ideas apparent 
in the seventies seeding to emphasise the authoritarian aspect 
of social work. This aspect of social -work has a long history 
and certainly flourished in the Charity Organisations Society of 
the late nineteenth and twentieth century (e.g. see Young,
1976.). But it is proposed that the recent history of the 
development of statutory social work is marked by an emphasis 
on the more humanitarian aspect of practice throughout the 
1960s. "Permanence" can be seen to represent something of a 
reaction to the liberal challenge of the 60s. Rowe and Lambert 
(1973) proposed, on the basis of a small sample that many 
children languished in child care institutions with little 
prospect of returning home. Good practice required that such 
children should be placed on a permanent basis with substitute 
families. Goldstein Freud and Solnit (1973) drew on 
psychoanalytic theory to argue that the small child's perception 
of time cannot be compared with that of an adult. Thus " all 
child placements, except where specifically designed for brief
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temporary care, shall be as permanent as the placement of a 
newborn with Its biological parents." (Goldstein et al. 
1973.p.35.)
A recent publication based upon the authors' D.H.S.S. funded 
study of this recent development within local authority child 
care provision recounts a small scale study of children placed 
for permanence and whole-heartedly endorses the principle and 
practice. Occasional cautions associated with natural parental 
rights or the wishes of some of the children concerned, are 
ultimately ignored in favour of enthusiastic support. The study 
proposes that the enthusiasm for ' the idea of permanent 
placements developed from a recognition that no child was 
"unadoptable". Such a concept fitted well with a commitment to 
early bonding, a need to close expensive children's Homes and a 
willingness to ignore the wishes of natural parents in favour of 
popular definitions of "the best interests of the child". 
•Preventive work had had its day following the 1963 Act,and had 
been judged to be less than successful; and for many of the 
children needing a secure family placement, attempts at long 
term foster care, had proved unsuccessful" (Thoburn et. al. 
1986.p.8). The authors do no more than assert the demise of 
"preventive work", an odd statement in view of a decrease in 
numbers of children entering local authority care in recent 
years so dramatic as to call forth leader comment in the new 
year issue of New Society (New Society 2.1.1987).
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“Permanence" is not a development of "care" and "prevention" but 
an alternative attitude to social work. The ideal permanent 
placement for a child "in care" not being returned to its home 
is of course, legal adoption. "Permanence" is a threat to the 
parent entrusting its child to the local authority with the 
expectation of return, as was envisaged under the Children Act 
of 1948. The two concepts have distinct and contradictory 
elements. While "care" and "prevention" were seen to be
principle features of child care social work, adoption remained 
insignificant and exceptional. With the development of the 
permanence principle adoption has come more to the fore and 
with it has come a new ethos, and a new and more suspicious 
relationship between social worker and client (see Appendix A, 
Tables 2 and 3).
To explore this change in detail the following two chapters will 
consider the development of adoption legislation since its 
inception in 1926. The move from insignificant procedure to 
principal definer of the practice of a main element of state 
social work will be traced mainly through the official reports 
and statutes. In identifying ideology embedded in legislative 
discourse (Burton and Carlin,1979) the process by which 
domination is generally perceived as legitimate can be 
illuminated.
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Adoption Prior to the Second Vorld War.
In this chapter, relevant legal Judgments, government reports 
and statutes will be reviewed. The overall aim will be to 
demonstrate the rather negative attitude displayed by the state 
towards legal adoption during the 1920s and 30s. This is in 
marked contrast to the contemporary situation which will be 
considered in chapter 6.
The Judicial Attitude.
The reported legal judgments of the High Court are the basis of 
the common law which can trace its history back over the past 
one thousand years or so. Problems associated with de facto 
adoption either by individuals or charitable societies were a 
common place to the High Court well before the passing of the 
Adoption Act of 1926. Prior to this Act there was no provision 
for legal adoption in this country, though de facto adoption had 
always existed here as elsewhere. Actions related to contested 
adoptions during the late 1920s and 1930s continued to be based 
upon writs of habeas corpus to a large extent, and reference to 
the Act was rare. Hence, a review of the judicial attitude 
towards "adoption" prior to the second world war will include 
actions based upon such writs.
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Re J.M. Carroll (an infant) (1931) KB 1 317, was an action 
brought by the mother to re-claim her young child. She had 
previously placed her with an adoption society who in turn had 
placed the child with prospective adopters. The mother relied 
upon a writ of habeas corpus, but the judgement reasons in 
similar vein to present day cases, considering whether or not to 
dispense with a parent's consent to adoption as being 
"unreasonably with-held". Indeed, in all the cases reviewed, some 
formulation of "the best interests of the child" is always said 
to operate. A parallel feature of cases decided in the first half 
of the twentieth century and before is "parental rights", a 
central feature of re. J.M.Carroll. -The rights of parents 
particularly related to decisions concerning the religious 
upbringing of children. Many cases arose because catholic 
parents allowed their children to be cared for by, or after 1926 
placed for adoption with, protestant families or charitable 
organisations, only to later insist upon their children being 
brought up as roman catholics. This might entail transfer to a 
catholic family, or more likely, a catholic institution.
The leading case was Barnardo v McHugh 1891. AC 388, where the 
mother's application was successful. The judgement stated that 
the primary consideration in such cases had to be the wishes of 
the natural parents, or the mother if the child was illegitimate. 
The mother had applied for and obtained a writ of habeas corpus 
to remove her child from one of Barnardo's Homes and place it 
with a nanny. This was eighteen months after leaving the child
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with Barnardo for an agreed period of twelve years. The 
Judgement made the point that the court was not bound to follow 
the wishes of the parent if it was not seen to be commensurate 
with the welfare of the child. However, courts usually saw this 
point as applying only if the parent could be seen to be 
somehow culpable. One of the strongest statements on this point 
is to be found in Carey (an Infant) 1883 10 QB 454, where a 
seven year old child was removed from his life long foster 
parents on the application of his mother, to live with her 
sister's family. After noting that the natural relations had a 
right to the child, the judge said, " ....we cannot interfere with 
the rights of the mother in favour of persons who are mere 
strangers."
To return to re J.M. Carroll, the mother had given birth to the 
child the subject of the litigation, in a workhouse in Vest 
London in 1929. Miss Carroll was of the roman catholic faith. 
She asked a protestant adoption society to place her baby for 
adoption, complaining that she could not leave the workhouse 
until her baby was provided for. The society took the child and 
placed it with prospective adopters. The mother changed her 
mind several times as to whether the child should be so 
adopted, or be re-claimed and be brought up by the Crusade of 
Rescue, a catholic child care agency. The latter course entailed 
children being fostered until school age, at which point they 
would be placed in an institution run by the society. Finally, 
Miss Carroll decided to re-claim her child and applied to do so
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by means of a writ of habeas corpus. The action was defended by 
the protestant Homeless Children's Aid Society. Miss Carroll was 
persuaded to her action by the Crusade of Rescue. The judgement 
quotes from a previous similar case where it was noted that 
habeas corpus was becoming more concerned with claiming souls 
than bodies.
Miss Carroll was successful in her action in the Divisional 
Court and the defence appealed. Lord Justice Scrutton in the 
Appeal Court considered that "unless the mother is of so bad a 
character as to be disregarded.... she has a right" Cto stipulate 
in which religion her child should be brought up). Further "...I 
cannot regard the difference between home training and training 
in a respectable institution as sufficiently important to enable 
the court to disregard the parent's wishes as to religion in the 
case of a child so young as to have no wish of its own." All 
this was in response to the Judgement of the Lord Chief Justice 
in the Divisional Court in favour of Miss Carroll. There, he 
distinguished Barnardo v McHugh partly on the ground of a 
"development of thought" which had taken place within the state, 
evinced by subsequent legislation favouring the welfare of the 
child as against the rights of parents. He also thought that 
infants were better served within the intimate relationships of 
the nuclear family, than in the impersonal upbringing of 
institutions. This latter point applied more to infant girls 
than boys.
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As is common In such cases, the Judgement contained a statement 
to the effect that it was no part of the court's function to 
judge the merits of one religion (sic) and another, but Scrutton 
L.J. seems to have had some difficulty in suppressing some non- 
judicial feelings concerning The Homeless Children's Aid Society. 
When told that its church, the Evangelical Christian Church was 
simply a branch of the evangelical wing of the Church of 
England, he commented with some irony that "evangelical members 
of the Church of England would be much surprised to hear that 
their religion (was) the same as their non-conformist brethren." 
His judgement in favour of the mother criticised the adoption 
society for not determining the faith into which the child had 
been baptised, and for requiring the mother to sign a consent 
form left blank as to the name of the adopter. Yet he avoided 
any detailed consideration of the welfare of the child.
Greer L.J. did consider the welfare of the child, and quoted with 
approval Fitzgibbon L.J. in re. O'Hara considering Gyngall's Case 
(1893) 2 QB 232. Four specific points were made.
1) At common law, parents had absolute rights over children of 
tender years unless forfeited by certain sorts of misconduct.
2) Chancery jurisdiction required that decisions were to be 
taken following the rule "what a wise parent would do", even 
though the natural parent desired, and had a common law right 
to do otherwise and had not been guilty of misconduct.
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3) Under the Judicature Act of 1873, It was made a 
responsibility of all divisions of the High Court to exercise 
Chancery Jurisdiction.
4) Courts were to act cautiously in superseding parents and 
only when the welfare of the child required it.
Thus Greer L.J. felt no constraint In applying 2) and 3) above 
and so opposing parental wishes in what he saw as the interests 
of the child. These would be best served by the child being 
brought up in a family home rather than a foster home soon to 
be followed by a Home. He felt that the vacillation of the 
mother was occasioned by pressure from the church against her 
taking the course she thought best. His was the minority 
Judgement in favour of the adoption society.
Slessor L.J.'s judgement attempted to find the common ground 
between the other two Judgements, while at the same time finding 
for the mother. He agreed that Chancery rules rather than 
common law jurisdiction applied, but saw Chancery as indicating 
that the welfare oi the child was best served by it being with 
its mother, always excepting the case of the culpable parent. As 
to the true wishes of the mother, "I prefer to believe her sworn 
testimony, rather than to draw inferences on very inadequate 
data to her detriment and to the detriment of those who are 
supporting her by affidavit in the present case." Slessor L.J. 
gave considerable weight to the right of a parent to determine 
the religion of the child and quoted New's Case, (1904) 20 TLR
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515 583, where a twelve year old was removed from foster 
parents to comply with the mother's requirement as to religion. 
Slessor L.J. agreed with Scrutton L.J. in allowing the appeal.
The significance of re. J.M.Carroll to the development of social 
policy concerning those experiencing serious difficulties in 
bringing up their children, is that it was the first major 
consideration of parental rights since the passing of the 
Adoption Act 1926. The permanent threat in adoption legislation, 
in common with most children legislation, is the power to 
remove children from their parents. In the context of this 
threat, no doubt the powers to dispense with parental consent 
are used much less than are any of the other powers of removal, 
yet the dispensing powers of adoption legislation make them 
more final and absolute than powers of removal contained 
elsewhere. For this reason if no other their significance should 
not be underrated as both a symbolic and an instrumental power. 
(For a description of the contemporary situation, see Appendix 
A, Table 3.)
The Adoption Act 1926 contained an all embracing clause 
allowing courts to dispense with parental consents not only for 
objective reasons associated with culpability and incapacity, 
but also if the court considered it ought to do so (see p.146 
below). The effect of re. J.M.Carroll is clear. The majority 
verdict bound the court in future to consider a restated 
emphasis of the rights of natural parents to their children. So
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distinction was made between legitimate and illegitimate 
children except that for the latter, "parent" referred the mother 
only. Equitable rules relating to the welfare of the child at the 
expense of the common law absolute right of parents to their 
children were acknowledged, but Greer L.J.'s emphasising of this 
point was certainly not echoed in the majority judgement.
Too much should not be made of any single judgement, but as 
can be seen with this and other decisions to be considered, 
leading cases tend to fall into line with the contemporary 
dominant ideology. Vhile, as will also be demonstrated, this is 
not a strictly determined relationship, even the remote reaches 
of welfare law that was legal adoption pre-war, fall within the 
paradigm of state policy. At the time of re, J.M.Carroll the 
welfare state was little more than the pre-war liberal reforms, 
encouraged by the Minority Report on the Poor Law of 1909. The 
Labour government reforms of the 1940s were still a world war 
away and welfare was still the relieving officer, the "spike" 
and the despised Poor Law. Social work had barely begun, and 
the adoption lobby, such as it was, was viewed with some 
suspicion by a disinterested parliament and judiciary. The idea 
that it might become an adviser to the state concerning its 
policing functions towards some families seen as deviant, had 
not dawned. The tone of the judgement in re. J.M.Carroll 
reflected exactly that of the Departmental Committee on Adoption 
Societies and Agencies of 1937 (Horsborough Report, 1937) (see 
pp. 143-152 below) when considering what were seen as dubious
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not to say sinister groups possibly more concerned with 
increasing church membership or even personal bank accounts, 
than providing a necessary corrective for society's deviants.
The Official Attitude.
On 3rd August 1920 the Committee on Child Adoption was 
appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Alfred Hopkinson K.C., 
and the report (Hopkinson Eeport, 1921) was presented to 
parliament the following year. Their terms of reference were to 
consider;
"D Whether it is desirable to make legal provision for the 
adoption of children in this country, and
2) if so what form such provision should take."
De ïacto adoption of children into families other than their own 
had always been a common place. Vhat was being contemplated 
was a law to confirm such transfers as permanent and binding, 
in line with, as the committee put it, "almost all civilised 
states."
The committee began its report by briefly reviewing this 
"civilised" legislation. They discounted continental legislation 
as inappropriate, with the possible exception of Norway's, but 
were more enthusiastic about that of the other common law, 
English speaking countries. They noted that within the United 
States of America, Massachusetts passed legislation as early as 
1651, and had been followed by the other forty seven states
-133-
Legal Adoption Prior to the Second Vorld War
subsequently. Australia, Hew Zealand and Canada all had adoption 
legislation.
The committee were clearly in favour of legal adoption. 
Increasing numbers of people were wanting to adopt as a result 
of losses during the Great War. They also detected an increasing 
interest in England, as elsewhere, in child welfare. They were 
apprehensive concerning the increasing number of de facto 
adoption with no safeguards available. Such safeguards might 
include an inspectorate and a register. In any event, adoption 
would occur in some form or other, and Indeed the committee 
supported the practice in principle, only excepting the cases of 
those children "clearly physically and morally defective."
The committee were impressed by the London County Council 
witness who spoke of the positive relationship which developed 
between foster parents and children and the fact that it was 
two and a half times as expensive for the local authority to 
accommodate children as it was to have them boarded out. 
Subsequently, familiar arguments concerning the assumed 
propensity of natural parents to re-claim foster children when 
they attained working age, and the insecurity felt by foster 
parents in this situation, were put forward. While the committee 
felt that the interests of the child should be paramount, they 
suggested that the benefit to foster parents who, under the 
proposed legislation would become adoptive parents, should be 
recognised. Their final point was one put to them by the
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national Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
Oi.S.P.C.C.). The bad results of uncontrolled and ill selected de 
facto adoptive parents were already becoming apparent, along 
side the good results of successful placements. Legislation was 
therefore urgently required. The logical conclusion of this 
argument was that the need for expert assessors, professionals, 
was undeniable if the welfare of the children was to be the 
priority.
The committee did not put forward any negative arguments. The 
catalogue of "civilised states", followed by expert witnesses 
regarding the emotional, financial -and physical benefits 
amounted to a self evident case for legislative intervention in 
what might otherwise become " a growing problem".
The remainder of the report was taken up with proposed features 
for such a bill. Hearings should not be in the High Court 
because of the costs that would be incurred. However, appeals 
should be direct to the Court of Appeal. Given the argument 
concerning the court of first instance, one wonders whether the 
suggested appeals procedure was designed to discourage appeals.
Consents were to be required of all the principles. In addition, 
Judges would consider the views of legal guardians, near 
relatives, the Ministry of Pensions in the case of war orphans, 
and the fathers of illegitimate children. Courts were to be
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empowered to dispense with consent to adoption in six specific 
instances:
1) Parent could not be found.
2) Child had been abandoned.
3) Parent incurably insane.
4) Parent guilty of persistent cruelty.
5) Parent deprived by law of custody.
6) Conditions existed which were detrimental to the moral or 
physical welfare of the child.
Adopters would be required to be over twenty five years of age, 
and single adopters, or married adopters with the consent but 
not the participation of their spouse, would be required to be 
over thirty years of age. "Generally adopters (would) be at 
least twenty years older than the adoptee."
Those making formal inquiries concerning the proposed adoption 
on behalf of the court would preferably be women. Judges were 
seen to be competent to advise adopters on all matters 
associated with adoption. Thus, a single woman adopting a boy 
might turn to the Judge for guidance concerning his upbringing. 
Judges were also seen by the committee as best placed to 
oversee an adopted child's interest in any property he or she 
might own. "As a rule religion of the adopters should be that of 
the child."
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Natural parents could apply for rights of access, and the 
child's right of succession and inheritance would remain with 
the natural family. Further, the child would have no automatic 
rights of inheritance or succession from the adoptive family. If 
the adopters wished the child to have such rights this could 
only be done by specific testimentary provision. This clause 
addressed the fundamental problem associated with the concept 
of legal adoption in this country, and was eventually enacted in 
the Adoption Act of 1926.
In pointing out that the responsibility for the welfare of 
children placed for adoption but not ultimately adopted would be 
met under the terms of the Children Act 1908 rather than the 
proposed adoption legislation, the committee at this early stage 
made a plea for a consolidation of the law relating to children, 
notwithstanding the Child Care Act 1980, such consolidation is 
still awaited (see Review of Child Care Law, 1985.),
The committee concluded their report with a strong plea not to 
separate parents and children lightly. "Nothing should be done 
to impair the sense of parental responsibility or, unless 
essential to prevent injury to the child, to interfere with 
rights and duties based on the natural tie between parents and 
children." Far from using economic circumstances as a reason 
for separating parents and illegitimate children, the committee 
proposed a cash allowance so that the material disadvantage 
which inevitably fell upon one parent families might be
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lessened. They thus anticipated the Finer Report on One Parent 
Families (1974) by fifty years, and such an allowance by an 
even longer term.
The Hopkinson Committee's report is a notable tour de force. 
Though its inclusion here is as the starting point of a review 
of official discourses on adoption, it is a report worthy of 
attention in its own right. It introduces into official discourse 
in Great Britain the concept of legal adoption, and with it 
solutions to what were seen as problems associated with
adaption. Inheritance and succession were probably seen as the 
most significant problems, but matters concerning residual
rights of natural parents, the dispensing with the consent of 
some natural parents to the adoption of their children by 
others, and the required minimum age of adopters, are other 
matters introduced into official discourse.
Though it is clear from the outset of the report that the
committee was whole-heartedly in favour of the introduction of 
adoption legislation, the tone and construction of the report is 
rather naive and apolitical. For instance, a catalogue of reasons 
for dispensing with a natural parent's consent is juxtaposed 
with a plea for allowances to be made to one parent families. 
Such a situation takes no account of the ideological
significance attached to legal adoption. The powerful arguments 
advising caution concerning adoption related to property and the 
way families entailed it. Humanitarian lobbies concerned with
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the plight of some children orphaned during the war, and moral 
entrepreneurs concerned with Illegitimacy or the remnants of 
"baby farming", took alternative ideological positions. The 
committee embraced all these positions at the same time and 
added the perspective of the natural mother as victim for 
good measure. Later and more successful reports, were to propose 
a much clearer and less ambiguous message. To date, this is the 
only government report on adoption which has not resulted in 
legislation. Maybe the report can be seen as the work of the 
decent fellow, who never the less did not appreciate the 
political dimensions of his task. In this context, it is of 
passing interests to note that Neville Chamberlain was one of 
the committee members.
The Hopkinson Committee was followed by a second official 
committee on the subject of a proposed adoption law. The Child 
Adoption Committee appointed by the Home Secretary in 1924 was 
an inter-departmental committee in all but name. The Board of 
Education, the Ministry of Health and the Home Office provided 
three of the six members under the chairmanship of the Hon. Mr 
Justice Tomlin. Though Tomlin covered much the same ground as 
Hopkinson, there is no acknowledgement of the work of the 
latter committee in the report of the former (Tomlin Report, 
al925). Its terms of reference were to "Examine the 
problems of Child Adoption from the point of view of possible 
legislation and (to) report on the main provisions which should 
be included in any bill." One year after their appointment, in
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April 1925, their terms ol reference were widened to include a 
review of "the workings and provisions of the Children Act 
1908, the protection of infant life, visitation of Voluntary 
Homes and any changes which might be required in the law or 
its administration."
It is doubtful whether this addition to the committee's terms of 
reference had the significance that was associated with a later 
Labour government's widening of the Houghton Committee's terms 
of reference in 1969. The point will be considered in the 
following chapter. It is sufficient to suggest here that while 
the Tomlin Committee members represented a cross section of 
those with responsibility for children deprived of a normal 
family upbringing, the Houghton Committee was selected over 
whelmingly from organisations associated narrowly with the 
process of the adoption of children. By 1969, adoption agencies 
were seen as responsible advisers to the government. This was 
not so between the wars.
Hopkinson and Tomlin had quite contrasting views on .the need 
for and desirability of legal adoption. Tomlin saw the need for 
legal adoption as to "create artificial families". The committee 
was unable to satisfy itself that there was an effective demand 
from those who were de facto adopters. The committee also 
doubted that the absence of legal adoption would put off people 
who otherwise wished to provide a permanent home for someone 
else's child. The committee thus directly contradicted the
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conclusions of Hopkinson of two years previous. Tomlin continued 
by pointing out that any demand for adoption occasioned by 
losses during the war were, seven years on, of little 
significance. The continued pressure for an adoption law 
appeared to the committee to be coming from those with a vested 
interest in adoption in general.
"People wishing to get rid of their children are far more 
numerous than those wishing to receive them and partly on 
this account the activities in recent years of societies 
arranging systematically for the adoption of children 
would appear to have given to adoption a prominence which 
is somewhat artificial and may not be in all respects 
wholesome. The problem of the unwanted child is a serious 
one; it may well be a question whether a legal system of 
adoption will do much to assist the solution of it." 
(Tomlin Report, al925. para.4)
Tomlin goes on to specify two "evils" which it was proposed to 
the committee an adoption act would remedy. The first was the 
insecurity of the de facto adoption, always threatened by the 
potentially reclaiming natural parent. This the committee saw as 
a "theoretical rather than a practical point, nonetheless 
understandable." A better solution would be to allow natural 
parents to legally transfer parental rights to de facto 
adopters. Then Judges, the only competent body, would be 
empowered to review the welfare of the child and take into
-141-
Legal Adoption.Prior to the Second World War,
consideration all the far reaching effects of such a transfer. 
The committee saw High Court judges as being those most 
competent to make such decisions, but allowed that it would be 
more practical to give jurisdiction to County Courts and 
Magistrates Courts.
Vlth no argument to the contrary at this point, the report then 
runs this discussion of transfer of parental rights into a 
detailed description of the administrative and legal 
implications of adoption law. The committee seemed to accept as 
inevitable the coming of adoption legislation, while themselves 
remaining sceptical. They gave no more credence to the second 
"evil" which it was proposed to them that legislation would 
remedy, than the first. The proposition was that legal adoption 
would halt the current "traffic in children" and its evil 
consequences. This was to be achieved by only allowing de facto 
adopters to keep the children if they began proceedings in the 
court. “This is a proposal, the mere statement of which is 
sufficient to disclose its impracticability." Better, the 
committee thought, to strengthen the Child Life Protection 
clauses of the Children Act 1908. At this time only the most 
casual supervision of children, living in homes other than their 
own was carried out under the authority of the Poor Law 
Guardians. It was this area to which the committee's additional 
terms of reference referred but reformed practice was legislated 
for in the Local Government Act of 1929 rather than the 
imminent Adoption Law.
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Tomlin's thrust seems to have been to make the courts central 
to most of the decisions concerning the transfer of parental 
rights, whether by legal adoption or not, to other individuals. 
The committee was critical of the local authority's executive 
power to assume parental rights over children in its care, and 
supported the agitation for an improved local authority 
supervision of fostered and boarded out children. The report
concluded with some details of what an adoption law should
include.
It was proposed that an investigator should always be appointed 
with "a duty of protecting the interests of the child before the 
tribunal." Provided that all gave consent freely, the guiding
consideration of the court was to be the welfare of the child, 
and this was to include where appropriate, the wishes of the 
child.
There was an attempt to put a positive gloss on the vexed 
question of inheritance and succession by emphasising the 
maintenance of the child's rights within his or her natural
family rather than the de-barring of automatic rights within 
the adoptive family.
Age limits were amended from those proposed by Hopkinson. 
Twenty five was to remain the minimum age, but the age 
difference was increased to twenty one years. The thirty year 
minimum was not mentioned, but married couples were only to be
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allowed to adopt jointly. One member of an unmarried couple 
could only adopt with the consent of the partner, and single 
men were to be barred from adopting females.
This in parts rather testy report, maintained its impatient 
attitude towards the adoption lobby to the end. In a late 
consideration of confidentiality the attitude is well 
demonstrated. The issue under consideration was that of not 
allowing natural parents to know the whereabouts of their 
adopted children. The committee noted that; "Certain of the 
Adoption Societies make this feature an essential part of their 
policy. They deliberately seek to fix a-gulf between the child's 
past and future." This policy was, as far as the committee was 
concerned, at best misguided, at worse perverse. Provided that 
the adoption had the force of law behind it, there was 
absolutely no need for further safeguards. A policy of "....if the 
eyes can be closed to facts, the facts themselves will cease to 
exist (was) wholly unnecessary and objectionable in connection 
with a legalised system of adoption, and we should deprecate 
any attempt to introduce it."
The second report of the Tomlin Committee (Tomlin Report, 
bl925) was a draft bill "to make provision for Adoption of 
Infants." It followed the terms of their first report on the two 
main issues of dispensing with parental consent and inheritance. 
Some subsequently familiar features of adoption law such as the 
banning of payments and the granting of jurisdiction to all
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three courts of first Instance appear in this first official 
attempt at an adoption bill. (Between 1920 and 1926 five private 
members bills were introduced on the topic.) The rights of de 
iacto adopters of over two years standing, to oppose the wishes 
of the natural parents were granted and subsequently enacted in 
the 1926 Act. The feature disappeared from later legislation, 
only to re-appear in the Children Act 1975 under the term 
Custodianship. More recent judicial interpretation increasing the 
powers of local authorities to assume the parental rights over 
some some children in their care has reinforced this recent 
trend.
Another feature of the draft bill which was included in the 
1926 Act was probation. Probation was in terms of a 
conditional order of up to two years, to be confirmed on the 
application of the adopters when they were satisfied as to the 
normality of their adoptive child. This "safeguard" was dropped 
from post second world war adoption legislation.
Adoption Act, 1926.
The Act received the royal assent on 4th August 1926, two years 
to the day after the appointment of the Tomlin Committee. At 
this point at least, interesting parallels with Houghton and the 
Children Act 1975 appear to break down. Houghton waited six 
years for legislative expression. The 1926 Act followed the 
report closely, with some notable additions.
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Adoption orders were not to extinguish property rights within 
the child's natural family, nor would it bestow such rights on 
the child in relation to its adopted family. That was in line 
with both Tomlin and Hopkinson.
The powers of the courts to dispense with parental consents 
were not really considered by Tomlin in the first report. The 
Act follows almost word for word the draft bill, but goes on to 
include a catch-all clause. Courts were to be able to;
"...dispense with any consent required by this subsection 
if satisfied that the person whose consent is to be 
dispensed with has abandoned or deserted the infant or 
cannot be found or is incapable of giving such consent, or 
being a person liable to contribute to the support of the 
infant either has persistently neglected or refused to 
contribute to such support, or is a person whose consent 
ought, in the opinion of the court and in all the 
circumstances of the case, be dispensed with." (Emphasis 
added.)
Tomlin's lack of concern in failing to specify detailed grounds 
upon which courts might rely when dispensing with parental 
consents, contrasts with the attention given to the matter by 
the Hopkinson Committee (see p.136 above). Tomlin all but 
ignored the matter except for its financial implications. Ill 
treatment was of little concern to the committee but parents put
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their rights at some risk by falling to make their financial 
contributions in respect of their children. The legislature 
recognised the lacuna but rather than thoughtfully legislating 
in the manner suggested by Hopkinson, passed the matter over 
to the judiciary to do as it saw fit. Given this lack of 
interest in the details of legal adoption one might question why 
an act was passed at all. Certainly the Act was as a result of 
compromise between those seeking to protect vulnerable children 
by promoting "new" families and at the same time secure their 
field of employment and operation, and a powerful but 
indifferent ruling class who only recognised adoption as some 
threat to lineage. Provided this issue was safeguarded they 
reluctantly allowed the adoption lobby their wish.
It is not proposed that the state was indifferent to the plight 
of socially deprived children. At the time the Poor Law was 
disintegrating and legislative activity was not aimed at 
reinstating it as far as children were concerned. The Local 
Government Act 1929 and the Poor Law Act 1930 sought to 
improve the supervision of children under the Poor Law. The 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 extended and consolidated 
the state's powers in relation to such disadvantaged children. 
There was at this time considerable consideration being given 
to the plight of children "in care" and how it might be eased. 
To this end, legal adoption was seen as irrelevant.
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The Borsborough Report.
State suspicion towards adoption societies, evident in the 
Tomlin Report in the mid 1920s, in no way abated as a result of 
the legislation. Indeed it probably heightened, and in 1936 a 
departmental committee was set up to "....inquire into the 
methods pursued by adoption societies or agencies engaged in 
the arranging for adoption of children, and to report whether 
and if so what measures should be taken in the public interest 
to supervise and control their activities." The report of the 
Departmental Committee on Adoption Societies and Agencies, 1937 
(Horsborough Report, 1937), noted how the Home Secretary had 
received a deputation ashing for an inquiry into "....the evils 
associated with unlicensed, unregulated and unsupervised 
adoption" in 1935. The committee under Miss Florence
Horsborough M.P. produced a detailed report which amounted to 
something of a review of the working of the Act ten years on.
The report begins by cataloguing the deficiencies of the 
societies associated with their practice under the act. Generally 
societies made insufficient inquiries and were lax in visiting 
prospective adopters and placed children. Societies had a duty 
towards adopters not to place unsuitable children. Societies 
should have made far greater use of the Vasserman Test to 
determine which children were backward and therefore not fit 
for adoption. The report notes with approval the practice of one 
society which "....refused many babies for reasons including bad
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health, mental defect in the mother, dubious parentage and lack 
of information concerning the father.“
To guard against the dangers of facilitating the adoption of 
backward or possibly defective children, there should be a 
compulsory period of at least three months, and there should be 
hostels available for the care and observation of potentially 
adoptable children, together with close medical supervision. The 
placements should be arranged by professional staff. Placement 
decisions should be taken by a case committee comprising 
experienced social workers and married women with children.
It was noted that many adoption placements did not result in 
adoption orders because prospective adopters did not go ahead 
with their applications to the courts. This practice was viewed 
with alarm and reform of the legislation was suggested. 
Following the majority decision in re. J.M.Carroll, the committee 
recommended that mothers should not be required to sign blank 
consent forms. In fact the recently amended Adoption of Children 
(Summary Jurisdiction) Rules 1936, required names only to 
appear. This was presumably seen as a compromise, allowing 
mothers to know the the name of the adopters but not the 
address.
The committee was concerned for the rights of natural parents, 
and took some courts to task for not requiring their presence 
before them. They saw attendance as a vital "...right and duty"
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of the parent to satisfy themselves as to the well being of the 
child, and to bring home to them that they were "sundering" all 
parental rights and duties. Also parental attendance would allow 
the parents to identify their child and so avoid risks of 
substitution. Attendance would also ensure that the courts 
would have a date of birth to place on the birth certificate.
The committee then reviewed the financing of societies. That 
this subject was always a sore point is no doubt associated 
with the scandals of "baby farming" rife in the late nineteenth 
century (see Select Committee, 1871) Cretney makes the point:
"The worst features of baby farming were stamped out by 
legislation, but the commercial exploitation of those who 
had an unwanted child, and of those who wanted to bring up 
a child as their own troubled the legislature for many 
years to come." (Cretney, 1979.p.532.)
Societies derived their income from four sources; contributions 
from the charitable public including endowments, payments by 
mothers, payments by putative fathers and payments by adopters. 
The committee anticipated no problem in the continuance of 
public subscription provided that the commission claimed by 
collectors was reasonable. They very much approved of natural 
mothers making payments. It was "....desirable that she should be 
reminded of her responsibilities and that the impression should 
not be cultivated that adoption societies exist(ed) for the
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cheap and expeditious disposal of illegitimate children." On the 
other hand societies should act responsibly and not, as many 
did, overcharge. There were examples of societies charging 
mothers five shillings per week for two years. Some societies 
pressed mothers for payments they could not afford. Mothers 
were not informed of their children being adopted, and had 
continued weekly payments to societies. One society is recorded 
as charging mothers a fee of £60 to place children. The largest 
and "best" society charged £9 per adoption to the natural 
parent. The committee suggested that the Adoption Act should be 
amended to allow courts to supervise payments in connection 
with adoption.
All societies invited payments from adopters. This was seen as 
acceptable provided that the question of payments did not arise 
until after an adoption order had been made. The report 
describes in some detail a "one man band" society, hopelessly 
administered and questionably financed. Generally the committee 
favoured more organised larger societies and recommended that 
only those societies should be able to advertise and place 
children. Private individuals who placed children should not be 
able to receive payments or advertise. Demand exceeded supply of 
children for adoption and so the law should be more rigorously 
enforced concerning foreign adoptions. No child should leave the 
country for adoption without the express permission of the
court.
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The model for adoption practice was the London County Council. 
They were seen as rigorous vetters of prospective adopters, 
refusing 37 of 297 applicants. The council would not allow a 
child to be adopted unless the child was physically and 
mentally fit and with a good social history; that is, no 
suggestion of any mental illness or criminal tendencies in the 
family. If all was well applicants would visit the Home and view 
the children before mailing their selection. The children were 
those over whom the council had parental rights and duties 
under section 52 of the Poor Law Act 1930. Few children adopted 
were over five years old, and the council would not allow 
adoption under one year of age. It is -interesting to note that 
of the six points of good practice noted above in relation to 
the London County Council, five would now be considered bad 
practice and the sixth, the administrative point concerning 
children subject to a parental rights resolution, would be 
irrelevant.
The committee recommended that adoption societies and other 
agencies involved, should be allowed to continue to place 
children for adoption. The societies agreed to a system of 
licensing and registration by local authorities. Indeed the large 
societies actively supported such a move. The committee 
suggested also that local authorities should be encouraged tD 
use their powers to arrange for the adoption of children cared 
for by them under section 52 of the Poor Law Act 1930.
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Adoption of Children (Regulations) Act, 1939.
The resultant Adoption of Children (Regulations) Act 1939 more 
or less enacted the proposals contained in the report of the 
departmental committee. Though the purpose of the committee was 
to specify effective controls of adoption societies,
paradoxically the very act of placing official restraint set 
the societies on their way to becoming a power in the land, at 
least in terms of processing some unfortunate children. The 
benefits to large concerns of state regulation in unorganised 
markets , has been argued in relation to nineteenth century 
factory legislation (Carson 1974) and regulation in food 
processing (Paulus 1974). Thus the "enlightened" factory owner 
campaigning for the restriction of the hours worked by women 
and children succeeds in putting small competitors out of 
business as they can no longer exploit cheap labour. By happy 
coincidence, the larger concern is now more secure with a 
dominant share of the market. When such a situation occurs in 
the field of voluntary societies the effect must be very 
similar. Another "unintended consequence" of regulatory 
legislation was arguably of greater significance in this 
instance. By registering societies, local authorities who were 
delegated the responsibility inadvertently granted to them seals 
of approval, notwithstanding that the initial aim of the 
exercise was the more negative one of indicating those societies 
which should no longer be regarded with odium. Registration may 
well start out to specify sufficient performance, but inevitably 
this becomes the accepted standard. Charitable voluntary
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agencies, dependent for their existence on society's approval, 
and offering no product or generally used service, can only reiy 
on their tutelage relationship with the state (Donzelot, 1980). 
It is a vulnerable position to be in but by no means a hopeless 
one. Adoption societies have learned well how to exploit it. So 
successful have they become, that forty years on it might be 
argued that it is the societies who now regulate the practice of 
the local authorities (see chapter 6 below). In 1939 such a 
relationship was not envisaged.
The 1939 Act required all bodies Involved in the process of the 
adoption of children to be registered, and only registered 
bodies were hence forth to be allowed to make such
arrangements. Only charitable institutions were to be eligible 
for registration. Section 2 (3) can be seen to favour larger 
societies at the expense of smaller ones. The section states:
"2. (3) A registration authority may refuse to register an 
adoption society under this Act if it appears to the 
authority
(a) that the activities of the society are not controlled 
by a committee of members of the society who are 
responsible to the members of the society, or,
that any person proposed to be employed or employed 
by the society for the purpose of making any
arrangements for the adoption of children on behalf of
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the society is not a fit or proper person to be so 
employed,
ic) that the number of competent persons proposed to be 
employed or employed by the society for the purpose 
aforesaid is, in the opinion of the authority insufficient 
having regard to the extent of the activities of the 
society in connection with that purpose; or
id) that any person taking part in the management or 
control of the society has been convicted of an offence 
under this act or of a breach of any regulations made 
under this act.
jiatural parents were to be given an explanation of the effects 
of an adoption order, written "in ordinary language" which they 
would be required to sign as having understood prior to the 
order being made. Societies were to set up case committees to 
receive reports on adopters and children, and these committees 
were to be responsible for decisions concerning placements. The 
responsibility was at law, and contravention of regulations 
concerning payments, prohibited except by leave of the court, 
and the placing of children abroad for adoption, were punishable 
by fines or terms of imprisonment. Section 12 states, "Where any 
offence under this Act committed by a body corporate, is proved 
to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to 
be attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, 
manager of committee, secretary or other officer of the body he, 
as well as the body shall be deemed to be guilty of that
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offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished 
accordingly." There are echos here of re. J.M .Carroll where the 
judgement noted that Miss Carroll's action should have named 
the officer of the Homeless Children's Aid Society, one Mr 
Besley, rather than simply the body.
Societies were to be liable for the care provided to children 
prior to placement, and they had to make their books available 
for inspection by the registration body, the appropriate local 
authority.
Societies could revoke the placement of a child for adoption, 
but otherwise adopters were to be required to apply for an 
adoption order within three months of a placement. Heavy 
penalties were provided for contravention by either agency or 
adopter.
Children placed for adoption under nine years of age were to be 
supervised by local authorities under their Child Life 
Protection function, except where such placements were the 
responsibility of an adoption society. Thus, what came to be 
known as "third party adoptions" were brought under statutory 
supervision. For the moment societies were allowed to take 
responsibility for their own placements.
Only adoption societies were allowed to advertise children for 
adoption. Age limits placed on those wishing to adopt, specified
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in the principle Act (Adoption Act, 1926), were relaxed where 
such adopters were related to the child.
The rhetorical ring of the committee's terms of reference (see 
p. 148 above) were attended to by the committee, but they also 
used the opportunity to take a considered view of the new 
procedure. The subsequent legislation, following the committee's 
report closely, added much needed structure to the process of 
legal adoption and ensured its development in the future.
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ii the inter-war years can be characterised as displaying a 
state attitude suspicious of legal adoption, the attitude
displayed since the late 1940s has been one of Increasing 
encouragement and support. Such an attitude can be seen to 
rellect the centrality of the nuclear family In our society 
(Morgan, 1985), and thus concern for those deprived of Its 
benefits. However, with adoption's Increasing popularity there 
comes the danger of Its misuse. An over enthusiastic attitude 
might recognise it as a panacea for the ills of childhood 
deprivation. Such an attitude would fit well with a public 
stance of blaming the victim for his or her circumstances of 
poverty, sickness, ignorance or what ever. A "two nations"
attitude encourages "child rescue“ (Platt, 1977) rather than 
support of families. Thus, the situation of an increasingly 
abrasive state ideology in a class-ridden society suffering 
economic decline is likely to promote such practice. Since the 
late 1960s social work has been required to develop the social 
control aspects of its tasks in line with its increasing 
significance in the process of disseminating the dominant
ideology. Reform of the law and practice of adoption
demonstrates the process. By the 1960s, the permanent transfer
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of children between families, even against the specific wishes 
of the natural parents, had developed to the point where 
adoption was but one of several such procedures of some 
significance to social work practice.
The previous chapter described the situation of the introduction 
of adoption legislation and the less than enthusiastic attitude 
of the state. In describing a more positive situation post war, 
the focus will remain upon official reports, resultant
legislation and judicial interpretation, for the most part.
Post war reforms establishing the "welfare state" included the 
passing of the Children Act 1948 (see Chapter 4). This was a 
radical piece of legislation aimed at assisting families and 
children through crises which required the provision of 
accommodation for children for the time being. While adoption 
was not seen as of equal significance with local authority 
•care“, it nevertheless was also considered within the pervading 
attitude of reform. The Curtis Report (1946) recommended reform 
of adoption legislation though its main preoccupation was 
shorter term care, and the Gammon Committee, an informal 
committee set up in 1945 to review the acts of 1926 and 1939 
also proposed reform. (Gammon Report, 1945).
Adoption Act, 1949.
When it came in 1949, the new Adoption Act was as a result of a 
Private Member's Bill presented by Mr Basil Mield. The new Act
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reformed the 1926 Act considerably, but the 1926 Act remained 
the principle Act. The following year, 1950, saw a consolidating 
Adoption Act passed taking in both the 1926 and the 1949 Acts. 
The effect of the Adoption Act 1949 was to insist that an order 
should only be made if it was in the best interests of the 
child, but once made the child was to be regarded as more or 
less on an equal footing with "natural“ children of the family.
Firstly those factors most obviously aimed at ensuring that 
orders were to be made in the interests of the child will be 
considered. Here it might be proposed that an assumption was 
that if the child's nuclear family could no longer care for him, 
the next best alternative would usually be the extended family. 
This assumption can also be demonstrated within the Children 
Act 1946, where local authorities were required to consider as 
an alternative to care, accommodation of the child by relatives.
The Adoption Act 1949 facilitated the adoption of children by 
their own families by relaxing the rules concerning the age of 
adopters in such situations. The minimum age of twenty five 
years, and at least twenty one years older than the child, was 
reduced to twenty one years of age for close relatives. In these 
cases the requirement of a twenty one year differential was 
repealed. Age requirements were dropped altogether if either 
applicant was the parent.
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A crucial concern related to parental consent to adoption. The 
Adoption Act 1926's catch-all clause oi dispensing with consent 
on the grounds that It ought to be dispensed with was repealed. 
The only grounds which a court could rely on in future were to 
be j
a) abandonment or neglect or persistent illtreatment,
b) persistent neglect or refusal to contribute financially, or
c) the parent could not be found, was incapable, or was 
withholding consent unreasonably.
As a leading legal commentary of the time put it, "Thus it 
follows... that the court's discretion is slightly curtailed. The 
court will not be able to dispense with a person's consent 
merely because the court thinks that, in all the circumstances, 
the consent ought to be dispensed with; the court must be 
satisfied that the person whose consent is required has 
unreasonably withheld it." (Butterworth, 1950. p.169.)
All required consents had to be obtained or legally dispensed 
with. They were to be unconditional except that the parents 
could specify the religion in which they required the child to 
be brought up. However, the procedure of consent was specified 
in some detail with the aim of protecting the rights of natural 
parents, adoptive parents and the child. Problems with consents 
related to either confidentiality or change of mind.
-1 6 1 -
Eost-Var Adaption
Sotwithstandlng Judicial assertions to the contrary, there was a 
consistently expressed need for confidentiality on the part of 
adopters. This was well appreciated by those working in the 
field and the argument had been presented to Tomlin with no 
success (see p.144 above.). The issue was also considered in re. 
J.M.Carroll with respect to general consents and held to be 
wrong. The Adoption Act 1949 only envisaged consents relative 
to specific adoptions but allowed these consents even where the 
name of the proposed adopter was kept from the natural parent. 
Furthermore, that consent could not be reasonably withheld 
simply on the ground that the parent did not know the name of 
the proposed adopter. Consents could be given in documentary 
form provided that they were properly witnessed by a Justice of 
the Peace, and the natural parent was not required to attend the 
court. Rules were to be made to ensure that if the natural 
parent did attend the court, he or she would not come into 
contact with the adopters. Thus, the issue of confidentiality 
required as a safeguard for adopters was subsequently seen to 
out weigh issues of law and administration which Tomlin had 
deemed to be paramount. To safeguard the adoption placement, 
withdrawal of consent once given, would not require the return 
of the child to the natural parent. Only the court could require 
such a return. If the court did not so require, the child would 
remain with the applicants until the hearing and a final 
decision.
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These amendments should be seen as an attempt to address the 
difficulties inherent in adoption, rather than indicative of 
success or failure for a pro or anti adoption faction. Thus the 
position of the natural parents was also given sympathetic 
consideration. They were not to be rushed, and were not allowed 
to signify their consent to the adoption of their child until 
the child was at least six weeks old.
General safeguards required applicants to have possession of the 
child for a minimum of six months prior to the making of an 
order, and the local authorities were to be responsible for 
supervising all such placements. Previously they were only 
required to supervise adoption agency placements.
The contentious issues of heredity and intestacy were reformed 
under this Act and the hypocrisy of earlier efforts expunged. 
"The ...Act...is designed to amend the law relating to the 
adoption of children by creating a relationship ... in all 
respects as nearly as possible to the relationship between a 
child born in lawful wedlock and its parent..." (Butterworth, 
1950.p.l60). The child's rights within the adoptive family were 
to be identical to those of a natural born child of that family. 
Henceforth a testator's reference to a child of the family would 
include adopted children, no matter that those children might 
have been adopted subsequent to the making of the will. All 
such rights associated with a child's natural family were to be 
dissolved with the making of an order. Bearing in mind that it
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had taken the legislature over twenty years to accept what one 
night argue would be the ilrst tenet of legal adoption, It Is 
not surprising that titles of honour were excepted from this 
requirement. Nothing is mentioned concerning titles of honour 
devolving from a child's natural family.
To sum up, early post war reform of adoption legislation saw 
adoption as appropriate if it could be demonstrated that it was 
in the overall interest of the child, and this was to be the 
main concern. Links between parents, particularly mothers and 
children were not to be lightly sundered and certainly "not only 
financial considerations (were to be> ’ the test." (Butterworth, 
1950.p-161.). Given the decision that adoption was appropriate, 
then reformed legislation set out to whole-heartedly support the 
new situation. Thus confidentiality for adopters was ensured, 
but at the price of a greater legal commitment on the part of 
adopters towards their adopted children. The child was to be 
seen henceforth as a full member of the family taking his or 
her equal place alongside the children of the marriage, in all 
matters administrative and legal. As well as matters of heredity 
and Intestacy, details concerning name, date of birth and 
consanguinity were dealt with. Other questions relating to 
children previously "in care" and/or subject to affiliation 
orders were dealt with on the principle of a complete break 
with the past and a new beginning.
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This Act's enthusiastic encouragement oi adoption is in contrast 
to what was still the principle act, the 1926 Act. The spirit of 
that Act, such as it was, was quite engulfed by the amendments 
of 1949. A similar fate was to befall the next significant piece 
of adoption legislation, the Adoption Act 1958, when it was 
amended out of sight by the Children Act of 1975. An account of 
these two pieces of legislation and their attendant reports, 
comprise the subject matter of the remainder of this chapter.
The Burst Report, 1954.
The various reports and statutes of the period 1945 - 50 can be 
seen as presenting an alternative -attitude towards legal 
adoption to that of the inter-war years. The Report of the 
Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children of 1954 
(Hurst Report,1954), presents an attitude of continuing support 
and consolidation for the idea of encouraging appropriate 
adoption, with effective safeguards against administrative and 
professional over-zealousness. The spirit of the Act Df 1949 
finds further expression in the subsequent and quite
comprehensive Adoption Act 1958. The Act was described by the 
then Home Secretary as having "...adopted (sic) many of the 
recommendations of the (Hurst) report." (Adoption - the Way 
Ahead. 1969 .p.5)
As a review of contemporary legal adoption, Hurst was quite 
uncontentious. By the mid 50s adoption practice was becoming a 
familiar adminisrative and legal process (see Appendix A,Table
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l).The Court of Appeal had heard cases based on the Act (e.g. 
Hitchcock v V.B. (1952) 2 Q.B. 561. considering the question of 
dispensing with consents.), and research findings on effects of 
the Act were beginning to appear (Brenner 1951, Kornitzer,1952.)
The main concern of the committee's report was with the 
organisation of the adoption process, rather than any issues of 
principle concerning the Adoption Act 1949. To an extent this is 
a mirror of what happened between the two world wars, with 
principles being thrashed first in the Hopkinson and Tomlin 
Reports of 1921 and 1926 respectively,and issues of process 
within the finally accepted position being spelled out in some 
detail by Horsborough in 1937 (see Chapter 5 above).
Hurst returned to the subject of adoption practice and the local 
authority/voluntary society dichotomy. It recommended that local 
authorities should have conferred on them all the rights and 
powers of adoption agencies. It was suggested that they should 
be empowered to arrange adoption placements for any child, not 
Just those children in their care. They should at the same time 
act "sympathetically and impartially" when helping mothers to 
reach decisions concerning their children.
The committee distinguished three types of voluntary adoption 
society. There were those termed Introductory Agencies. They did 
no more than bring together prospective adopters and parents 
wishing to have their children adopted. Then there were the
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established Adoption Societies who also provided care for 
children not being adopted. Thirdly there were Moral Welfare 
Agencies concerned for mothers, mother to be and illegitimate 
children. Hurst endorsed evidence given by the larger and more 
professional agencies critical of Introductory Agencies. As well 
as controlling few physical resources, staff of such agencies 
were largely untrained. It was recommended that those societies 
and agencies not doing casework should consult with those that 
did. Local authorities would supervise all the placements and 
liaise with all the voluntary adoption societies in their area. 
They might also make financial contributions to such agencies 
who employed trained workers. The supervising local authority 
would also have discretion to decide when applicants of a 
voluntary agency placement should make application to the court.
It was recommended that the guardian ad litem should usually be 
an adoption worker from the local authority, except of course 
where the local authority was the placing agency. In any event, 
the committee deplored the practice of appointing as guardians 
ad litem anyone other than a professional adoption worker, a 
social worker. While the committee was exercised by the practice 
of third party placements, it refrained for pragmatic reasons 
from recommending their total abolition.
The committee then went on to consider the legal and medical 
aspects. It recommended retaining jurisdiction for the three 
courts of first instance, the Magistrates (Juvenile) Courts, the
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County Courts and the High Court. There were however 
considerable misgivings concerning the powers held by courts to 
dispense with the consent of parents, particularly on the ground 
of it being "unreasonably withheld". In commenting on the 
consolidating Adoption Act 1950, it was noted that "...the 
dispensing powers appeared in section 3 and were thus separated 
from the provisions requiring consent which appear in section 
2. Some of the emphasis which had been given in former Acts to 
the fact that adoption should normally be possible only if it is 
in accordance with the parent's wishes, seem to have been lost 
by this separation." (Hurst Report. 1954.p.29.).
The committee disagreed with the current legal interpretation of 
what constituted reasonableness in relation to consents being 
withheld. Court practice was to assess what was best for the 
child. The High Court including the Appeal Court fairly 
consistently emphasised in Judgements that while culpability on 
the part of a parent may indicate unreasonableness, the reverse 
was by no means always true. As Cretney comments when 
reviewing "unreasonableness", "In a series of cases it was held 
that although it was a prerequisite to the making of an order 
that the High Court should be satisfied that the order, if made, 
would be for the child's welfare, the mere fact that the order 
if made would conduce to the child's welfare did not make the 
withholding of agreement unreasonable'' (Cretney, 1979,p.548). The 
point will be returned to in Chapter 7. However, it is noted in 
passing that the test for unreasonableness stated by Lord
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Denning in re. L (1962) 106 SJ 611 amounts to what the
reasonable parent would decide in the circumstances. Given that 
the bench have to decide this, it becomes rather a circular 
proposition. The bench have to decide what they think would be 
seen as reasonable on the Clapham omnibus or where ever. It is 
of course the Judges who decide, and it is doubtful whether High 
Court Judges have any working familiarity with any omnibus 
passengers. The committee's confusion over the point is
illustrated by its recommendation that grounds associated with 
unreasonableness be withdrawn in favour of the substitute
ground of "making no attempt to discharge the responsibilities 
of a parent." The committee's proposed solution actually 
contradicts its earlier discussion. It proposed a substitute 
clause related to parental culpability only. Yet as the courts 
have recognised, there may well be arguments in favour of
dispensing with the consent of the non-culpable parent.
To conclude this brief discussion of the Hurst Committee's 
confusion over consents and their being Judged to have been 
withheld unreasonably, the committee argued against long term 
pre-hearing consents on both administrative and moral grounds. 
The committee was generally against making parenthood 
negotiable to any appreciable extent. The committee also 
supported recognition of a legal distinction between what is 
reasonable for a parent to argue and what might be materially 
best for the child. The case for the child's interests being 
paramount under the Guardianship of Minors Act 1925 was in no
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way analogous with consideration of the natural parent's case 
vis a vis prospective adopters. That prospective adopters could 
offer superior material circumstances, was not to be regarded by 
the court as sufficient argument to Justify a finding of 
unreasonableness against a natural parent withholding consent
The committee did break new ground when considering the role of 
medical reports in adoption. It was maintained that in the past 
too much concern had been expressed in relation to the child's 
state of health (see p.134 above) and not enough in relation to 
the prospective adopters. It was proposed that in future doctors 
should make no recommendation concerning the child's suitability 
for adoption, but merely report on the child's health. "This is a 
matter for the applicants to decide when they know the facts." 
(Hurst Report 1954.p.143.).
The committee strongly recommended that strict procedures 
should be devised for informing people that they had been 
adopted and allowing them to trace their natural parents.
Any payments associated with adoption and any advertising of 
children for adoption were matters which the committee felt 
strongly about, and recommended increased sanctions against 
such practices.
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Adoption Act 1958.
The Adoption Act 1958 is, at the time of writing (1987) still 
the principle adoption act, though now substantially amended. 
However, for the purposes of this paper the Act will be 
considered first as it was when implemented on 1st April, 1959. 
Amendments made in the 70s are considered separately as they 
comprise the third identifiable phase of adoption legislation, 
displaying an official attitude distinct from both the inter-war 
attitude of suspicion and the immediate post- war attitude of 
support and encouragement.
The Act of 1958, it is argued, can be seen as the high point of 
efforts to set a legal framework within which something 
approaching an even handed consideration of the interests of 
the three parties involved in adoption might be made. Of course 
a considerable amount of professional influence is apparent by 
this time and indeed the legislative powers were of considerable 
assistance to the developing social work profession. Local 
authority Children's Departments received a considerable boost 
from the new responsibilities conferred upon them by the new 
Act. The large voluntary adoption societies had lobbied the 
Hurst Committee and as a result obtained a new statutory 
framework of rules concerning their composition and 
performance. The process and results mirror closely the 
activities and aims of some large factory owners at the time of 
the early Factory Acts as described and theorised by Carson 
(see p.153 above) whereby regulation benefited large concerns in
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as much as smaller competitors were put out of business, being 
unable to meet the cost of compliance. Yet the point is that 
the professional attitude was to maintain what might be termed 
the tripartite consideration in relation to adoption decisions. 
Adoption was seen as a discrete disposal appropriate to some 
social situations confronted by some clients and social workers. 
It was nothing more than this, though relative to other 
disposals available to families not able to care for their 
children, it was unique in its irrevocability. Hence it was seen 
to require considerable specialist expertise and, given its 
unusual nature, it was very much a minority consideration within 
the context of the day to day work of the Children's Department. 
Throughout the 1960s the situation remained much the same, 
though subsequently there have been considerable shifts.
The Act followed Hurst in further defining the detailed legal 
and professional practice of adoption. The Act is divided into 
five parts and six schedules. Part V deals with miscellaneous 
matters including prohibitions of certain payments and 
restrictions on advertising as recommended by Hurst. It also 
deals to some extent with overseas adoptions. Part IV 
considers the supervision of children awaiting adoption or 
placed with strangers as distinct from relatives. As noted 
above, there was a continuing concern that children awaiting 
adoption should not fall into a limbo. They were designated 
Protected Children under this Act and became the supervisory 
responsibility of the local authority.
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Part III again concerns local authorities in their supervisory 
capacity relevant to "care and possession of infants awaiting 
adoption."
Part II deals with local authorities and adoption societies. 
This part bestowed on all local authorities the power to 
become adoption agencies themselves. The only bodies 
subsequently allowed to arrange for the adoption of children 
were to be local authorities and such voluntary adoption 
societies as had been approved by the local authority. 
Imprisonment was an optional sanction available to the courts 
on conviction of unregistered societies operating in the field.
Part I specifies legal procedures and the activities of courts 
when considering adoption applications. This part comprises 
about one half of the act but much of it reiterates clauses of 
the 1950 Act. Alterations only tend to emphasise what has been 
termed "the spirit of (such) legislation" of the 1940s and 50s.
Following the Adoption Acts of 1949 and 1950,further details 
were spelled out in section 7 concerning adopted children being 
seen as full members of their adoptive families. Courts could 
also require such families to provide for an adopted child by 
the making of a bond in its favour "... or otherwise to make for 
the infant such provision (if any) as in the opinion of the 
court is Just and expedient." The section stipulated that the 
order must be in the interests of the child. To this end courts
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would need to be satisfied concerning the health of the 
applicants, and the concurrence of those children able to 
express an informed opinion concerning their proposed adoption.
Age minima favouring those natural parents applying to adopt 
remained. A three month period subsequent to the infant's sixth 
week was stipulated as the minimum period during which the 
applicants had to have full care of the infant prior to the 
consideration of the making of an order, with a further 
requirement that non-parent applicants inform the local 
authority of their intention to apply for an adoption order at 
least three months prior to the hearing.
Section 4 stipulated that consents were only to be required of 
parents or guardians, and, notwithstanding Hurst, dispensing 
powers were stipulated in section 5 (see p. 168 above). They 
were:
5.(1) (a) has abandoned neglected or persistently ill
treated the infant; or
(b) cannot be found or is incapable of giving 
his consent or is withholding it unreasonably.
Having retained the "unreasonable" clause , the act then goes on 
to include the ground that Hurst proposed as an alternative
5. (2) (a) has persistently failed without reasonable
cause to discharge the obligations of a parent or
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Evidence of consents were to be acceptable in documentary form, 
duly witnessed by specified competent witnesses. Commensurate 
with the recently allowed (1949) confidentiality clauses for 
applicants (see p.162 above), the withholding or withdrawing of 
consent because of ignorance of the identity of the applicants 
was to be Judged as "unreasonable".
Along with the emphasis in section 7 on impressing on natural 
parents the irrevocability of an adoption order, Part I 
generally reiterated the attitude to legal adoption evident since 
the 1949 Act. Otherwise the act detailed processes and 
procedures to be complied with when adopting and the people who 
"know" were to be the local authority; the recently established 
Children's Departments.
There were also consequences for the voluntary adoption 
societies in requirements to keep books and have them available 
for inspection, employ competent staff, not employ particular 
categories of persons and generally comply with registration 
requirements. As noted above, this would inevitable benefit 
larger societies with the resources to meet the requirements, by 
eliminating some small competitors. Thus adoption was 
established and organised and in the hands of local authority 
social workers to a considerable extent, with strong support 
from their associates in the voluntary societies. It may have
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remained so for longer than it did had not these professionals 
agitated for further change.
The Houghton Report, 1972.
As demonstrated above, with the implementation of the Adoption 
Act 1958, legal adoption was established and generally accepted 
as a legal procedure which social work had at its disposal to 
deal with particular cases of children unsupported by their 
natural parents. It was seen by the profession as a discrete 
entity, and for obvious reasons associated with the permanent 
nature of adaption, it was a very significant one. It was also 
available to families and children without the participation of 
social work, though this availability was seen by the profession 
as something less than desirable. Where natural parents were 
one of the adopters, the social work task was peripheral and 
the object of the procedure was at variance with professional 
aims. These were to only use adoption legislation to create new 
relationships and social situations for adopted children and 
their adopting parents. As for the situations analogous to 
those promoted by adoption agencies but without professional 
involvememt prior to placement, so called third party 
adoptions, they were frowned upon by the profession but were of 
no great numerical significance.
The early conflicts associated with adoption were now dead 
letters. Arguments in support of adoption in official reports 
became perfunctory during the 50s. The adopted child's place in
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the family was established. Appeals were allowed from any of 
the courts of first instance, that is Magistrates (Juvenile) 
Court, County Court and High Court.
The operation of the procedure, particularly in its ideal type, 
the adoption of an infant by a married couple who were 
strangers to the child, was largely controlled by adoption 
agencies and hence the burgeoning adoption social work 
profession. Adoption agencies comprised voluntary adoption 
societies and those local authority Children’s Departments who 
chose to take on the task. In 1972 at the time of the 
publication of the Houghton report, ninety six of the 172 local 
authorities in England and Vales were so designated. 
Accountability in relation to the voluntary societies was to 
the registering local authority, and of course, Children's 
Departments were publicly accountable.
But if the old areas of conflict were indeed yesterday's 
arguments, by the late 1960s the professionals were agitating 
for reformed legal provisions based on their experience of 
operating the procedures, and desire for enhanced status 
commensurate with their role and responsibility.
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Two documents were published by the profession in the late oOs 
arguing for adoption law reform. They were significant in 
setting many of the parameters for the debate. They also 
"popularised" the cause of reform in this area at a time when 
there was much debate and legislation concerning social reform 
under the Labour administrations of 1964-70. The Standing
Conference of Societies Registered for Adoption, the body
particularly representing the Voluntary Adoption Societies
though also open to appropriate local authorities, published its 
"Report to the Home Office on Difficulties Arising from the 
Adoption Act 1958", in 1968. The Association of Child Care 
Officers , published "Adoption - the Vay Ahead", in 1969. A 
detailed analysis of these two documents is outside the scope of 
this paper. Suffice it to note that the two publications were 
in general agreement concerning the problem which mainly 
related to the requirements of multi-consents by natural 
parents, the use of adoption by relatives of the child, third 
party placements, and issues relating to the profession being 
given greater recognition for its developing expertise. All
this, it was proposed, could only be achieved with the
implementation of a new adoption act. In this respect the 
professionals were wrong. All of their major recommendations 
are now (1987) part of a vastly reformed and altered 1958 Act. 
A new adoption act, the Adoption Act 1976, is on the statute 
book consolidating the reforms of the mid 70s, but ten years on 
implementation is still awaited. "...it is understood that no 
part of that act will be brought into force until all relevant
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parts of the Children Act 1975 have been implemented." (Cretney, 
1979.p.153)
When the issues for reform noted above are considered in detail 
and placed alongside Hurst and the 1958 Act, they can be seen 
to be sympathetic reforms and developments of that legislation. 
They can be seen to be concerned with standards of work, 
relatives and adoption, and consents. Vhat makes the adoption 
reforms and amendments of the last ten years no less a 
contradiction to the late 50s position than that position was 
compared with the pre-war position, is the inclusion of all 
children within the ambit of local authority care as potential 
adoptees. This development has quite skewed the concept "local 
authority care" as presented in the Children's Act 1948 (see 
pp.106-108 above for discussion on this point). This is a 
particularly good example of the tail wagging the dog.
The Houghton Committee was set up in July 1969, and reported in 
October 1972 (Houghton, 1972). It was appointed as the 
Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children, and 
comprised eighteen persons. Two members died before the report 
was completed, the committee's chairman, Lord Houghton and Mrs 
Mitchell, the committee's only representative of local authority 
members. Of the remaining sixteen members, three were lawyers, 
three worked for local authority Social Services Departments, 
(by this time the local authorities personal social services 
departments had been amalgamated under the terms of the Local
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Authority Social Services Act 1970), and one member represented 
a Voluntary Agency primarily concerned with keeping single 
parents and their children together. The other nine persons, 
fifty percent of the original committee, comprised members and 
employees of constituent voluntary societies of the Association 
of British Adoption Agencies.
The committee was selected to comprise a wealth of experience 
of the process of legal adoption. Its terms of reference were 
"...to consider the law, policy and procedure on the adoption of 
children and what changes (were) desirable." They were 
particularly instructed to consider alternatives to adoption for 
relatives, and the position of putative fathers. Subsequent to 
the setting of the terms of reference and the selection of the 
committee the terms of reference were extended to include a 
review of "the position of long term foster parents who wish to 
keep children permanently, by adoption or otherwise, against the 
will of the natural parents." Vhile a basic proposition of this 
paper is that to attempt to identify specific cause and effect 
in relation to influences for social change is a hazardous, not 
to say foolhardy exercise given the complexity of the subject, 
it is nevertheless proposed that this extending of the 
committee's terms of reference was a very significant occurrence 
when placed in its temporal context. No doubt Leo Abse K.P., a 
committee member, makes too much of his part in the 
proceedings when he claims responsibility for both the 
extension of the terms of reference and the subsequent
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unanimous report (Abse, 1973). Nevertheless there were 
obviously considerable party political pressures associated with 
the committee and its report.
Boarding out of children, usually referred to as fostering, is 
the most popular method employed by local authority social 
workers to accommodate children "in care". There is no strict 
or administrative division between short term and long term 
boarding out. Though most children received into local 
authority care are discharged home after a short period (see 
Appendix A Table 5), practice indicates that it is impossible to 
forecast, in many instances, the length of stay of a child in 
care on admission. Hence any such review of fostering would be 
of absolutely central concern to local authority Social Services 
Departments and of much less significance to voluntary 
societies.
In short, a committee with the task of reviewing adoption law 
and practice was seen to require much experience and expertise 
is the area and was selected on that basis. It was then further 
required to review a far more extensive and significant field of 
social work. It was not seen as necessary to ensure that the 
committee comprised anywhere approaching equal experience and 
expertise in the additional area of fostering. Not only did the 
committee make far reaching recommendations concerning 
fostering; the recommendations were followed. It is proposed 
that this skew in expertise was a significant factor in shaping
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a new and competing paradigm for social work which has gained 
ascendancy over the past ten years.
The committee will be referred to as the Houghton Committee 
though it is recognised that Judge F.A. Stockdale took over the 
chair on the death of Sir William Houghton almost a year before 
the submission of the final report to the Home Secretary in 
October, 1972 (Houghton Report, 1972).
The Houghton Committee published two documents of similar size 
though different weight. In October 1970 Adoption of Children 
was published and widely distributed within the profession and 
associated groups. It was "A Working Paper containing 
provisional proposals of the Departmental Committee on the 
Adoption of Children..." (Adoption of Children, 1970) It was 
stated that it was published "for comment and criticism only, 
(and it did not ) represent the unanimous... views of the 
committee" (op. cit. title page).
Overall, it is a far more abrasive and polemical document than 
is the final report, though both cover well-nigh identical 
ground and make very similar proposals. Where as the final 
report has the self assured style typical of such reports, the 
discussion paper displays a rather desperate desire to convince 
an ignorant or hostile reader. Total authorial self confidence 
in the correctness of the proposed case which will be obvious 
to all right thinking persons, is absent. In place of the
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typical self confidence of official reports there is a 
considerable tendency toward overstatement. A few examples 
from the discussion document will help to illustrate this point.
As noted above, an early paragraph in all the official reports 
on legal adoption had argued, though with decreasing passion, 
for the need for such legal powers. It might have been thought 
that by the 1970s the proposition could simply be asserted. To 
over state the case was pointless. The discussion paper quotes 
(Adoption of Children,1970. para.9) recent figures for all 
adoptions as proof of the continuing need for adoption, while 
later arguing that anything up to 50% 'of adoptions in any one 
year, those by relatives, should be prohibited. The document 
appears to be substantiating its case with what it later states 
to be inappropriate adoptions. The paper goes on in the same 
paragraph to state, in support of the need for legal adoption, 
that if the present annual figure was maintained, "something 
like one million children would be adopted in the course of 40 
years." Whatever else the table in Appendix B of the final 
report indicates it certainly illustrates clearly that adoption 
figures hardly remained the same from year to year leave alone 
for a period of 40 years. In the four years from 1926 the 
number doubled. Ten years later the figure had double again and 
again in the next six years and yet again in the next three 
years. The annual figure then slumped to 13.000 by 1950. During 
the 50s the figure remained fairly constant to begin to rise 
again to 14.000 in 1959 and 15.000 in 1960. By 1968 the figure
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had. risen to a high point of over 24.000. Thereafter the 
figures that the committee possessed demonstrated a 
considerable slump in adaption of children by strangers. 
Overall figures were held in some sort of check by the 
continuing rise in adoption by relatives so that the figure for 
1972 still remained at about 21.000 (see Appendix A, Table 1>. 
A reasoned argument for adoption by strangers in 1972 might 
have simply noted the long term trend of increasing numbers of 
people adopting, but to overstate the case was unconvincing. 
The final report eschews reference to figures when arguing "The 
Need for Adoption" (Houghton Report, 1972. para 15). It simply 
relies on assertion, thus demonstrating an improved political 
awareness of what was required in the situation. Offering such 
hostages to fortune may well be a symptom of some lack of self 
confidence arguing the case of a new (semi?) profession in the 
corridors of power. Remaining with the "Need for Adoption" 
(op.cit. para.15), it is also notable that the final report tones 
down the discussion document's description of adoption as "...one 
of a number of alternatives, which appears to be the most 
satisfactory solution in many but by no means all cases" to 
"...one of a number of alternatives and ...a satisfactory 
solution in many cases but not in all."
Of course there are bound to be variations between a discussion 
document and a final report. That after all, is the point of a 
discussion document. However, the variations referred to here 
concern style and tone rather than substance. There are many
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instances within the discussion document where social workers 
are proposed as experts not to be questioned. When authors 
have to proclaim their abilities for "skilled professional 
assessment" and that they are "people with a deep knowledge and 
understanding of child development" they may not inspire great 
confidence in their own report as a disinterested review of the 
subject (Adoption of Children,1970. para 13). Again when 
considering whether or not statute should contain specific 
provisions in terms of minimum ages of adopters and minimum 
length of marriage before being able to apply to adopt, the 
discussion paper asserts that such provision "...illustrate the 
way in which skilled professional judgment can be fettered by 
precise criteria laid down in the law" (op.cit. para 60).The 
final report more simply states that it does not "....wish to 
hamper professional judgment by recommending a minimum period 
because circumstances vary" (Houghton Report, 1972. para.76).
As stated above, the main points proposed in the discussion 
document were recommended in the final report, with detailed 
amendment but not wholesale exclusion. Conclusions concerning 
tone and style relate to a burgeoning professional group 
striving for recognition, and maybe striving too hard. One 
wonders whether the modified tone of the final report 
demonstrates the confident and calming influence of its 
substitute chairman.
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The burden of the Houghton Report comprised the organisation of 
an approved and registered adoption service uniformly and 
nationally available (Chapters 3 and 4 >; the excluding of
relative adoption in favour of guardianship (Chapters 5 and 6); 
the re-organisation of consent procedures (Chapter 8); and some 
modification of adoption and court procedures (Chapters 9 and 
10). All this was, to a considerable extent, previewed in the 
two professional publications urging reform published by the 
Association of Child Care Officers and the Standing Conference 
of Societies Registered for Adoption (see p.178 above). The 
contentious area not considered by the profession prior to 
Houghton concerned the specific inclusion of foster children 
within a discussion of adoption (chapter 7).
A notable difference between this report and previous ones was 
the emphasis on the role of social work and social workers 
within it. It is noted in the introduction that "...adoption 
laws cannot be considered without regard to social work.services 
which operate in this field, since law and practice are 
inextricable interwoven." (Houghton Report,1972. p.l.). While 
Hurst gave considerable attention to the organisation of the 
adoption service, the role and function of social work, its 
expertise and responsibilities, did not feature to any marked 
extent in that report.
The question arises, if law and practice, in social work terms 
at least, cannot be considered except in relation to each other,
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what is that relationship? The assertions of the discussion 
paper certainly indicate a belief that at least practice was as 
influential on the construction of statues as concepts 
concerning the rule of law and the rules of law. There is also 
a suggestion that the strong adoption lobby, evident within the 
Houghton Committee, took a fairly cavalier attitude towards the 
central task of their local authority counterparts in respect of 
social work with families and children. This particularly 
applies to fostering, or more specifically the boarding out of 
children “in care". Ignorance and self interest rather than 
mendacity may have been the cause of this. However, 
consequences of the committee's recommendations have been no 
less far reaching in their effect on social work practice in 
general, for being unintended. As will be shown, these effects 
on social work practice have not only been as a direct result 
of the statute, but also of courts' interpretations of the 
statute. Such interpretations extend to not simply ignoring 
Houghton but directly contradicting the report. (See Chapter 7.)
Thus a model representing the process of reform of recent child 
care legislation and practice can be constructed:
a) The case for reform. In this context
this would include Houghton and the professional
publications.
b) Resultant and consequential legislation. The
Children Act 1975, plus
c) Judicial interpretation.
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The social wort or professional influence is apparent in a) even 
if, certainly in this case, it was a naive and partial influence, 
b) which I have considered elsewhere (Teague.1975) and will 
only outline here, was the arena where politicians encouraged 
and responded to a moral panic, and c) considered in the
following chapter, provided and continues to provide an arena 
where the dominant attitude can be reinforced and re-asserted. 
The power of state ideology is established at c) in its
continuing ability to present itself as "obvious", what 
everybody knows" and "common sense". These are strong counters 
to any group of "experts" with esoteric theories who 
nevertheless "continuously" fail to prevent social tragedies 
from occurring. (As an example see A Child in Trust, 1985. 
pp.xx-xxiii.)
Before describing in some detail the proposed position of foster 
children within the report, a brief consideration of the four 
areas which comprise the bulk of the report and follow the
Report tD the Home Office on Difficulties Arising from the
Adoption Act 1958 (1968), and Adoption - The Way Ahead (1989), 
is appropriate.
Houghton does not so much contradict Hurst as take those 
arguments much further as they relate to the provision of an 
adoption service. It supports the basic structure of local
authorities and voluntary agencies sharing the field, though it 
argues for closer co-operation, and an extended service to cover
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the country uniformly. As in Hurst there is considerable 
emphasis on the development of a professional practice, and an 
urging of small societies to come up to standard or shut up 
shop (Houghton Report,1972. para. 42). As would be expected, 
there are recommendations aimed at assisting those voluntary 
societies able to meet the required standards. These relate to 
some funding of them by local authorities and a closer working 
relationship whereby a society might make use of a local 
authority's material resources in the shape of say, a children's 
home. This might avoid the society having to set up its own.
All this is in the light of a vigorous though unsubstantiated 
assertion that there is a need for this duplication of the local 
authority service. The only attempt at argument is to propose 
the hoary one of the provision of choice (op. cit. para. 42) It 
might be argued that the only recognisable choice the voluntary 
societies ever offered related to religious faith. Many of these 
societies were founded by denominations of the Christian church 
and the point of placing one's child with one of them was to be 
assured that the child would be brought up in the true faith. 
It will be recalled that the condition as to religious 
persuasion was the sole condition on which a natural mother 
could insist when placing her child under the terms of the 
Adoption Act 1958. It may be surprising then that the 
committee advocated withdrawing this power from the natural 
parent (op. cit. paras 228-230). Further, para. 229, agreed by 
all the members of the committee, appears to relegated faith to
-189-
Post Var Adoption.
the status of an optional extra when it declares that the power 
to stipulate religious upbringing “...may be contrary to the best 
interests of the child in that adopters may be selected not 
because they are the most suitable but because there is a 
shortage of adopters of the religious persuasion named by the 
mother, or there may be a considerable delay in placement while 
adopters of a particular sect are sought," The overt 
implication is that suitability does not include, to any 
significant extent, religion. One may be surprised that those of 
any religious persuasion are prepared to state this. One could 
with confidence predict that certain religious minority groups 
in this country would hotly dispute this point. The committee 
recognised the point but obviously saw it as one to be 
legislated against when they stated, "There are now many more 
mothers of other faiths (than Christian and Jewish), some from 
overseas". Such "overseas " faiths have to become negotiable 
in the same way that Christian (and "Jewish"?) faiths have, it 
is implied, along with natural parenthood itself.
In the event this was yet another right of natural parents 
removed by the subsequent legislation. In a multi-racial 
society such a recommendation displays racist thinking and lays 
the act open the charge of racism. Transracial fostering is 
being opposed by some local authorities and the whole question 
brings the insensitivity of the Houghton Committee's discussion 
into relief (Brockman, 198b).
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Several recommendations concern the development of a 
comprehensive service with improved standards and centrally 
rather than locally registered.
Only registered adoption societies should have the power to 
place children for adoption with non-relatives, thus banning 
"third party" adoptions. The committee were exercised by 
adoption by relatives, usually a parent on marriage or re­
marriage. The discussion document actually recommended that 
natural parents might be allowed to adopt their illegitimate 
child, usually on marrying someone not the parent of the child, 
but that legitimate children should not be available for such 
adoptions. The final report did not seek to ban adoption by 
parents but suggested that any adoption by relatives should be 
exceptional (Houghton Report,1972. para.115). The committee 
proposed that the better course would be for relatives to apply 
for guardianship under the recent Guardianship of Minors Act 
1971. a consolidating act .
Consents had always been problematic in the procedure of 
adoption and the committee addressed the problem in great 
detail proposing a news approach which they termed "freeing for 
adoption". It is quite exceptional for a mother to agree to
place her infant child for adoption except with great 
reservation and under the force of circumstances very adverse 
to her bringing up her own child. Nothing in the professional 
literature argues otherwise and it is because of this axiom that
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totally satisfactory procedures in relation to consents have 
proved to be been impossible to define. Hence the powers in 
adoption legislation to dispense with consents either on 
specified grounds or under a catch-all condition. It will be 
remembered that the original catch-all condition gave carte 
blanche to the court (see p.146 above.). This power was modified 
under S.3 of the Adoption Act 1949. In future the test would 
be whether or not the consent was being withheld unreasonably. 
As has already been noted and will be considered in some detail 
in the following chapter, this modification still allowed the 
Judiciary ample latitude.
The committee's proposed "freeing for adoption" procedure 
(op.cit. paras. 173 - 183) was to enable the natural mother to 
make a once for all decision to allow her child to be placed for 
adoption. The decision still had to be delayed until the child 
was at least six weeks of age but the time limits associated 
with periods of care by applicants prior to a hearing would 
cease to have any significance as far as consents were 
concerned. There was to be no requirement that the child should 
be placed before consents were given. Indeed the discussion 
paper proposed that the irrevocability of the new form of 
consent should be such that the mother would lose any right at 
all to even be informed if it proved impossible for her child to 
be adopted. The final report withdrew from this hard line and 
proposed that a mother should be able to indicate if she 
wished to be informed subsequently, if her child was not
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adopted, and have the right in such a case to apply for parental 
rights to be restored. A concern about such procedures related 
to responsibility for the child between relinquishment by the 
natural mother and an adoption order being made. The committee 
proposed that responsibility should rest with the agency. Given 
the committee's stated aim to frame legislation with first 
interest being the welfare of the child, it is difficult to 
follow their reasoning in proposing that the natural mother 
should not have the right to be informed if her child was not 
in fact made the subject of an order. It is not difficult to 
imagine a change of circumstances for the mother, say marriage, 
remarriage, re-housing or such, where an unadopted child would 
have the opportunity of experiencing the security of family life 
as a full member. To seek to rule out this possibility would 
indicate great concern for administrative procedures at the 
expense of some humanity.
The further ground of serious ill treatment was added to the 
list of conditions which courts could rely upon when seeking to 
dispense with parental consent. This could amount to Just one 
episode, but the court would need to be convinced that it would 
be unlikely that the child could be rehabilitated with his 
natural family.
The Adoption Act 1958 did not make any stipulation concerning 
the status of the concept “the welfare of the child" when 
considering whether parental consent was being withheld
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unreasonably. At the time of Houghton, the High Court 
demonstrated two opposed lines of thinking. One had it that a 
parent would have to have behaved in a culpable manner before a 
court would dispense with her consent, while another line of 
reasoning held that a reasonable parent would take into account 
the best interest of the child and therefore if the courts 
perceived her as not doing so, these were ground for finding 
her behaviour in the matter unreasonable, and hence grounds for 
dispensing with the consent. In 1971 the House of Lords on 
appeal, came down in favour of the latter reasoning. (R.V. 
(1971) 1VLR 1227.) Houghton opposed this line of argument. 
Again the final report modified a ' recommendation of its 
discussion paper in advocating that in this issue the child's 
interest should indeed be of first concern, but not that it 
should follow guardianship legislation and be considered as 
paramount.
A first interest is significantly different from a paramount 
one. Paramouncy is a reasonable rule in a situation where 
divorcing parents claim custody of their child. All other 
things being equal, both parents have an identical claim and 
therefore the interests of the child is, on the face of it, the 
only variable for consideration. However, the interests of 
natural parents as against prospective adopters is not 
analogous with divorcing parents. To deny a natural parent a 
natural right to be heard on her Dwn account may be typical of
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the attitude displayed In the discussion document but arguably 
such a denial eschews natural justice.
In all the committee made 92 recommendations, many concerning 
details of process in court, the role of guardians ad litem, and 
medical reports, their quality and cost. Maybe the single 
recommendation most clearly displaying "the new attitude" to the 
role of adoption, was that recommending payments of allowances 
to some adopters to enable them to afford to adopt "...although 
most of our witnesses were opposed to our suggestion..." (op.cit. 
paras. 93-95).
Yet it was the late extension of the committee's terms of 
reference and their response to this in chapter 7 of their 
report particularly, which separates off their perusal of legal 
adoption from all former such exercises. Their specific 
inclusion of foster children as a group who in future would have 
a special relationship to legal adoption as distinct from all 
other children within the population, skewed not only the 
concept foster children, but also the concept legal adoption. 
The most obvious effect on the latter concept was to place it 
within a continuum of official care, rather than it being seen 
as a discrete and uniquely significant disposal of a social 
problem. What relationship there had previously been between 
fostering and adoption was accidental and unintended in that 
the aim of reception into care under the terms of s. 1 of the 
Children Act 1948 was re-unification of parents and children.
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Only if that seemed unlikely in the immediate or foreseeable 
future would authorities consider assuming the parental rights 
over such children "in care". Where such powers were assumed 
there was little liklihood of parents interfering
inappropriately while a local authority looked on helplessly. 
Thus in social work terms, there was no need for adoption 
legislation specifically to provide safeguards for children in 
care. Such children stood in the same relation to legal 
adoption as all other children. If it was appropriate in
relation to the three parties concerned, the child the natural 
parents and the prospective adopters, then so be it.
In essence, what the committee proposed in relation to foster 
children was that there should hence forth be a presumption of 
possible adoptability. While the committee did not put their 
proposals in such a direct form, it is difficult to see this 
result as an unintended consequence and particularly not an 
unforeseen one.
The committee's main recommendation in the area was that any 
foster parent could apply to a court to adopt a child whom the 
foster parents had cared for for a minimum of five years. The 
committee in its discussion paper, had proposed that with the 
agreement of the local authority, foster parents could apply 
after one year. In each of these cases the natural parent would 
lose the power to frustrate the application by removing their
-196-
Post War Adoption.
child, assuming that the parents did not consent to the 
proposition.
The final report states:
"These suggestions attracted far more comment than any 
others. While they received considerable support from 
members of the public, many professional organisations in 
the child care field such as the British Association of
Social Workers and the Society of Medical Officers of 
Health and some of the large voluntary child care 
organisations, such as Dr Barnardo's and the Church of 
England Children's Society, disagreed with them" (op.cit. 
Para. 145)
In its final report the committee bowed to the opposition which 
comprised the representatives of workers and organisations
boarding out the vast majority of children other than those 
privately placed by their parents. The committee withdrew 
suggestions of encouragement of foster parents in claiming legal 
rights of either guardianship or adoption of children boarded 
out for less than five years. This was at the expense of
suggesting increasing powers for local authorities to assume 
parental rights over children in their care, or in the care of a 
voluntary society. However, to a considerable extent the damage 
had been done. The symbolic effect of statutory powers is as
significant as the use of the powers. Thus any increase in
powers social work may obtain over children "in care" must
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threaten the families of all children "in care". A new ground 
was added to those, any one of which would allow the local 
authority to assume parental rights over a child in its care.
The existing grounds under s.2 of the Children Act 1948 were:
a) That his parents are dead and that he has no guardian.
b) That a parent of guardian has abandoned him, or 
suffers from some permanent disability rendering the said 
person incapable of caring for the child, or is of such 
habits or modes of life as to be unfit to have the care of 
the child.
Further clauses were added by section 48 of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1963:
a) That the parent or guardian suffers from a mental
disorder ... which renders him unfit to have the care of he 
child; or
b) that the parent or guardian has so failed without 
reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a parent 
or guardian as to be unfit to have the care of the child.
The Houghton committee proposed that a local authority should 
have power to pass a parental rights resolution in respect of 
any child who had been in their care for three years (op.cit. 
para. 156). Further, a local authority could pass a parental 
rights resolution in respect of any child in the care of a
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voluntary society citing any of the above grounds, (op.cit. para 
158)
Where a resolution was in existence in respect of one parent, 
the local authority, it was proposed, should have powers to 
frustrate the other parent against whom there were no grounds 
for an assumption, if it seemed likely that the culpable parent 
might thereby gain access to the child (op.cit. para 157). Local 
authorities were also to have powers to apply to the courts for 
"the permanent transfer of parental rights" including the right 
to consent tD adoption for any child in their care (op.cit. 
para.225). The power to consent to adoption had not previously 
been included in the parental rights which a local authority 
might assume.
Other recommendations included giving to parents explanatory 
leaflets on the implications of reception into care of their 
children (op.cit. para 151), a right of appeal from the decision 
of a Juvenile Court to uphold a local authority's parental 
rights resolution (op.cit. para. 159), and that there be 
required of parents a Notice of Removal of children who had 
been in care for more than one year. The local authority should 
be allowed to require up to 28 days notice, "....to give time for 
the child and parent to get to know each other again." (op.cit. 
para 152). It was noted that "in many cases (the authority) 
would be likely to agree to the child being returned in a much 
shorter period." This observation will be considered in detail
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in the next chapter when considering how the Lewisham case (see 
chapter 7 below) continued the trend set by Houghton.
Children Act 1975.
The Houghton Committee reported in October 1972 and the main 
recommendations of the report were enacted in the Children Act 
1975. Given the number and significance of clauses not wholly 
pertinent to adoption, it is unsurprising that this Act was not 
entitled "Adoption". It is of course the originating report, not 
the resultant act, that was inaccurately entitled (see p. 179 
above). There was more official activity related to children in 
the care of local authorities, between the committee reporting 
and legislation. Maybe the most notable event was the setting 
up and reporting of "A Committee of Inquiry into the Care and 
Supervision Provided in Relation to Maria Colwell". (Colwell 
Report, 1974). The moral panic surrounding this case was 
encouraged by an alliance of a Tory Secretary of State at the 
D.H.S.S., Sir Keith Joseph, and an opposition M.P. Dr. David Owen 
who respectively made parliamentary time available for, and 
presented a Private Member's Bill seeking to enact Houghton late 
in 1973. This populist effort came to nothing with the fall of 
the government in February 1974, but David Owen then found 
himself in a position to present a Government Bill on the 
subject which was enacted in November, 1975.
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How much significance can be attributed to such moral panics 
when considering forces for legislation is a matter of some 
interest, but the question is out side the scope of this study. 
A definitive argument would probably need to include the 
correspondence among many items of contemporary legislation to 
demonstrate a trend, and this would need to be set alongside a 
demonstrable trend elsewhere in the public sector, "the social" 
(Donzelot, 1980). However, the present study is more modest in 
seeking to trace and account for the dynamics of adoption work, 
social work more generally and the power of legislation. It is 
proposed though not demonstrated that recently assumed powers 
over parents and children is only one example of an 
increasingly authoritarian attitude adopted by the state 
towards those defined as deviant in the 1980s.
Part 1 of the Children Act 1975 reads as an adoption act. The 
first seven sections define a nationally available, professional, 
centrally registered and approved service envisaging a 
partnership between the public and voluntary sectors.
The new expeditious procedure of "freeing for adoption" is 
specified in some detail. The procedure follows Houghton 
precisely (Houghton, 1972,p.165-167). Consent procedures under 
the 1958 Act were universally criticised, usually requiring the 
natural parent to consent on three separate occasions. The first 
occasion would be when the agency received the child for 
placement. The child would be at least six weeks of age. Then
-201-
official consents would be made and officially witnessed. 
Thirdly a guardian ad litem would interview the mother to 
ascertain, amongst other things, that the consent was freely 
given in the full knowledge of the implications of that consent.
Applicants criticised the 1958 Act consent procedures as 
anxiety provoking. The period prior to the making of an order 
was one of uncertainty, knowing that the natural parents could 
withdraw consent at any time. Thus a change to irrevocable 
consents early in the procedure was desired by all parties. 
However, such reform is also in line with the trend of limiting 
the rights and powers of natural parents in the process. It can 
be seen that in a situation of poor advice and less than the 
highest professional standards, the practice of "freeing for 
adoption" could be at the expense of some rights of natural 
parents.
Under section 9. (7) of the 1958 Act, the court was obliged to 
appoint a guardian ad litem to report to the court on the 
proposed adoption, and with a duty to safeguard the interests of 
the child before the court. It was specified that the guardian 
ad litem should not be an employee of the agency placing the 
child because it was felt that a placing agency was an 
interested party. Houghton had argued against this on the 
grounds that as agencies' professional standards improved, so 
would their competence to report to the court direct. There was 
some acceptance of this argument, and section 20 refers to the
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subsequent Adoption Rules <1984) allowing some discretion as to 
whether or not a guardian ad litem should be appointed.
As described above <p.l91> much consideration had been given to 
adoption by relatives by the Houghton Committee and it had been 
recommended that an order under the terms of guardianship 
legislation would usually be more appropriate.In the event the 
1975 Act contained a complete Part (Part II) on such custody 
matters, and defined a new order, the Custodianship Order.
This discussion of custodianship will be linked with extensions 
of the rights of foster parents to apply for the adoption of 
children living with them, described in Part I of the Act. 
Together these clauses specifically define foster parents as a 
group with special rights distinct from all other potential 
adopters. Custodianship orders were introduced as the preferred 
order where previously a natural parent or spouse might have 
jointly applied for an adoption order, or where relatives other 
than parents might have applied. It had been argued that 
adoption was something of "a sledge hammer to crack a nut" in 
such circumstances. In the case of a parent's applications, the 
child's position could more appropriately be confirmed by an 
order specific to the step-parent. Such an order would also 
avoid the fiction of parenthood, allowing the natural parent to 
at least maintain her, or more likely his, symbolic status. 
Similar arguments were associated with relative adoption. 
Typical situations involved grand parents or uncles and aunts
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adopting children, with even more liklihood of the physical 
presence of the natural parent. All this was non-contentious, 
indeed a generally advocated reform among the professionals. 
However, Part II goes on to introduce foster parents as a second 
group for whom custodianship orders were to be appropriate. 
Thus, any person who had provided a home for a child for twelve 
months including the three months prior to the application 
might apply for custodianship with the consent of the 
parent .After three years of care the relative or foster parent 
might apply, notwithstanding opposition from the parent 
(Freeman, 1986).
Similar clauses relate to foster parents as applicants for an 
adoption order. Under previous legislation it was the case that 
once a parent had consented to adoption, though that consent 
could be withdrawn at any time up to the making of that order, 
the parent could not physically remove the child from the 
prospective adopters without leave of the court. This was not 
the case if the applicant had applied without consent, in which 
case the parents could physically re-claim their child. The 1975 
Act gave the right to any foster parent who had cared for a 
child for five years to apply to the courts for an adoption 
order and, notwithstanding the opposition of the natural parent, 
they could not then remove their child without leave of the 
court. Further, if a child placed with prospective adopters 
became the subject of a "freeing for adoption" application by an 
adoption society responsible for the child, again the natural
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parents would lose the rights to re-claim their child prior to 
the court hearing, notwithstanding that they had never consented 
to adoption for their child.
It must be emphasised that foster parents have always been able 
to adopt the children for whom they cared and in many cases 
adoption orders did little more than confirm de facto adoptions. 
Again many children boarded out by local authorities were 
subject to a parental rights resolution by the local authority, 
and so the natural parents could not remove the children at 
will. Yet rights to apply for adoption orders, in certain cases 
without the consent of the parents and in other cases even 
without the agreement of the local authority in whose care the 
child had been placed by the parents or court, was something 
quite new. Similarly, priority rights to apply for legal custody 
of boarded out children, against the wishes of both natural 
parents and local authority, was also quite new. The rights of 
parents had been severely undercut. Rights were transferred to 
local authorities, adoption societies and fosterparents. The 
process of transferring children, particularly but not only by 
legal adoption, from natural parents unable to accommodate them 
for the time being, to families who could so accommodate them, 
was being greatly encouraged, Encouragement was given to both 
the local authority in respect of children "in care", and to 
local authorities and voluntary societies acting as adoption 
agencies. Also encouraged were private citizens, those families 
acting as foster parents either by private arrangement with
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natural parents, or by more formal arrangements. Such formal 
arrangements would be with local authorities or large voluntary 
societies such as Dr. Barnardo's or the Church of England 
Children's Society, providing for children "in care". This 
encouragement of the private individual as distinct from the 
state agency is emphasised by the conferring of a statutory 
right to apply to the courts notwithstanding opposition from 
legal guardians or even the local authorities, themselves 
standing in loco parentis'. For some families, parenthood has 
become quite negotiable.
Part III of the Act was given over to amending previous 
legislation, to bring it more into line with the recommendations 
of the Houghton Committee. The 28 days notice of removal 
required of a parent whose child was “in care", was written into 
the Children Act 1948 (see p.199). Houghton had recommended the 
notice period for children who had been in care for a minimum 
of one year. Section 3A of the 1948 Act now specifies six 
months. Similar conditions now apply to children in the care of 
the voluntary societies. More conditions were specified, any one 
of which a local authority might rely on to assume parental 
rights over a child in their care. Previously such conditions 
related to there only being either no parent available or the 
parent being in some way culpable or incapacitated. A new 
clause introduced by the 1975 Act simply related to the child 
being "in care" for a minimum period of three years, no matter 
what the attitude, behaviour or resources of the parents. The
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Act did introduce a right oi appeal to the High Court against 
the decision of a juvenile court confirming or otherwise a 
parental rights resolution of a local authority.
To follow through its general attitude of negotiable parenthood 
as distinct from a basic assumption that parents and children 
have a right to live together, a new section was inserted into 
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 as section 32A.
"If before or in the course of proceedings in respect of a 
child or young person ....it appears to the court that there 
is or may be a conflict, on any matter relevant to the 
proceedings, between the interests of the child or young 
person and those of the parent or guardian, the court may 
order that in relation to the proceedings the parent or 
guardian is not to be treated as representing the child or 
young person..."
In such cases the court could order legal aid for the parent to 
allow him or her to take part in the proceedings.
Finally the 1975 Act is noteworthy in that it modified the 
general duty of local authorities in care cases and adoption. 
The Children Act 1948 was amended at section 1 so that "...in 
reaching any decision relating tD any child in their care, a 
local authority shall give first consideration to the need to 
safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his
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childhood...". Two points are significant here. Firstly, the 
Houghton Committee debated whether or not the welfare of the 
child should be "paramount". It proposed that it should be in 
its discussion document, but opted for the lesser emphasis of 
"first consideration" in the final report. Discussion of the 
preposterous nature of the suggestion that identical 
considerations apply in the situation of awarding the custody of 
a child as between competing parents, and the situation of 
deciding as between parents and the state, will not be 
laboured. Even "first consideration" indicates a presumption 
rather than an exception that the child's interests are distinct 
from his or her family's. The second point is that the phrase 
"throughout his childhood" heralded a new concept within such 
general duties relating to children "in care". Most children 
entering into the care of the local authority, do so with the 
expectation of a short stay and a return home (see Appendix A 
table 5). Vhile the retreat from paramouncy indicates that the 
Houghton Committee and the Children Act 1975 could have 
discounted the rights of parents of children "in care" to a 
greater extent than was the case, the new statutory general 
duty to plan long term for all children received into local 
authority care is an extensive symbolic and instrumental 
responsibility. Awareness of this feature of "care" must 
inevitably create apprehension in the minds of families likely 
to have to deal with "the welfare".
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The influence of the dominant state ideology an the development 
of adoption legislation has been considered in the previous two 
chapters. The delegation of powers to social services 
departments enhances the significance of statutory social work 
as a disseminator of the dominant state ideology. Though the 
force of legislation can be seen to be irresistible, the practice 
of a statutory service is also determined to a considerable 
extent by the judicial interpretations of statutes. This chapter 
will consider judicial interpretation by reviewing two cases 
concerning appeals relating to a local authority's power to 
assume parental rights over children in care. Judicial 
interpretations can be as significant as legislation in 
effecting practice. Certainly both statute and judicial 
interpretation are more significant than "professional 
standards" as determinants of social work practice. The chapter 
concludes with a consideration of two recent reports examining, 
inter alia, social work practice. The reports contradict each 
other with their proposals for reform. As such they are 
examples of competing pressures within the state to define 
social work practice. Practice is as a result of at least three 
direct influences, statute, binding legal precedent and the
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professional "body of knowledge". Professional attitudes are 
always more malleable than "the law".
The Interpretation of Statutes.
By the late 1970s, local authorities were responding to demands 
for their social services departments to adopt a firmer 
supervisory attitude towards some clients. Their most obvious 
efforts were in relation to attempts to extend their powers in 
relation to assuming parental rights over children in their 
care. It must be noted that the following discussion refers to 
Judicial interpretation of the Children Act 1948. Since these 
events the Act has been repealed in favour of the Child Care 
Act 1980. The 1980 Act is a piece of consolidating legislation 
re-enacting all of the 1948 Act effective at that time. For the 
sake of clarity the discussion will be framed in terms of the 
1948 Act but it should be noted that sections 1 and 2 of that 
Act are now sections 2 and 3 of the 1980 Act.
The issue related to sections 1 and 2 of the Children Act, 
1948. Before describing the ambiguity which was "discovered" in 
these sections nearly thirty years after their enactment, it may 
be helpful to note in part, the wording of the act .
"Sec 1. U) Where it appears to a local authority with 
respect to a child in their area appearing to them to be 
under the age of seventeen -
cal that he has neither parent or guardian.... or
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(b> that his parents or guardian are....prevented....from 
providing for his proper accommodation, maintenance and 
upbringing; and
(c> in either case, that the intervention of the local 
authority under this section is necessary in the 
interests of the welfare of the child,
it shall be the duty of the local authority to receive 
the child into their care under this section. (Emphasis 
added. )
(2) Where a local authority have received a child into 
their care under this section, it shall, subject to the 
provisions of this Part of the Act, be their duty to keep 
the child in their care so long as the welfare of the 
child appears to them to require it, and the child has 
not obtained the age of eighteen.
(3) Nothing in this section shall authorise a local 
authority to keep a child in their care under this 
section if any parent or guardian desires to take over 
the care of the child, and the local authority shall, in 
all cases where it appears to them consistent with the 
welfare of the child so to do , endeavour to secure that 
the care of the child is taken over either-
(a) by a parent or guardian of his, or
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(b) by a relative or friend of bis, being, where possible 
< of the appropriate religion)".
Section 56 of the Children Act 1975 added to section 1 of the 
Children Act 1948 a new subsection (3A) which must also be 
noted.
"<3A> Except in relation to an act done-
(a) with the consent of the local authority, or
(b) by a parent or guardian of the child who has given 
the local authority not less than 28 day's notice of his 
intention to do it,
subsection (8) (penalty for taking away a child in care) 
of section 3 of this Act shall apply to a child in care 
of a local authority under this section (notwithstanding 
that no resolution is in force under section 2 of this 
Act with respect to the child) if he has been in the 
care of that local authority throughout the preceding six 
months; and for the purposes of the application of 
paragraph (b) of that subsection in such a case a parent 
or guardian of the child shall not be taken to have 
lawful authority to take him away".
Section 2 of the Children Act 1948 contained the powers first 
enacted as the so called poor law adoption powers of the Poor 
Law Amendment Acts of 1889 and 1899. These were the powers to 
assume the parental rights over children in care. The 1948 Act
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powers related to children In care voluntarily under section 1 
and could be assumed by the local authority if it so decided, at 
any point when the necessary conditions applied. They were 
permissive powers and the decision as to their application in 
any particular instance was a professional one. The grounds for 
such an action related to the child having no effective parent 
capable of caring for the child, or that the parent, because of 
his or her "habits or modes of life (was) unfit to have care of 
the child." Grounds were added from time to time and the 
amendment made by the Children Act 1975 required the section to 
be completely re-written (see Children Act 1975, sec. 57.). The 
grounds added related to mental illness of the parent, 
consistent failure to act as an acceptable parent, that a parent 
not subject to such a resolution may allow the child to contact 
the other parent subject to such a resolution, or that the child 
had been in care for the three years previous to the resolution. 
It can be seen that by the time the Children Act of 1975 had 
been passed section 2 of the 1948 Act had been considerable 
extended. The trend was to continue.
To demonstrate this increasing emphasis on the control aspect 
of social work in the late 1970s two principal cases will be 
considered; Johns v Jones 1978 3 VLR 792 and Lewisham London
Borough Council v Lewisham Juvenile Court 1979 2 VLR 513. Both 
cases concerned the operation of section 2 powers of the 
Children Act, 1948. The former case is a re-statement of "usual 
practice". The latter represents the new reality.
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Johns v Jones was decided in the Appeal Court in the summer of 
1578. It concerned a local authority's powers to pass a 
resolution under section 2 of the Act, assuming parental rights 
after the mother had requested the child's discharge from 
section 1 voluntary care. Section 2 (1) of the Act begins by 
stating that it only applies to a child "who is in care under 
the foregoing section..." Thus, the question hung on section 1 
(3) which of course specifically stated that nothing in the 
section could authorise a local authority to keep a child 
against the wishes of a parent. (See p.211 above.) The local 
authority's action in passing such a resolution was therefore 
deemed to be invalid and the mother's- appeal was upheld. The 
Court of Appeal refused permission for the local authority 
appeal to the House of Lords, and a request direct to the House 
of Lords Judicial Committee was similarly refused. The Appeal 
Committee of the House of Lords which dismissed the petition by 
the local authority to hear the appeal comprised Lord 
Vilberforce, Lord Salmon and Lord Keith of Kinkel. 
Notwithstanding that decision, seven months later the House of 
Lords did consider the point when the three law lords were 
joined by their colleagues Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Scarman.
In Johns v Jones, Sir David Cairns gave the following judgment;
"In my judgment the words: 'Nothing in this section shall 
authorise a local authority to keep a child in their care 
under this section if any parent or guardian desires to 
take over the care of the child' in section 1 (3) of the
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Children Act 1948, have the effect that, if a parent 
informs a local authority of his or her desire to take 
over the care of the child, the child is therefore not in 
the care of the local authority under the section. I 
should have formed that opinion without the assistance 
of any authority. That view is fortified by the judgment 
in this court in Bawden v Bawden (1978 3 VLR 798).
Accordingly I would allow the appeal, entirely agreeing 
with the fuller reasons given by Orr L.J." (1978, 3 VLR 
797).
There had been previous attempts to re-write the 1948 Act, the 
most notable being in the case of Halvorsen v Hertfordshire 
County Council 1974 5 FAM LAV 79 DC. The Lord Chief Justice, 
Lord Vidgery argued that where section 1 (3) refers to any
parent of guardian desiring to take over the care of a child 
(See p.211 above), it applied only to any parent not
disqualified by the reasons which persuaded the local authority 
to receive the child into care in the first place. This argument 
is now generally accepted as "wrong" (Hoggett. 1977.p.l75.).
Nevertheless, there are echos of the reasoning (and
misunderstanding) in Lewisham London Borough Council v 
Lewisham Juvenile Justices considered by the Law Lords in early 
1979. This case similarly related to an appeal against a local 
authority passing a section 2 resolution subsequent to a parent
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requesting the return of her child in care under section 1 of 
the Act. Unlike Johns v Jones, the authority passed its 
resolution within 28 days of the request by the mother, this in 
an attempt to comply with the new subsection (3A> (see above 
p.212>. By now of course, the Court of Appeal was bound by the 
previous House of Lords ruling, and so the appeal went to the 
House of Lords. While the Judicial Committee of the House of 
Lords could not agree whether the new subsection (3A) was 
relevant they did agree to allow the appeal and so add a new 
vulnerability to all children in care, and a threat to all their 
parents. Further, another factor was presented for the 
consideration of all parents who might at some point in the 
future need to seek local authority care for their children. 
There is no evidence that such considerations ever impinged 
upon the Law Lords.
Repeatedly throughout the Lewisham judgment, the Law Lords
exercised their powers of reasoning to find the "true"
relationship between the two points of section 1 (3); the duty 
to return the child to the parent on demand and the duty to 
endeavour to secure that the care of the child is taken over by 
the parent or other, if consistent with the welfare of the child. 
Viscount Dilhorne proposed, "All that the first part of the 
subsection provides, in my opinion is that a local authority
cannot if such a desire is expressed, rely on section 1 as
authorising them to keep it" (op.cit. p.518). He continued 
further down the page, "the second part of the subsection is
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linked to the first and is not in my opinion to be treated as 
if it were a separate and distinct subsection. It provided that 
in all cases the local authority must endeavour to hand over the 
child if that is consistent with the child's welfare, and its 
duty so to endeavour does not only arise when a parent or 
guardian desires to take over the care of the child."
Lord Salmon found himself with similar "difficulties of 
construction" in relating the duty to return a child, with the 
duty to advance the interests of the child. "It would surely be 
shocking if the law does compel an authority to hand over a 
child in its care to a parent who is, for example a violent 
alcoholic, likely to neglect, injure or do the child irreparable 
harm" (op.cit. p.524.). Lord Salmon hesitated to fully support 
his colleagues Viscount Dilhorne (op.cit. p.512.) and Lord Keith 
of Kinkel (op. cit. p.536.) in their assertion that subsection 
(3) allowed the local authority to ignore a parental request for 
the return of its child and resolve to assume parental rights 
over the child. He was persuaded however, that the 28 days 
notice required under subsection (3A) may be used for the 
purpose of considering whether the local authority might wish 
to make a section 2 resolution. Lord Salmon saw the
opportunity that such a resolution might give to the juvenile 
court to decide whether or not a child should be discharged 
from the care of the local authority as a positive advance and 
safeguard for both parent and child (op.cit. p.526.).
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Lord Scarman noted the knotty administrative problem of 
maintaining a child in care for up to 28 days after he had
apparently been discharged under the terms of section 1. He 
referred to such matters as problems of construction of the Act. 
"In seeking to solve these difficulties, different courts have 
reached different conclusions, the effect of which have been to 
present the local authorities and their social workers with 
severe problems in the exercise of their responsibilities under 
these two statutes (Acts of 1948 and 1975.)." Lord Scarman went 
on to state of the new subsection <3A), requiring 28 notice in 
respect of children who had been in care for more than six
months: "It is to ensure that, when a child's period in care had 
exceeded the duration of a temporary family crisis, or 
emergency, a parent is not to be able to take him back without 
the local authority having a proper opportunity to consider 
whether what the parent proposes is really consistent with the 
child's welfare" (op.cit. p.539.). He agreed with Wheatley v 
Waltham Forest London Borough (1979) 2 WLR 543 that the point
of the twenty eight days notice was to give a "breathing
space" to the local authority so that it could consider all the 
options, including a section 2 resolution.
As noted above, the five Law Lords were in general agreement 
and allowed the appeal. The direct results of the judgment have 
been significant. It is now common practice for parents to sign 
a notification on placing their children in care to the effect 
that after six months, 28 days notice may be required of them
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when requesting the discharge of their child. The negotiable 
character of discharge from care must make parents pause. "Care" 
was originally designed as a better alternative to "baby 
farming". This modification of its procedures has no doubt 
encouraged a latter day "baby farming" together with a 
considerable increase in unregulated child minding. The effect 
of the reform is also reflected to an extent in the paradox of 
declining numbers of children being admitted to care in an era 
of increasing privation. (See Appendix A, Table 5)
The Law Lord's statements concerning the purposes of the new 
(1975) amendment adding subsection (3A> to the Children Act of 
1948 is a good example of judge made law. The Law Lords were in 
general agreement that the point of requiring 28 days notice 
of discharge for a child who had been in care on a voluntary 
basis for more than six months, was so that the local authority 
might consider whether it wished to oppose the discharge and 
take over the parental rights. Bo other purpose was stated. The 
suggestion for such a period of notice comes from the Houghton 
Committee and they picked the idea up from the publications of 
the professional bodies which they considered. The Houghton 
Committee put it thus:
"Notice of Removal.
At present the parents of a child received into local
authority care may require his return at any time,
irrespective of the length of time he has been in care,
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provided that parental rights have not been assumed. A 
sudden move, without preparation, can be damaging to the 
child and can have long term repercussions. Ve therefore 
recommend that where the child has been in care for 
more than one year there should be a requirement to give 
28 days notice of removal. Removal within the period of 
notice without permission, would be prohibited in the 
same way as removal of a child subject to a Care Order. 
28 days would be the maximum period of notice, which 
could be waived by the authority or voluntary society, 
who, in many cases, would be likely to agree to the child 
being returned in a much shorter period. This provision 
would help to prevent impulsive and temporary removals 
from care, and would give time for the child and parents 
to get to know each other again." (Houghton Report 1972. 
p.44.>
Lord Salmon made it clear in his judgment the the Lewisham case 
was an appeal brought to the House of Lords as a test case, and 
the local authority concerned was supported by about 50 other 
such authorities (1979 2 VLR 523). The authorities got what 
they came for in terms of a re-definition of their powers to 
assume parental rights over a child. The Law Lords were 
obviously persuaded by the appellants, but the decision is 
questionable if one applies a strict interpretation of the rule 
of law argument whereby arbitrary decision and discretion are 
eschewed in favour of strict statute and rule. The practice of
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assuming parental rights over children had been altered and the 
Justification for this reform, where one was alluded to in the 
judgment, was the new subsection inserted in the act by section 
56 of the Children Act 1975. Yet if the judges had bothered to 
refer to the Houghton report for guidance as to the purpose of 
the powers mentioned in <3A> they would have seen that the 
overall purpose was to assist the transfer of children from 
care bach to their parents and family. The Law Lords chose to 
ignore this fact and interpreted the new power in directly 
contrary terms.
Had the judges followed their rules for constructing statutes 
when faced with uncertainties or ambiguities, rules which have 
developed over centuries of the common law, it is difficult to
see how they would have decided that when it was enacted,
*
section 56 ‘Of the 1975 Act was meant to extend the powers of 
local authorities In the direction the local authorities required 
when they appealed the Lewisham case. Walker and Walker's The 
English Legal System states that "Where a statute was passed to 
remedy a mischief the court must adopt the interpretation of 
the statute which will have the effect of correcting the 
mischief in question." Though courts generally look no further 
than the statute itself to discover its intention the rules do 
specifically allow judges in such cases to consult "..extrinsic 
sources such as reports of Royal Commissions or Law Reform 
Committees which may indicate the state of the law before the 
passing of the Act". (Walker and Walker.1972.p.107.) It is not
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proposed that the Judicial Committee oi the House of Lords 
behaved in any way improperly. It is proposed that as one oi 
the very powerful organs for the dissemination of the dominant 
ideology operating within the state, they provide an excellent 
example of the process in action. The case also highlights the 
naivete of the proposition that professional practice is proof 
against the power of the state. Professional practice can only 
modify a process, it cannot specify aims contrary to state 
ideology.
A trend of allowing to local authorities increasing powers in 
relation to children “in care" can be - seen to continue. V. v. 
Bottingham County Council <1981) 3 V.L.R 959, has further
serious implications for natural parents desiring the return of
their children from the care of local authorities. The Child
\
Care Act 1980 re-enacted substantial parts of the Children Act 
1948 including what became section 3 (6) (b). This was to the 
effect that on appeal against a local authority having passed a 
parental rights resolution the situation had to remain such that 
"at the time of the hearing there continued to be grounds on 
which the resolution under that subsection could be founded..." 
In the case in question, the local authority passed a resolution 
on the grounds that the mother had "consistently failed to 
discharge her parental obligations." The case was adjourned so 
that the parties might explore methods of worm which might lead 
to a re-unification. In the event this plan broke down, but 
because of the mother's working with the local authority the
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original ground no longer applied. Nevertheless, the juvenile 
court upheld the local authority's resolution. On appeal to the 
High Court, it was held that the resolution could not be upheld 
by the juvenile court because the original ground no longer 
applied, and the alternative ground, that the child had now been 
in care for more than three years, could not be substituted 
because it was the original ground which had to pertain at the 
time of the hearing. "The local authority appealed to the Court 
of Appeal, which held that the Divisional Court had been wrong 
on both counts." (Lyon.T. 1982)
Given any reasonable reading of the statute, the Court of 
Appeal is seen to have driven a coach and horses through its 
logic. Firstly the court dismissed the statute's assertion that 
the original grounds for a resolution must pertain at the time 
of the appeal, because to observe the statute might give rise to 
anomalies. So, to avoid anomalies which might occur say, if 
parents became unfit to have the care of their children during 
the passage of an appeal, the letter of the law was deemed to 
be worthy of no further consideration. The fact that other 
remedies were available to safeguard children does not seem to 
have weighed with the court. By this ruling local authorities 
are presented with the means to manipulate situations and then 
employ the results of the manipulations to Justify their 
resolution assuming the parental rights of parents of children 
"in care". If an authority appeals the refusal of a court to 
grant it parental rights, and if the delay in a decision caused
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by that appeal results in the child remaining "in care" for more 
than a period of three years, then that very fact can be used as 
grounds for the resolution. The point has also been raised in 
this context that while an appeal is pending, the child is "in 
care" subject to a parental rights resolution, and that is not 
the same as a child "in care" under section 2, so called 
voluntary care. While it is true that a child subject to a 
parental rights resolution is still legally cared for under the 
powers invested by section 2 (see sections 13 (1) and 15 of the 
Child Care Act 1980), to propose that a parental rights 
resolution does not effect the nature or status of the care 
under section 2, as Ormrod L.J. does in V. v. Nottinghamshire 
County Council, cannot be correct in law: in its social context 
such a remark is nonsensical. In law "...this remark ignores
various ...differences in the status of a child over whom the
\
authority! has parental rights and one over whom they have not, 
for example the power to recapture one who runs away" (Lyon, 
1982.p.232). As to the social context of the child and its 
family, the nature of a voluntary arrangement and the nature of 
one where the state has annexed the fundamental relationship of 
parent and child can only appears as opposites. For the state 
to then maintain that nothing of significance has occurred must 
encourage Kafkaesque nightmares for such families.
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Inquiries and Social Vork.
The legal profession has a central role to play in the 
dissemination of state ideology though pronouncements are often 
held to be simply common sense. When the "good and the great" 
are inquired of to discover a chairman for an official inquiry 
of one sort or another, lawyers have become an obvious choice. 
The two most publicised inquiries of (poor) social work practice 
in recent years , those subsequent to the deaths of Maria 
Colwell and Jasmine Beckford (Colwell Report ,1975, and A Child 
in Trust, 1985.), were both chaired by lawyers and both 
advocated an increasingly legalistic attitude for social work. 
There have of course been official reports reflecting to a 
greater extent a social work attitude and the fact that such can 
still be found demonstrates a continuing challenge to aspects of 
the dominant ideology, albeit muffled. The fate of official 
reports which seek to contradict the prevailing morality is 
often to gather dust in some official pigeon-hole. The Finer 
Report (1974) on One Parent Families is a good example of such 
an occurrence, and the Children and Young Persons Act of 1959 
noted above (p.113-115) actually contains pro-professional 
clauses though these suffered a similar fate later in the day by 
the device of non-implementation by the government of the day. 
Another example is The Barclay Report (1982) which was more 
descriptive than analytic but attempted to put foreward a social 
work point of view. Disagreement among the members of the 
working party was not really surprising given that it 
comprised eighteen person. However, two minority reports along
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with the majority report would not inspire confidence in the 
enterprise, and the report was probably destined to gather dust, 
even prior to its publication.
There are two publications of very recent date which will be 
considered. Both can be seen to be authoritative addressing 
areas of concern to the state and both may well initiate state 
action. Both concern social work practice but they represent 
alternative attitudes. There is no doubt that both demonstrate 
the influence of what was described in chapter 3 as the
dominating ideology. However, whereas "A Child in Trust" (1985) 
is a re-statement in some detail, of the contemporary critique 
of statutory social work, seeking ever greater emphasis on its 
policing role, the "Review of Child Care Law" (H.M.S.O. 1985.) is
an attempt to re-assert a social work definition within the
\
state attitude.
"A Child in Trust" (1985) is "The Report of the Panel of Inquiry 
into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Jasmine 
Beckford", and it is indeed an impressive document both detailed 
and comprehensive. As a result of being seriously assaulted by 
her step-father when she was two years old, Jasmine Beckford 
was made the subject of a care order under section 1 of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 The abuse came to light 
when Jasmine was admitted to hospital with a broken leg. Her 
three month old sister had been admitted to hospital three days 
earlier with a broken arm and she was also made the subject of
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a care order to the local authority. The sisters were returned 
"home on trial" seven months later when their parents had been 
re-housed in much more acceptable accommodation. After a
further seven months they were removed from the "child abuse" 
register. That was towards the end of 1982. In June of 1984 
while still living at home but subject to the care order, 
Jasmine was killed by her step-father. At the time, the Social 
Services Department were preparing to go to court to request 
revocation of the care order.
Though the department prepared for an inquiry into the event,it 
did not suspect its own culpability ’ in respect of Jasmine. 
However, it emerged later that Jasmine had been subject to 
cruelty over an extended period, and the main reason why this 
was not detected by the supervising social worker was that she 
had failed to insist on seeing Jasmine in the face of 
prevaricating parents. It appears that naive and myopic social 
workers were duped by cunning and evasive parents while the 
child in question was slowly battered to death.
The remarkably detailed inquiry apportions blame to most of the 
agencies involved, but particularly the Social Services
Department and to a lesser extent the local authority Health 
Department. The findings are depressingly familiar, centring 
upon very poor communications between those involved. When all 
the pieces of information held by agencies and individuals were 
brought together in the inquiry it became crystal clear that
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Jasmine's plight should have been recognised and steps should 
have been taken to protect her. Reports were lost in files, 
procedures were forgotten, phone calls were recorded "on backs 
of envelopes" and magistrates pontificated inappropriately. All 
this is the stuff of everyday life within a state bureaucracy, 
indeed some such practices are part and parcel of the "gate 
keeping" functions of over stretched services. Such a defence 
would not apply to a "child at risk". Because such occurrences 
are common knowledge within a bureaucracy such as a busy local 
authority social services department, steps must be taken to 
ensure that they do not occur in the particular case. Yet it 
must be said, as it is after each such tragedy, that it will 
occur again. Motorists will continue to kill pedestrians, doctors 
will continue to kill patients, police will continue to kill
suspects and parents will continue to kill their children "home
\on trial"i Judges do not now sentence the wrong person to the 
gallows but only because no-one is now sentenced to the 
gallows. If no children went "home on trial", what an apt phrase 
in the situation of Jasmine Beckford, no children "in care" 
would be killed by their parents.
The social workers involved were dismissed. The supervising 
social worker and her senior were sanctioned for adopting the 
wrong professional stance. The inquiry held that the focus of 
their work was the well being of the parents when it should 
have been the protection of the children. Yet assuming that 
social work can alter relationships between marital partners for
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the well being of the nuclear family, such work must be based 
upon some minimum level of mutual respect between worker and 
client. Constantly emphasising to a parent that the local 
authority and not she possesses the rights and powers of a 
parent over her child, can only reinforce feelings of profound 
failure. As the report noted but did not appear to understand, 
it is very difficult for a parent to visit foster parents caring 
for one's own child. It is the recognition of such overwhelming 
forces which can determine client's actions, and the readiness 
and ability to confront them, which distinguishes social work 
from police work, or the helpful friend. Social work must take 
account of the inter- and intra-personal pressures when dealing 
with clients' social worlds, and the balancing of all the forces 
complicates social work decision making to a degree.
Decisions'i in relation to Jasmine Beckford were ill informed.
i
While every effort must continue to be made to eliminate errors 
of commission and omission the debate concerning social work 
itself could be better informed than is the case with this 
report. If the spirit and detail of the recommendations 
contained in the report were accepted, the result would be not a 
reformed social work but a profession subjected to revolution. 
The process has been increasingly pressed over the past twelve 
years and more, but when the relationship between the worker 
and the client is finally discounted, then a new profession will 
have superseded social work.
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The report runs to three hundred and five pages with another 
one hundred and forty pages of appendices and makes sixty eight 
recommendations. Many of the recommendations are apposite, 
though they cover ground covered by previous inquiries. This is 
of course recognised. The thorough consideration of procedures 
in relation to child abuse, if followed, would no doubt make for 
a well run service. Throughout, there is a satisfaction with 
legal training, even though it is noted that welfare law is not 
particularly popular amongst the profession. This is in sharp 
contrast with social work training which is seen as slight in 
relation to the requirement. Yet there is little evidence of any 
knowledge of contemporary social work training. To note but two 
examples, there is an unattributed selection from Biesteck 
(1957) when describing the process of social work (A Child in
Trust, 1935.p.294.) As an alternative, social work is then
tencouraged . to reform in as much as it should specify aims and 
objectives when acting . In moving away from central reliance 
upon psychological explanations of behaviour such as those to 
be found in Biesteck, social work has in recent years developed 
a unitary approach. The central tenet of the unitary approach is 
the specification of aims and objectives and subsequent 
assessment of their achievement or otherwise (e.g. see Pincus 
and Minahan,1973. Goldstein, 1973. Specht and Vickery, 1977.).
Without a moderately detailed review of social work education 
and training, it is not reasonable to expect a committee of 
inquiry considering a particular incident of child abuse to be
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Informed of the details of social work education. Similarly, 
superficial comments on the education and training debate at 
present occupying social work, relating to the alternative 
patterns of the Certificate of Qualification in Social Work or 
the Certificate of Social Service , are not helpful. The Inquiry 
appears to over reach itself when it pronounces on the 
education and training of social workers on the basis of brief 
examination. The problem for social work is that in the present 
uncertain climate such comments are available to support an 
increasingly controlling state ideology, notwithstanding their 
flimsy nature.
The "Review of Child Care Law" (1985) was published after the 
Beckford Inquiry had concluded its main examination of
witnesses, but the inquiry report does note the review. There
\
are considerable similarities between the two reports. For 
instance both make the novel recommendation that magistrates in 
the juvenile court should be required to give reasons for their 
decisions in care proceedings (A Child in Trust, 1985. p.171 and 
Review of Child Care Law. 1985.p.l20.). Though the two reports 
address different subjects, there are obvious overlaps. These 
overlaps are quite sufficient to demonstrate their alternative 
attitudes to statutory social work. It must be stressed that 
these alternative attitudes are both within the parameters of 
"the state attitude". Neither could possibly be seen as 
proposing an alternative to the supporting of a dominating 
state ideology. It is more a question of emphasis.
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The Review Report was prepared by an interdepartmental working 
party. That working party was set up by the D.H.S.S. as a result 
of recommendations made by the House of Commons Social 
Services Select Committee on Children in Care in 1984. The 
working party's terms of reference were "...to make proposals 
and to set out options for codification and amendment of child 
care law." The attitude of the working party to its subject is 
stated in section 2. They see present practice as unfairly 
biased against parents "unable to exercise their
responsibilities for the good of their children" (p.5.). The 
report goes on to consider how far the principle of the "welfare 
of the child" should predominate in decisions made by social 
workers. They oppose such an idea, recognising that if such an 
attitude was taken to a conclusion many children from poor and
deprived families could be removed on the basis that a better
\
material standard could be provided elsewhere. "But 'the child is 
not the child of the state.' " A Child in Trust echoes this 
sentiment in quoting from the Review Report (p.269), only to go 
on and stress the exception to the rule, whereas the Review 
Report states;
"2.13 Ve are firmly of the opinion that....where 
compulsory committal to local authority care is an issue 
the present balance between the welfare of the child and 
the claims of his parent should be maintained." (Review 
Report,1985. p.6.)
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The tenor of the review gives the reader confidence that the 
subject of the review, statutory social work, is practiced 
competently and is of value. Given this attitude, it is proposed 
that a clear distinction is made between "major issues" such as 
transfer of parental rights, which should concern courts, and 
"the management of the case (which) should be the 
responsibility of the local authority." (op. cit. p.7.). Hence, 
the working party dismissed the suggestion that courts should 
have any powers or duties to review cases periodically.
A recommendation to the Select Committee aimed at increasing 
social surveillance, was that a reporting law should be 
introduced. As with so many of the initiatives in this area it 
is an idea based upon a procedure in operation in the United 
States. The requirement would be for identified professionals, 
doctors, health visitors, teachers and such, to report any 
suspected abuse as a legal requirement. The reasons the Review 
Report gave for rejecting such a proposal would equally apply to 
many new procedures required of statutory social work in recent 
years, supposedly contributing to the "welfare of the child":
"12.4 Ve have concluded that....there is no demonstrable 
need for a mandatory reporting law. Vhat is more, 
providing one might, in our opinion, be counter­
productive and increase the risk to children overall, 
first by weakening the individual's professional sense of 
personal responsibility and secondly, in casting the
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shadow of near automatic reporting over their wort, by 
raising barriers between clients and their professional 
advisers and even between professionals concerned in the 
same case. One consequence might well be to set back 
the advances made over the years in encouraging inter­
disciplinary communication and co-operation between all 
those involved in the health and welfare of families and 
their children." (Review Report, pp.80-1)
It is difficult to understand how legislators might read the 
above and see the passage as a description of unintended 
consequences. Alternatively, if these" consequences are not 
unintended, then it must be concluded that the legislators have 
no concern for the working relationship between what one might
loosely term "welfare professionals" and their poor clients.
\iThe continuing implementation of this lack of concern would be 
disastrous for G.P.s, teachers, Health Visitors and such. It 
would be fatal for the profession of social work as currently 
practiced. And where would all that leave "children at risk"?
The covert aim of the "Review of Child Care Law", it is 
proposed, is to counter to some extent, the contemporary thrust 
of official direction of statutory social work. Reception into 
care, it is proposed, should be separated into two alternative 
procedures, one for the very short term accommodation of 
children, and one for the longer stay. The first is termed 
Respite Care, where the local authority might provide
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accommodation but only in close partnership with the parents, 
lio powers over the child would be invested in the local 
authority! in would be little more than a neighbourly act with 
the parent encouraged to do all or most of the work. Where the 
situation was more problematic and the period of accommodation 
likely to be more than a month Shared Care would be provided. 
Shared Care is the review's proposition of what the present 
voluntary care under section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980 
should become .The main emphasis is to be on involving the 
parent in the care. Four problems are identified with the 
present situation. Respective powers as between parents and 
local authorities are unclear; some parents fear they will lose 
their children to the local authority; guilt is felt by parents 
giving their children up to the stigma and supposed second rate
care of "Care", (or why should it be so stigmatised?); finally
\
there is the problem of the unwillingness of parents to retain 
close involvement. The latter problem is seen as the most 
serious. “This involvement is crucial to achieving a return home 
which in the majority of cases is the best outcome for the 
child.“ (op.cit. p.53)
The review proposes restriction on the use of Place of Safety 
Orders noting a significant increase in their use.It must be 
noted that the A Child in Trust argues along very similar 
lines for a reduction in the availability of the order, but it 
only stresses the unsuitability of the order in relation to non­
school attendance. It could be better argued that the increase
- 235-
Courts Inquiries and Ideological Domination.
in the use of these emergency orders, especially for young 
children, is a direct response to the constant and generalised 
criticism which social work has been subject to for the past 
ten years and more. Such generalised criticisms are to be found 
within A Child in Trust.
As to compulsory care, actions under the Children and Young 
Persons Act, 1969, would only be undertaken to prevent "harm". 
As with the argument concerning making the welfare test 
paramount noted above, to apply "best" standards as section 1 of 
the act implies could lead many into care. Maybe most children 
at some time and to some extent have their "proper development 
....neglected" or their "health...neglected" or are "exposed to 
moral danger" and such. But of course not all children are 
likely to be thus arraigned. The original spirit of the 1969 Act 
is encouraged by suggesting that it would be as unusual to make 
a care order on the grounds of commission of an offence as it 
would to make one on the basis of non-school attendance. In 
either case, "harm" would have to be proved, and this would be a 
far stiffer proposition than the existing "care and control" 
grounds which are frequently taken as read (Priestley 
et.al., 1977).
To emphasise the counter revolutionary style of the Review 
Report a note of some of its propositions countering significant 
reforms brought in under the Children Act 1975 and that act's 
influence will be noted in conclusion.
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Maybe, the most pertinent is the proposition that the ruling in 
the Lewisham case reviewed above (p.199-206 > should be 
modified, so that the 28 days notice required of parents under 
what would be "Shared Care" could only be used as Houghton 
intended; that is as a period of re-introduction of parents and 
child (Review Report, p.59-60). Local authority's powers to 
assume the parental rights over children in care would be 
repealed, care proceedings on the basis of "harm" being the only 
option (op.cit. p.60). The review proposes that the duty of a 
local authority “to afford (the child "in care") opportunity for 
the proper development of his character and abilities", section 
12 (1) of the Children Act 1948 repealed by the Children Act 
1975, should be reinstated.
It is not that the panel of inquiry relating to Jasmine
iBeckford's death would individually oppose all or any of the 
propositions of the Review Committee. As noted, the Child Care 
Review was seen prior to the completion of A Child in Trust and 
several of the Review's recommendations appear in A Child in 
Trust. The point is that the overwhelming impression of A Child 
in Trust is one of censure of the contemporary practice of 
social work. The following conclusion flows easily from what 
went before:
"Ve fear that (the) attitude regarding the parents of 
children in care as the clients, rather than the children 
in their own right, may be widespread among social
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workers. Ve say this circumspectly, because we have not 
been able, nor has it been part of our function, to 
review the training or practice of social workers in the 
field of child care (sic). But we have listened to a 
number of social workers and expert witnesses, and in 
each case we have detected an attitude which is the 
negation of any authoritarian role in the enforcement of 
Care Orders" (A Child in Trust, 1985.p.294.).
The circumspection, not in great evidence throughout the report, 
soon gives way to forthright statements again.
"'Authority' is not a dirty word. Indeed, it must be 
brought officially from behind the arras of social work 
training onto the public stage, not just of child care 
law but also into the practice of all social workers. Ve 
regard it as an essential ingredient in any work 
designed to protect abused children. At the same time 
one has to recognise that social workers have a 
difficult task to perform, but it will not be made easier 
by being deflected from a proper appreciation of what 
society is demanding of them in the protection of 
children at risk." (op.cit. p.295)
Two points stand out from this brief consideration of two 
recent reports. Firstly the reports are incompatible one with 
another, in that if the assessment of the incompetence of
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contemporary social work which is A Child in Trust is accepted, 
then the confidence in social work implicit in the Child Care 
Review must be misplaced. Secondly, A Child in Trust advocates 
an altered social work practice strongly emphasising 
surveillance in what it terms “high risk" child abuse cases. The 
report does not appear to accept that the demand is not new. It 
has been a recurring theme since the mid 1970s, and far from 
authority needing to be "brought officially from behind the 
arras of social work training onto the public stage." the 
increase in Place of Safety Orders and Care Orders in relation 
to under fives are causing concern, concern incidentally, which 
the report notes . It would appear that the increase in these 
orders reflects a profession confronted with difficult decisions 
attempting to "play safe". Social work must be by now very
clear what it is that is being demanded of it. These demands do
'
not come from "society" but rather from the proponents of the 
state ideology.
It has been demonstrated that the state ideology can be 
detected in what might be termed extra official texts as well 
as obviously official texts such as statutes and official 
reports. Strong support for the official position can be found 
in judicial pronouncements. Here the appeal courts have a vital 
role to play in that their decisions can determine the actions 
of lower courts. The role of Inquiries, in this case child abuse 
inquiries also provides practical support to bolster the 
official ideology. Their effect over the past ten years or so
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has been very significant in modifying social work practice to 
emphasise a policing role. It cannot be too strongly emphasised 
that this process is quite distinct from acts of conspiracy or 
totalitarian domination. Alternative court decisions and official 
reports have been considered. The point is that given the 
dominating ideological position practice attitudes based upon it 
become "obvious" and "common sense". The Law Lords deciding the 
Lewisham case were not instructed to change their attitude of a 
few months previous as displayed in Johns v Jones. Rather, they 
"recognised" the folly of their ways when this was explained to 
them in some detail by the local authorities. It will be 
interesting to see whether the Child Care Review can turn back 
the tide. On the basis of this analysis, the document, in its 
present form, is more likely to suffer the fate of the Finer 
Report (1974)(see p.190 above) and gather dust.
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In this chapter the main conclusions of this thesis will be 
briefly re-stated and juxtaposed with a consideration of the 
recent development of professional social work practice. This 
exercise highlights a fundamental conflict within social work 
relating to, on the one hand its helping ethos, and on the other 
its surveillance function. Some 'implications of this
contradiction for social work organisation and practice are 
noted.
This thesis has been concerned to illustrate how statutory 
social work in local authorities has attained prominence in 
recent years. This prominence was sought by the burgeoning 
social work profession in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
flushed with what it saw as its achievement in successfully 
arguing for a comprehensive statutory social work organisation, 
social services departments. The move to prominence has been 
illustrated by a detailed consideration of adoption legislation, 
associated reports and relevant appeal court decisions, as they 
have appeared since the early 1920s. The significance of inquiry 
reports concerning the killing of children "in care" by their 
parents and others has also been considered. Overall, the
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state's relationship to particularly poor families and children 
has been a central point of concern, and the dynamic nature of 
this relationship over the last one hundred and fifty years has 
been reviewed.
While there was a growing concern for the welfare of children 
seen to be the responsibility of the state, throughout the 
nineteenth century, and this could be seen in the establishment 
of schools and a system of universal primary education, the 
position of children of the poor law at the turn of the century 
was still a rather gruesome one. While young girls of the 
poverty classes were no longer to be found in the pits or 
factories, the height of their ambition, as described by the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Law which reported in 1909, was to
be placed in domestic service. There was an argument for a more
\!
imaginative approach towards tapping the full potential of boys, 
but this only amounted to specifying a range of more or less 
hazardous occupations. And of course both sexes were seen to be 
appropriate and unquestioning material for the population of the 
Empire. There could not be said to exist any particular concern 
for the individual child.
Such a state attitude of poorly informed unconcern can be seen 
to provide the context for early adoption legislation. Though 
Private Members introduced several bills on the subject and the 
concern was well expressed in the Hopkinson Report of 1921, it 
was a further five years before a somewhat reluctant parliament
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legislated. A notable feature of that legislation was that even 
though it enabled children to be legally adopted, in terms of 
inheritance and wills the child's rights remained with his or 
her family of origin and no such rights to the property of the 
adoptive family came with the adoption order. It had to await 
the changed political climate of the immediate post war years 
before the principle that adoption involved full transfer of 
rights from the family of origin, the natural family, to the 
adoptive family, was recognised. Obviously the main beneficiary 
of this change was the child and thus the move can be seen to 
signify a growing concern for the individual child. This concern 
can be seen to be a considerable development of the state's 
previous expression of some minimum responsibility for children 
who were its direct responsibility.
\
The post-war years are seen as a period when there was a 
concern for the users of state welfare and the attitude noted 
above in the Adoption Act of 1949, and the Hurst Report of 1954 
reflected this. The Hurst Report (1954), taking its lead from 
the spirit of the 1949 Act, attempted to spell out in some 
detail an adoption procedure which could be seen to be fair to 
all parties. The parties were seen to be essentially three: the 
natural parents of a legitimate child, or the mother of an 
illegitimate child, the adoptive parent or more usually parents, 
and the the child. ' In stipulating the, responsibilities as well 
as the rights of adopters, Hurst can be seen to be emphasising 
the welfare of the child as a primary concern. This committee
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was by no means the first to advocate the welfare principle in 
relation to legal action concerning children, but it can be seen 
to seek to conscientiously operationalise the concept. The 
Committee's faith in the informed judgement of professionals is 
demonstrated by its advocacy of an increased role for the 
social worker and the adoption agency in the operation of the 
procedures. The Adoption Act 1958 followed Hurst closely to 
establish adoption as a secure and well administered disposal 
for the very small minority of children who were seen to stand 
in need of permanent substitute families.
The re-organisation of local authority social work under the 
terms of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, saw the 
social work profession brimming with self confidence and
pressing for greater powers to enshrine the professional
lattitude 1 . in reformed adoption legislation. The Houghton 
Committee's Report (1972) indeed pointed the way towards the 
professional legislation requested of it by the adoption 
professionals, both statutory and voluntary, but it also did the 
state's bidding in recommending radical reform of the powers 
and procedures associated with the boarding out of children in 
the so called voluntary care of the local authority. In 
successfully recommending that local authorities needed these 
rights and powers over children "in care" under the Children Act 
1948 sec. 1, Houghton can be seen to'have been responsible for 
fundamentally altering the relationship of the local authority 
social worker and families of children "in care". What is more,
-244-
Cone ius ions.
these rights and powers which amounted to a procedure lor the 
negotiation of parenthood, would also be a factor influencing 
potential clients of the social services departments and indeed, 
the papulation in general. The Children Act 1975 can be seen to 
be the key piece of legislation reforming most areas of social 
work practice with families and children. The 1975 Act followed 
closely the recommendations of the Houghton Report of 1972, the 
"Report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption of 
Children". Both the report and the Act would have more 
accurately been entitled "Social Work" rather than "Children" or 
"Adoption of Children" respectively, so wide have been their 
significance for contemporary social work practice.
Of course, had not the Houghton Committee been appointed, then
some other such committee would have had to have been created.
\
The whole development of statutory social work has been in the 
direction of increasing powers in recent years. As the Children 
Act 1975 was being implemented, greater powers were being 
discovered by the Appeal Court within the legislative powers 
used by local authorities to "receive" rather than "take"
children into care. This was particularly so in the case of
vlocal authority powers to assume parental rights over children 
"in care". Along side these developments, a series of central and 
local government inquiries into children who local authorities 
and their social workers failed to protect from harm, encouraged 
a popular opinion of an inadequate social work profession. This 
really makes the point that the increasing powers were powers
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against the poverty stricken clients rather than powers for the 
social workers. In as much as social workers are seen to 
advocate some measure of empowerment for the poverty stricken, 
they are popularly coupled with their pariah clients.
The contradictions within statutory social work have been 
referred to on several occasions. However, before conclusions 
can be reached on the effect that these recent developments are 
likely to have on social work practice, some mention must be 
made of what Evans (1976) refers to as social work practice 
theory and theory for practice.
The legion of social work practice publications fall into two 
broad categories; those written with the aim of advancing
practice and those written with the aim of expressing
\l
destructive criticism of practice. Of course the former group is 
of a far greater number than is the latter, though it may well 
be that the latter group obtains a wider notice. No doubt the 
reasons for this are associated with trends which comprise much 
of the subject of this thesis, trends associated with state 
influence and professionalism.
Until the 1960s social work was synonymous with social case 
work. Throughout the sixties unease was becoming increasingly 
apparent within social work itself at the theoretical reliance 
upon psychodynamic theory, and at this time a more sociological 
orientation began to developed. Too much should not be made of
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this development. Probably of greater importance than the move 
to distance social work from psychodynamic theory, was the 
continuing commitment to a client centred approach. Though there 
was no reluctance to emphasise the social work aim as one of 
achieving social change, and it was the social work task to 
specify the direction of change, the assumption was that the 
social worker and the client would engage together in the 
enterprise. If the force of social and community pressures were 
given increasing consideration in assessing the difficulties of 
clients, it became increasingly recognised at this time that 
people could not be defined in social terms without giving 
priority consideration to them as - family members. This 
developing focus on the family was of course, apparent in fields 
other than social work (for a recent review of the topic see
Morgan, 1985). It was a central theme of much social policy at
\
the time and found political expression in the Children and 
Young Persons Act of 1969, and the series of reports leading up 
to that Act (see Chapter 7 above). The pressures to widen 
social casework, and at the same time some reluctance to do so, 
permeates the National Institute for Social Work Training's "New 
Developments in Casework" (1966) compiled by Eileen 
Younghusband, later Dame Eileen Younghusband. In a perceptive 
paper Elizabeth Irvine (1966) "...record(s) a change of heart", 
acknowledging the need for a broader focus for social work. "Ve 
need to develop more appropriate and effective techniques for 
all types of clients in all kinds of agencies..." (Irvine,1966. 
p.46). Francis Turner, explaining the need for a second edition
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of his U.S.social work compendium, well illustrates the dilemma 
of social case work in the early 70s. Writing of the concept 
diagnosis in social work, a concept particularly linked to the 
treatment ethos of psychodynamic casework, he goes on; "Although 
we have often said diagnosis should never, and was never 
intended to be unidimensional, I think that we have nevertheless 
projected a view that it was a more easy manageable phenomenon 
with rather clear boundaries than in fact it is." (Turner, 
1976.p.xx). In having recantation forced upon him, Turner would 
no doubt have sympathised with the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary 
when confronted with the appellants of the Lewisham case 
discussed above (pp.215-221>.
At the same time so called "family therapy" was developing to 
take account of this wider perspective. This development as 
many others in this field, was initiated in the U.S. (Satir, 
1967), but was taken up in England by social work and 
psychiatry (Skynner, 1976). By the 1980s the perspective had 
led to the founding of several English and continental schools 
of family therapy. Social work and psychiatry have shared this 
development at some cost to any development of individual 
psychotherapy (Treacher and Carpenter, 1984). As noted above 
(pp.24-5) in parallel with this development has been a somewhat 
functionalist systems approach to social work problem 
assessment, which • has nevertheless aimed at concentrating 
workers' attentions on addressing concrete social problems, 
again at the expense of the psychodynamic (Evans, 1976).
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Arguments persist concerning the eilicacy of the various 
approaches, but it must be conceded that as social work's raison 
d'etre is structural poverty, concrete problems rather than 
intra-psychic problems are more immediate to clients, more 
available to modification and so more appropriate concerns for 
statutory social work.
Critiques of social work at most levels usually address the 
point concerning intra-psychic problems versus material 
problems, but many also go on to assume that social work 
continues to attempt to meet contemporary material problems 
with an esoteric clinical practice. Probably the best known 
recent attempt at this "straw man" argument is that by Brewer 
and Lait (1980). Better informed and more reasoned arguments
would include those by Sheldon (1978) advocating a behaviourist
\
perspective, and Bottoms and McWilliams (1979) taking a more 
existential attitude.
At some danger of over simplification, the problem may be 
stated thus. In attempting to work with clients by exerting 
influence through the medium of a personal relationship both 
social worker and client will inevitably identify with each 
other to some extent. Through such detailed and intimate work, 
social work is able to make a fairly comprehensive assessment 
of the situation of its generally -poverty stricken clients 
(Becker and Macpherson, 1986). But in attempting to effect some 
structural change for the benefit of the poverty classes,
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statutory social work is immediately confronted by a dominant 
state ideology of which it is itself a part. When the object of 
the ideological process of the state is to, at best, maintain the 
status quo, the inbuilt contradictions of the situation become 
chronic. It is not proposed that statutory social work is 
unique in this respect. However, it may be that the problem is 
more apparent with social work because of its uniquely 
contradictory position. Other state occupation groups concerned 
primarily with policing such as prison officers or the police 
themselves are trained narrowly for the specific task without 
expectation of their initiating novel forms of practice. Members 
of such groups may well feel the frustration of such a position 
but it is unlikely to be a major issue within the group. Status 
groups, what have been referred to here as professions, those 
usually advocating education as well as more narrow trainingi
\
for qualification, are expected to advance their own practice. 
Doctors, lawyers, architects, librarians, teachers and such fall 
within this group. The ability of status professions to regulate 
their employment will always be circumscribed, but the extent of 
circumscription varies. As the policing functions of social work 
are accentuated, to the inevitable detriment of a helping ethos, 
so the contradiction between a narrow policing job and a 
“helping profession" becomes critical. The recent modification to 
the general duties required of Social Services Departments in 
relation to children "in care" is a ‘case in point (see p.207 
above).
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Conclusions.
The demise of the Poor Law can be seen to have been central to 
the creation of the personal social services. The question 
arises as to whether the demise of statutory social work might 
herald a late twentieth century version of the "New" Poor Law. 
Certainly the Central Council for the Education and Training in 
Social Vork (CCETSV), is now engaged in the process of totally 
reorganising social work education and training (CCETSV, alS85, 
bl985, cl985, 1987). Immediately prior to undertaking the task, 
the Council itself was re-organised. Its membership was cut by 
two thirds, and the new council is now appointed by the 
Secretary of State rather than nominated by social work 
agencies as previous. As a further post script to this note on 
the organisation and direction of social work training, a new 
Director of the CCETSW was appointed in the summer of 1986. He
was the only short-listed applicant not trained or experienced
\i
in social work. He was, however, the Chairman and Secretary of 
the British Association of Adoption and Fostering Agencies. The 
influence of the profession on this re-organisation has been 
minimal as compared with that of the state. .
Two central questions arise from this study. Firstly, with the 
changes which have been brought about in the practice of 
statutory social work, has any thing of value been lost or 
gained? Secondly, does this account of the process of 
contemporary social change add anything to an understanding of 
the process and the structure of society? These two questions 
will be considered in turn.
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Firstly the point concerning the value of such changes. Such a 
subjective question immediately prompts the further question, 
from who's point of view? For instance Roberts, in his study of 
the origins of the welfare state, considers the contribution of 
Sydney and Beatrice Webb. He notes that a decade after their 
minority report of the 1909 Royal Commission on the Poor Law, 
they wrote The English Poor Law History, Part II, the Last 
Hundred Years, published in 1929. Here, Roberts proposes, the 
Vebbs displayed an ignorance of the concept of less eligibility:
"The Vebbs were critical of the Law's policy of a strict 
workhouse test and maintained that the authors of the Law 
did not seek to remove the cause of destitution. Filled 
with a socialistic desire to end poverty they overlooked
the (belief of Chadwick and the assistant commissioners
\
that the end of easy relief, along with better education, 
improved health in towns, and workhouse schools for the 
young, would remove the cause of destitution. The 
Vebbs' hostility to individualism prevented them from 
understanding the philosophy of the new poor law..." 
(Roberts, 1960.p.337>.
Roberts is surely wrong in this instance. To assert that a 
hostility to individualism prevented the Vebbs from 
understanding "the philosophy of the new poor law" is to assert 
that their collectivist attitude, such as it is maintained it 
was, sprang from some unconsidered reflex. No doubt personality
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and socialisation contributed to their standpoint, but for them 
above most, it was informed by study. In as much as the same 
can be argued for Chadwick's point of view their difference has 
a basis in value rather than ignorance. Value and opinion must 
have a central part to play in social science. Indeed, the notion 
that it plays no part in the practice of the natural sciences is 
also quite mistaken. (See for instance Kuhn, 1970, generally, 
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, concerning experimental chemistry, and 
Chalmers, 1982, for a recent review of the field of "philosophy" 
of science.)
The value of what has been put at risk by the reformed social 
work practice for social work itself, concerns relationships 
with clients. The trend from an ethos of treatment to one of 
helping in the sixties removed much of the mystification from
i
the concept of the social work relationship. Help and trust can 
be seen to be associated concepts and can be simply 
understood. Statutory social work was never particularly 
simple because it always carried the dominant ideology within 
it. nevertheless, social work clients are well used to 
confronting state employees who view them through "the grid or 
spectacles" of a dominant ideology, It is from this perspective 
that it is maintained that statutory social work could then be 
encountered as bureaucracy with a human face. Davies (1983) 
analyses the situation of professions within bureaucracies, 
rejecting earlier discussions which concluded that the two were 
quite incompatible structures. Professional statutory social
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work no doubt often made a welcome change for clients, from the 
harassed world of the perspex, shatterproof screens and screwed 
down chairs of the D.H.S.S. Supplementary Benefits waiting rooms, 
another familiar feature of the state for many social work 
clients. Simplistic definitions of the "welfare of the child" 
entailing "child saving" attitudes (Platt, 1977) at the expense 
of any consideration of the claims of parents or indeed 
children, to the maintenance of their nuclear families, are an 
anathema to any concept of state promoted social welfare (see 
pp.228-234 above for a detailed discussion of the point). 
Already British statutory social work cannot be forced much 
further in this direction without ' its practice becoming 
unrecognisable as social welfare work. Probation Officers in the 
U.S. carry hand guns!
s
\
The cost for clients will be greater. In as much as reception 
into care for children meets a perceived need, this need will be 
met less frequently. Ho matter that the standard of care "in 
care" is high and improving; the more that families perceive 
local authority care as a threat rather than as a service, so 
the more will they accept continuously lowering standards of 
substitute care free of the state. State care has never been just 
a service. There is a stigma attached to being unable to provide 
for one's offspring, the more so if one has not even a friend or 
relation to take over. Reception into care is, in itself a major 
trauma for any family and child. It is to be expected that 
parents will find it immensely difficult to visit their children
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"in care", particularly so when that visit entails admitting 
one's incompetence to a peer, a foster parent (Holman, 1975). 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the price must be 
paid, because usually foster care is preferable to institutional 
care for young children. Other things being equal, transfer to 
another nuclear family and one permanent carer, is likely to 
present a more familiar situation to the young child, than 
transfer to a Home and several transient carers. To all this has 
been added the stigma of "everyone knowing what happens to 
children whose parents put them 'in care"', and the real threat 
of not being able to reclaim one's child. The time limits of 
care which now form a "contract" (hardly between.equals), state 
clearly what was often suspected: the authority may negotiate 
concerning the parental rights of children " in care". Thus, in
this instance the cost to parents concerns some peace of mind
i
when committing their children to the substitute care of the 
local authority. Costs for the children themselves are difficult 
to assess. If what went before in terms of an unsupervised and 
exploitive child minding service summed up in the nineteenth 
century phrase ""baby farming", occurs again, the child may have 
to pay a heavy price.
It was argued in Chapter 2 above that legitimation is the 
achievement of ideology. In a modern industrialised society "the 
haves (continue) to come out ahead" ‘ (Galanter, 1974), but as 
long as the regime is granted legitimation by the majority of 
the populace a social and political revolution will not occur.
-255-
Conclusions...
The legitimation of a regime, a social order, is achieved 
covertly through unthought and unrecognised agreements which 
mundanely and continuously structure the social world. Giddens' 
detailed and comprehensive study identifies the whole process 
as structuration, the process whereby all societal members 
continuously reproduce the social world in their interactions. 
These interactions are structured on the basis of unrecognised 
rules of speech, expectation and perception. This Giddens terms 
practical consciousness which informs and is informed by 
discursive consciousness, the process and method whereby we 
routinely account for ourselves and each other. Using this model 
to account for contemporary statutory’ social work, one might 
suggest that recent reforms of social work are emphasising what 
were previously rules in the realm of practical consciousness. 
The poverty classes are having their poverty thrust upon them,
I
and services which formerly could be seen to ease their lot 
somewhat are being reformed in more oppressive terms. Habermas 
published his Legitimation Crisis almost twenty five years ago 
and it is proving prophetic. For if the oppression of 
significant sections of the population increases to the point 
where legitimation is withdrawn, when the practical becomes 
available for discourse, then ideological domination has to 
surrender to a more overt form of domination or the society 
undergoes revolution.
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This appendix comprises a series of tables followed by a short 
commentary on their relevance to the arguments put forward in this 
thesis.
Table 1.
The Incidence of Legal Adoption in England and Vales. 1927 - 1984.
Year Total
Number of 
Adoptions. 
(1)
"Parent's Own" 
Adoptions.
(2)
Non-Parental
Adoptions.
(3)
1927 2,943
1928 3,278
1929 3,294
1930 4,511
1931 3,777
1932 4,465
1933 4,524
1934 4,756
1935 4,844
1936 5,180
1937 5,547
1938 6,193 \
1939 6, 826
1940 7,775
1941 7,429
1942 10,409
1943 11,548
1944 13,027
1945 16,319
1946 21,279
1947 18,255
1948 18,540
1949 17,317
1950 12,739
1951 13,850
1952 13,894
1953 12,995
1954 13,003
1955 13,001 4,519
1956 13,198 4,727
1957 13,409 4,720
1958 13,303 4,328
1959 14,103 4,814
I960 15,099 4,487
1961 15,997 4,470
(cont.)
8,486 
8,974 
• 8,683 
8,976 
9,295 
10,612 
11,530
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(1) (2) (3)
1962 16,894 4,369 12,525
1963 17,782 4,650 13,132
1964 20,412 4,651 15,090
1965 21,033 5,784 15,258
1966 22,792 6,898 15,694
1967 22,802 7,189 15,613
1968 24,831 8,647 16,184
1969 23,705 9,335 14,370
1970 22,371 10,361 12,012
1971 21,495 10,751 10,743
1972 21,603 12,233 9,211
1973 22,200 11,677 8,459
1974 22,502 14,835 7,508
1975 21,299 14,567 6,580
1976 17,621 11,852 5,661
1977 12,749 7,783 4,867
1978 12,121 7,444 4,590
1979 10,870 6,534 4,254
1980 10,609 6,150 4,364
1981 9,284 5,057 4,153
1982 10,240 5,807 4,343
1983 9,029 4,939 4,008
1984 8,648 4,459 4,078
Sources: Years 1927 to 1973 Inclusive; The Registrar General's
Statistical Review of England and Wales, Pt. II. Published 
Annually. London. HMSO.
Year's 1974 to 1984 inclusive; OPCS Monitor. F.M.3. London. 
Government Statistical Service.
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Table 2.
Children Adopted from Care Annually, as at .31 March. 1953-1984. 
(Thousands)
Year. Total.
1953 1.0
1954 1.0
1955 —
1956 1.1
1957 1.0
1958 1. 1
1959 1.1
1960 —
1961 1.5
1962 —
1963 1.6
1964 1.7
1965 1.7
1966 2.0
1967 —
1968 2. 1
1969 2.2
1970 2.2
1971 1.9
1972 1.7
1973 1.6
1974 ! . 1.7
1975 1.5
1976 1.6
1977 1.5
1978 1.6
1979 1.5
1980 1.6
1981 1.7
1982 1.9
1983 2.2
1984 2.0
--- Figures not available or obviously incorrect.
Source. Children in the Care of the Local Authorities in England and 
Vales. Published annually in London by HMSO up to 1978: 
since 1979 by the Department of Health and Social Security.
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Table 3.
Number of Adoptions where Parental Consent was Dispensed with, 
England, and Wales. 1977 - 1983.
Year. a)No. of occasions 
when consent adjudged, 
to have been 
"unreasonably" 
withheld.
b)Total No. of 
occasions consent . 
dispensed with.
a) i 
of 1
1977 225 869 26%
1978 243 773 31%
1979 253 673 ' 38%
1980 317 763 42%
1981 372 731 51%
1982 511 898 57%
1983 580 956 61%
Sources: (1) Children Act 1975. First Report to Parliament. (1979)
A Report by the secretary of State for Social Services and 
the Secretary of State for Vales as required by Section 105 
of the Children Act 1975 on the Operation in England and 
Vales of those sections of the Act which are in force. 
London. HMSO.
(11) Children Act 1975. Second Report to Parliament. (1984) 
London. HKSO.
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Table 4.
Total dumber of Children In the Care of Local Authorities in England 
and Vales at 31st March, and Total Population oi U.K. in Age Group 
0-14 in Sample Years for Comparison.
Year Total. 0-14 years 
Population 
in Sample
Years.
(1) (2)
1951 62.7 Thousand. 11.4 Million.
1959 61.6 U
1961 62.2 u 12.4 "
1965 67.0 I
1966 69.2 It
1967 69.4 I
1968 69.4 •1
1969 70.2 »1
1970 71.2 I
1971 *87.4 I 13.4
1972 90.6 I
1973 93.2 It
1974 95.9 II
1975 100.6 I
1976 100.7 I 12.9
1977 101.2 I
1978 ' 100.7 M
1979 < 100. 1 M
1980 100.2 N 12.9
1981 96.9 I 11.6
1982 93.2 I 11.3
1983 86.6 I 11.4
1984 78.9 M 11.0
* The 1971 increase is mainly accounted for by the abolition of the 
Approved School Order and its replacement with the Care Order to the 
local authority under the terms of the Children and Young Persons 
Act, 1969.
Sources. Col. (1)
(i) Social Trends. (Published Annually) Nos. 6, 8, 10, 12,
13, 16. (1975-86) Central Statistical Office. London. HMSO.
(ii)Children Act 1980. Social Services for Children in 
England and Vales, 1982 - 1984. (1985) A Report by the 
Secretaries of State for Social Services and for Vales 
with respect to the exercise by local authorities of the 
function specified in Section 79(5) of the Child Care Act 
1980, the provision by voluntary organisations of 
facilities for children, and other matters relating to 
children. London. HMSO. 1985. (cont.)
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(iii)Health and Personal Social Services Statistics. (1973) 
London. DHSS 
Col. <2>
Social Trends.(Published Annually) Nos. 6, 6, 10,12,13,16. 
(1975-86) Central Statistical Office. London. HMSO.
Table 5.
Admissions to Care of Local Authorities by Type. Total.Number of. 
Discharges from Care and Total Numbers in Care at 31st March: England 
Only.(Thousands)
Year. Admission 
Sec.2 Child Care 
Act 1980 or 
previous equivalent: 
"Voluntary Care".
Admission 
C.&Y.P. Act 1969 
"Care Order".
Total
Discharge
Total No. 
s.Children 
In Care, 
at
31 March.
1972 41.9 9.2 48.7 86.5
1973 42. 0 8.9 49. 1 88.8
1974 40.3 9.6 48. 1 91.3
1975 37.7 10.8 45.6 94.2
1976 37.7 11.5 48.3 95.8
1977 29.4 10. 0 47.0 96.2
1978 26.5 9.2 45.2 95.8
1979 24.4 8.4 41.8 95.2
1980 25.4 8.7 44.3 95.3
1981 23,8 8. 0 44.5 92.3
1982 22.7 7.2 43.7 88.7
1983 20.9 6. 0 42.0 62.2
Sources. Personal Social Services Local Authority Statistics.
Children in Care of Local Authorities. A/F/76/12 (1976) 
and A/F/83/12. (1983). London. D.H.S.S..
Table 6.
Place of Safety Orders In Year to 31 March. England and Vales. 
(Thousands) Year.
_______________1£Z2__ 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981__1982__1983 1984
Children aged
under 15 yrs. 0.2 0.7 5.5 5.8 6.6 6.2 6.3 5.7 5.2
Sources: (i) Norris,T & Parton.N. (1987) "The Administration of Place 
of Safety Orders." in The Journal of Social Welfare Law. 
January, 1987. (Figures for 1972 and 1975.)
(ii) Children in Care of Local Authorities. Personal Social 
Services Statistics, DHSS. 1980 and 1981.
(iii) Children Act 1975. Second Report to Parliament. HMSO.
1984.
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Cnunupn t.a ry.
Constructing Official Statistics.
The use of statistics, official or otherwise, is a hazardous 
undertaking within a sociological thesis. A thorough if brief 
consideration of the subject by Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) is 
framed as a critique of R.K. Merton's assertions on the subject 
in his Social Theory and Social Structure (1957). The authors are 
considering the use of official statistics related to forms of 
deviance. Merton is taken to task for warning against the use of 
statistics, in this case because they are not organised with 
sociological research in mind, and because’for various reasons the 
statistics may well be unreliable. On the contrary, Kitsuse and 
Cicourel argue, official statistics are a reliable source of data. 
Merton's mistake was to seek data which could not possibly be 
found within official statistics. For sociologists to use data as 
presented is naive. Official statistics on crime accurately 
portray the official definition of crime. The sociologically 
interesting questions associated with this are not so concerned 
with the numbers of recorded offences, as what actions in what 
circumstances are officially defined as "crime", and what 
significance if any can be observed from variable rates of 
"crime". Thus, for Kitsuse and Cicourel, the aim of a sociological 
investigation of official statistics would be to reveal
information concerning the definers df the subjects of the 
statistics, rather than the subjects themselves.
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V. Yule (1971) also investigated aspects of statistics in a 
Critical Note concerning the the National Child Development Study 
report, "From Birth to Seven". His main contention was that in any 
use of statistics, allowance must always be made for error. As an 
example of error he noted a study with which he was associated, 
where experienced doctors mismeasured eight of 99 children by more 
than 5 cm.. "By now all researchers should realise that all 
measurement includes error." (ibid, p.329.).
Huxley (1986) reviewed the first fourteen volumes of the British 
Journal of Social Vork and identified thirty nine papers 
containing statistical error. He compared his finding with the 
results of a similar piece of research applied to the British 
Journal of Psychology. His Table 5 is reproduced below. The 
layman's suspicion of statistics summed up in the popular 
association between statistics and "damn lies" may be a harsh 
judgement on the competent statistician. Nevertheless, it would 
not be difficult to support a conclusion that statistical results, 
no more that the results in the natural sciences, should provide 
data for decision making in the social world only after placing 
them within the context of the social world and subjecting them to 
critical analysis.
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A Comparison of Articles in the BJSV and the BJP.
BJP BJSV
n a) n (%>
Total number of papers examined 168 348
Papers with numerical results 139 (83) 97 (28)
Papers also with statistical
analysis 103 (61) 59 (17)
Papers with statistical
analysis containing one or
more errors. 63 (61) 39 (66)
Containing serious errors
likely to affect one or more
conclusions.\ 47 (34) 19 (32)
Inadequate analysis. 10 (10) 4 (7)
Source: Table 5 in, P. Huxley (1986) "Statistical Errors
Papers in the British Journal of Social Work. (Volumes 1-14)", 
in The British Journal of Social Work, Vol. 16 So. 6. 12.1986. 
pp.645-658.
The statistics quoted in this study of the adoption of children 
are by way of illustration and have been kept to a minimum within 
the text. The theoretical and empirical points noted above were 
familiar and accepted "truths" at the outset of this project. In 
line with Kitsuse and Cicourel, Tables 1 to 6 relate to clearly 
social legal constructs of the state and it is not proposed that
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perusal of them reveals anything other than the incidence of 
official decisions. Adoption Orders no more account for all 
children living permanently with other nuclear families than their 
own, than do Place of Safety Orders number all instances of 
children being moved from their parents to safer situations. And 
it would come as no surprise to learn that some totals had been 
mis-calculated. The statistics are only being used to demonstrate 
trends and minor errors are of little significance.
Vhile it remains the case that the figures can be seen to
illustrate trends in official actions,, the error apparent is
noteworthy. Here error is revealed through contradiction between 
different government publications purporting to convey identical 
Information. Two glaring examples will be cited. Lesser examples
were so numerous that a conclusion must be that precise figures
»!are usually not available.
The first example of error relates to numbers of recorded Adoption 
Orders made in England and Vales in specific years. The Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys publishes through the Government 
Statistical Services, OPCS Monitor. The issue of 17 June 1986 
quoted in its Table 5 the number of Adoption Orders made in 
England and Vales for various years. The numbers quoted for the 
years 1979, 1980 and 1981 are 10,870, 10,609 and 9,284. The report 
of the Secretary of State to Parliament on the workings of the 
Child Care Act 1980 for the years 1979 to 1981 (Social Services 
for Children in England and Vales 1979 - 1981. London. HMSO.
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1982.) reported these figures as 11.7 thousand, 11.0 thousand and 
10.3 thousand respectively. The second example relates to numbers 
of children in the care of the local authorities. Social Trends, 
published annually by HMSO for the Government Statistical Service 
quoted figures for total numbers of children in care of local 
authorities in England and Vales for the years 1979 and 1980 as 
105.0 thousand and 105.1 thousand in its 1982 edition (Social 
Trends No 12.(1982) London. HMSO). The following year the figures 
for the years 1979 and 1980 were stated to be 100.1 and 100.2 with 
no note of amendment.
All six tables in this appendix are compilations of various 
tables. Sources are official ones Considerable efforts have been 
made to obtain accurate returns but all figures must be treated as 
approximate. Where contradictions of the magnitude noted above
i
came to light’, the most frequently quoted figure has been used. 
All tables relate to England and Vales except Table 5.Apparent 
accuracy took precedence over uniformity at this stage, with the 
availability of a run of internal DHSS tables providing the 
information.
Statistical Trends as Indicators.
While taking full account of the cautions issued by Kitsuse and 
Cicourel (see above), no doubt the trebling of the number of 
adoption orders made when comparing 1941 and 1946 was directly 
related to an increase in illegitimacy (see Table 1). Yet even 
this observation can be seen to be simplistic, in that an increase
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in illegitimacy in the late 1960s was not matched by a similar 
increase in adoption by strangers. The increase in the late 60s is 
to a considerable extent accounted for by natural parents adopting 
their own children rather than the ideal type situation common 
during and after the Second World War.
In direct contrast to the decline in both types of adoption over 
the last ten years, the most notable recent trend is the steady 
increase in numbers of children adopted from "care". When the 
trend apparent in Table 2 for figures since the mid seventies is 
viewed within the context of an otherwise recent dramatic decrease 
in numbers of children being adopted, it can be seen to illustrate 
a major contention of this study.
Table 3 can also be seen to be central to the proposition of an 
increasingly ' hard line being taken by the state towards the 
families of children "in care".
Table 4 makes the point that there is no direct correlation 
between the overall size of the population and numbers of children 
"in care". From Table 5 it can be seen that there is a 
considerable population moving in and out of "care". Though those 
subject to court orders (see also Table 6) are in the minority, if 
an increasing one, the large (and decreasing) majority are 
received into "care" short term. The decrease between 1980 and 
1983 of about 20% in numbers received into care is probably the
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most stark illustration of the modification being brought about 
recently in state social work.
When considering discernible trends within these tables, three 
factors have explanatory value. Firstly, there have been 
significant demographic changes to the population in recent years. 
The decrease in the birth rate at the end of the 1960s is largely 
responsible for the situation of a decreasing school age
population throughout the 1980s. This fact can certainly be seen 
to account for most of the recent school closures in England and 
Vales and the effect is mirrored in the decrease in "demand" for 
the residential facilities provided for children by social 
services departments. All services for this population will be 
more or less effected by this decline in population, albeit a
temporary decline. Secondly, specific social policy changes will
\
be reflected 1 in an altered social work practice. Thus the 
increased emphasis being put on "community care", resulting in 
increasing investment in services such as Intermediate Treatment, 
day care and day assessment at the expense of residential 
provision, will effect numbers "in care". A third factor effecting 
numbers "in care" is the altered image projected by the concept 
'local authority "care"'. If a service which was formerly 
regarded as more or less benign, is subject to forces which result 
in its coming to be regarded as increasingly authoritarian, the 
voluntary rate of application for the -use of that service is 
likely to alter. This, it has been argued throughout this thesis,
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is the case regarding local authority "care", particularly that 
under the terms of the Child Care Act 1980, section 2 .
An awareness of these factors will enable understanding of the 
statistical trends apparent within Tables 1 to 6 above.
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